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I n t r o d u c t i o n
E x p l a i n i n g  E l e c t o r a l  P a r t i c i p a t i o n
This book is not about weather forecasts, the impact of rain on the individual or the influence
of the greenhouse effect on worldwide precipitation patterns. Sincere apologies to all who
have read the title, yet not the subtitle. This book is about electoral participation, and how the
characteristics of an election may affect the individual voters decision to participate or not1. 
Electoral participation is a widely studied subject, so one might justifiably wonder what
this study aims to add to all thats been said before. This chapter outlines the added insight
into the understanding of electoral participation this research intends to offer.
1 .1 Who  Vo t e s ?
If voting is of concern, the obvious first question is: who votes in elections? Not everybody
votes: some vote at every election, while others never vote. And then there are those who vote
sometimes, but not always. Especially this latter, may-or-may-not-vote group will be of
special interest for this research. What may explain that people participate in one election, but
not another?
There is a substantial amount of literature that explains to us why people do vote. The
typical approach is to investigate participation in election Y, held in country Z by using
information on individual voters, typically collected in a large-scale survey at the time of the
election. The data are entered in an analytical model, and the best predictors for electoral
participation are revealed. A typical analysis may show that young people vote less frequently
than older people, while the higher educated show a high tendency to vote, compared to lower
educated. Frequent churchgoers tend to vote more often than the less religiously persuaded,
while politically interested voters show an unsurprisingly higher chance to participate than
those who indicate that they care less about politics. A similar pattern is often detected for
political efficacy. Union membership frequently proves a positive indicator for electoral
participation, while gender sometimes make a difference in the rate of participation as well.
Depending on information gathered through the election survey, even more predictors of
participation can be determined. Income, party identification, and even marital status, class
or social economic status are but a few. 
1 .2 Why  Vo t e ?
Why then do the higher educated vote more often than lower educated? Why does a frequent
act of religious worship instigate people to vote? Why would the frequent reading of a
1
1 Throughout this work, referring to the electorate as 'voters and non-voters' will become tedious and tiresome. Therefore,
the term 'voters' will be used throughout to refer to voters and non-voters alike. This means that with the term 'voter' a
prospective voter is meant; a member of the electorate, eligible to vote, who, come Election Day, may or may not turn
out to cast a vote. Where specifically 'voters' or 'non-voters' is meant, this will be made clear in the text.
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newspaper, or discussing the affairs of the day with others encourage someone to take the
trouble of voting on Election Day? To answer that, it is helpful to take the pros and cons of
voting into account. Voting can be more or less troublesome, and it can be more or less
attractive. The direct benefit of voting is obvious: taking part in determining the course of the
country. How large this benefit is depends on several factors, one of which is the perception
people have of the degree to which politics is actually able to steer the course of events in a
country, or the degree to which they believe politicians will take the average voters opinion
for granted. Such factors may limit the benefit of voting. Benefits of voting, sometimes less
obvious, can be thought of as well. If one is part of a community where electoral participated
is highly valued, participation in an election may offer a chance to identify with that
community. I vote, because I am part of and care for this community.
On the other hand, voting takes effort as well. The most obvious effort is perhaps the
time it takes to go out to the voting booth. That may be more to ask of someone who works
80 hours a week than of a part time employee, just as it may be more to ask of a remote farmer
than of a city dweller not two steps away from the polling station. And thats leaving rain or
shine still out of the equation. But other costs of voting exist as well. To make a choice for a
party or candidate, information on the vote options is required. That information may be
collected through a thorough examination of newspapers, election broadcasts and party
manifestos. But shortcuts may also be taken. If a trusted source, which could be anyone
ranging from a life partner to the vicar or the union leader, says Party X is the best option,
reaching a decision becomes a far less strenuous affair. 
Milbrath and Goel use the terms facilitative and motivational to distinguish between
individual characteristics that facilitate or motivate people to participate in an election
(Milbrath & Goel, 1979). Facilitative factors influence the amount of effort that a voter has
to overcome to partake in the election. Examples can be cognitive skills, or access to
information regarding the elections. Education can thus function as a facilitative factor, as can
religion or union membership, when respected leaders give cues for best possible vote
options.
Motivational factors influence the amount of effort a voter is willing to overcome to
participate in an election. One potential positive motivational factor is group membership.
Some social groups perceive voting as a civic duty, and will place a positive incentive on
electoral participation, or, adversely, condemn electoral abstention. Examples of such groups
are certain religious denominations, socio-political associations such as political parties or
labor unions or the higher educated. For members of these groups voting may be a way to
express that they belong to the group. As Durkheim (1897) argued, people will abide to social
norms, depending on their level of integration into social groups. Conversely, a strong belief
that politicians will do as they please irrespective of electoral outcomes certainly lowers the
benefits of voting, and diminishes a persons inclination to participate. Political cynicism and
efficacy are thus characteristics that affect an individuals motivation to vote.
Facilitative factors thus raise or lower the barriers to voting, while motivation factors
influence the willingness of a voter to overcome those barriers. Although the notion of
facilitative and motivational factors may be useful to understand how certain individual
characteristics work to influence the likelihood to vote, the system is not perfect. There are
characteristics that contain both facilitative and motivational aspects. Education, to give an
example, helps lowering information costs by making political news and information easier
2
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to process (facilitative) while it may also work to ingrain civic norms that value electoral
participation, making voting per se an appreciated act (motivational). Being less than perfect,
the notion of facilitative and motivational factors still provides a useful insight in the logic of
voting. 
1 .3 A  S t ab l e  Vo t e ?
Let us return to the stereotypical analysis of voting presented above. It was aimed at
explaining electoral participation in election Y in country Z. What now, if time passes, and
another election presents itself? Well, again typically speaking, another analysis is performed,
predicting electoral participation in what now has become election Y+1. Again individual
electoral participation is predicted on the basis of information gathered around election time.
Roughly the same kind of information is entered into the model, and in virtually all cases,
outcomes remarkably similar to those achieved for the previous analysis are obtained. Age
again shows a positive relationship with voting, as do education and religiosity, while the
politically cynical voters still tend to participate in fewer numbers.
Such a similar outcome is of course quite a relief. The explanation regarding facilitative
and motivational factors influencing voters, the barriers and incentives to voting, would lose
its value if analyses proved that the relationship between individual characteristics and the
chance to vote fluctuated considerably between elections. And the loss of this explanatory
scheme put aside, more seriously would be our concern if for instance the higher educated
voters voted in large numbers in one election, while abstaining in another, without the real
world having been turned on its head as well. At best, that would be a suggestion that we have
not captured the relation between education and electoral participation very well.
Apparently then, we have nailed down the factors that determine electoral participation
with analyses replicated over time and space. They are found to work in single analyses, and
they work in largely the same way in follow-up analyses. Moreover, the reader can rest
assured: these factors have been shown to work in virtually similar ways in a very
comprehensive range of analyses of electoral behavior. Does that mean we know now what
determines electoral participation? Well not quite, as Figure 1-1 will make clear. 
Figure 1-1 Turnout Rates - Sweden, the Netherlands and Great Britain, 
Parliamentary Elections 1970-2000
Sweden The Netherlands Great Britain
Figure 1-1 shows turnout rates for parliamentary elections in three European countries:
Sweden, the Netherlands and Great Britain. These countries are selected here for illustrative
purposes: they are not extreme cases of the democratic universe. It is a revealing picture
indeed: it shows that turnout figures do vary substantially between elections. Since it was
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established above that the influence of individual characteristics on electoral participation is
very stable over elections, the variation in turnout figures cannot be attributed to variation in
the influence of personal characteristics. Alternative explanations are therefore required.
If the nature of the relationship between individual characteristics and electoral
participation - the strength and the direction of the effect, in technical terms - does not vary,
the outcome of the equation, namely turnout rates, can only vary if the individual
characteristics vary. This means that either the composition of the electorate changes
substantially, or the individual characteristics vary substantially within persons. Of course,
there is also the possibility of omitted variables: we may simply have not found the complete
answer to the question of electoral participation. For characteristics at the individual level,
however, research into electoral participation has evolved well enough to preclude this option.
To explain the pattern reflected in Figure 1-1 on the basis of compositional changes
alone, is rather difficult. If, as we have just seen, the relationship between determinants of
electoral participation does not change over time, then variation in turnout would have to be
explained by variation in, e.g., the educational composition of the electorate. The number of
highly educated voters should increase in elections where turnout is high, while these higher
educated should vanish again in elections that show lower turnout. In other words, to explain
variation in turnout rates through individual characteristics requires the sum of these
characteristics to change accordingly, since their relationship with electoral participation
remains stable. In view of the fact that some of the largest fluctuations in turnout appear
between elections that follow each other rather quickly (cf. the Netherlands, for the elections
in 1981 and 1982, or Great Britain, for the two elections held in 1974), these changes would
have to be quite dramatic at times. We would therefore have to conclude that either personal
characteristics (an individuals level of education) or the composition of the electorate as a
whole (the number of higher and lower educated people in a country) are expected to be
markedly volatile. 
In principle this volatility may occur for some variables. For others this is very unlikely.
The degree of political interest or efficacy, the level of education or religiosity of a person
can of course change over time, but it is difficult to imagine how someone may go down in
level of education over time. Variation in the electorate through entry of new, young voters
and exit of older generations - cohort replacement - or possibly immigration may shift the
balance between voters and non-voters. But such compositional changes do not occur as
frequently and as quickly as the fluctuations in turnout figures would require (cf. van der Eijk
& Niemöller, 1983, p72-76). An influx of higher educated youngsters might hypothetically
serve as explanation for the high turnout figures in the first election held in 1974 in Britain,
but that explanation is thwarted if the second election in 1974 is taken into account where we
see turnout go down again considerably. Surely all those hypothetical highly educated new
voters could not have vanished within less than a year. The electoral composition argument
therefore does not suffice in explaining the turnout variations of Figure 1-1.
Could personal characteristics vary sufficiently to explain the turnout variations of
Figure 1-1? Could, over the space of 5 years, levels of political interest in the Netherlands
have gone up, down and up again for individual voters to explain the marked drop and
recovery in turnout rates during the elections of 1981, 1982 and 1986? In theory, yes. Political
interest is a characteristic that may vary over time, far more so than, e.g., education, which
typically increases during ones youth, after which it remains stable. It is not inconceivable
4
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that a persons political interest increases and decreases over time. But it is unlikely that
whole segments of the Dutch electorate went on a synchronized political interest roller-
coaster ride in 1981, 1982 and 1986, to produce the dip and recovery in turnout rates observed
for these elections, unless they were affected by an outside influence. Individual variations in
personal characteristics are not at all inconceivable, but they are likely to be randomly
dispersed between individuals, and thus cancel each other out at the aggregate level. To
produce variations in turnout at the aggregate level, such individual variations would have to
occur in unison for (segments of) the electorate. The explanation for the picture presented in
Figure 1-1 then becomes the following. People tend to be rather stable in most of their
personal characteristics and behavior, and if they do change, this is likely to be cancelled out
by another voter changing in another direction. But the surroundings voters find themselves
in change as well, sometimes slowly, sometimes rather abruptly and significantly. These
contextual changes can affect the behavior of large segments of voters, which explains the
variations in aggregate turnout shown in Figure 1-1.
Variations in the circumstances of the election, which may be called context factors or
the contextual characteristics of the election, hold the key to explaining the variation in
turnout between elections, determining which election will see a high turnout, and which a
low turnout. The argument is made easier if Figure 1-2 is inspected, below. Figure 1-2 may
illuminate why the step of turning to context characteristics to explain variations in turnout
levels is so much easier made when comparing countries.
Figure 1-2 Turnout - Sweden, the Netherlands and Great Britain Compared, 
Parliamentary Elections between 1970 and 2000.
From Figure 1-2, it is evident that turnout rates show considerable variation between
countries as well as within. Although the elections held in these three countries over the
period 1970-2000 show considerable variation in turnout rates, at the same time there is little
overlap in the bandwidth of this variation between the countries. Comparing turnout over the
decades depicted in Figure 1-2, Swedish turnout rates are consistently higher than Dutch
ones, while these in turn are consistently higher than the British.
It is tempting to argue again that the differences in turnout rates between these three
countries are to be attributed to differences in the composition of the electorate. But
although each of these countries is unique in itself, they do not differ enough to explain
the marked differences in individual characteristics that would be required to create such
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different turnout levels between countries. Britain is not a country filled with uneducated
politically disinterested non-voters, nor is Sweden made up of politically aware, socially
integrated and extremely high-educated voters. With regard to the point that aggregate
levels of political interest or efficacy do indeed vary between these countries, this is
more likely to be the result of other, contextual, characteristics, than an inherent trait of
the Anglo-Saxons or the Nordic people. Should the Swedish social and political
landscape come close to reflecting the British one, Swedens high turnout rates will
become a thing of the past. It is in other words the context of the election, determined by
political, systemic and societal characteristics, that matters. The electoral system, the
time between elections, the number of political parties, the day elections are being held,
the number and size of constituencies, single party or coalition governments and a whole
host of other characteristics of a society, political and non-political, have been shown to
influence the willingness of voters to partake in elections. Some of these characteristics
are very stable. The electoral system, or the day elections being held are typically matters
that vary between countries, but remain unchanged for long periods within a country.
This explains the consistency in the difference in turnout rates between Sweden, the
Netherlands and Great Britain. Other factors, such as the closeness of an election race,
or the time between two elections, show much more short-term variation. These more
variable contextual characteristics can help to explain variation in turnout that is much
less structural, such as for instance the difference in turnout between the two elections
held in 1974 in Great Britain, or 1981 and 1982 in the Netherlands. These latter, more
variable contextual characteristics may help us understand why turnout is high in one
election, while lower in another, even though the country need not have changed
fundamentally. Such contextual characteristics can offer us explanations that work within
a political system, as well as between political systems, and these will form the focus of
this research. 
From the discussion of Figure 1-1 and Figure 1-2 it already becomes evident that it only
makes sense to talk about contextual influences when making comparisons over time or
space. Only if we look at the rate of turnout for several elections, or differences in turnout
between countries, can we include contextual factors into the equation. A model that focuses
on the influence of individual characteristics in a single election is unable to capture the
influence of the political context, since that context will be a constant for all voters in that
election. But it would be a mistake to assume that, since it is a constant, the context of the
election is without influence on individual voters.
Why then is research on electoral participation not focused on context effects solely?
Well, for one reason of course, that would be to ignore the individual voter completely. Which
is odd, to say the least, as in the end the rate of turnout is determined by voters, not by the
constitutional make-up of the country, or the political landscape as it was at the moment of
the election. Aggregate turnout figures are the sum of individual actions, they are not
independent of individual voters. Eventually, any change at the system level will therefore
have to be explained by bringing in the individuals that do or do not vote. Analyses at the
level of the political system may present us with plausible suggestions on the causes of a rise
or fall in electoral participation, but, as will be shown in the subsequent chapters, only at the
individual level can hypotheses be tested. Macro analysis can never be a substitute for micro
analysis.
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1 .4 P l a c i ng  the  I nd i v i dua l  w i t h i n  t he  Con tex t
Combining information from both levels of analysis, placing the individual voter within the
context of the election, is a natural step forward in explaining electoral behavior. It permits
testing hypotheses on the influence of individual and context level characteristics on electoral
participation. It creates an analytical model that does not treat individuals isolated from the
context they live in, and treats the electoral context as influential, without neglecting the fact
that voters in the end make the decision to participate or not. Most importantly, it enables an
explanation for fluctuations in turnout, without making excessive assumptions about
individual characteristics or the composition if the electorate. Combining information on
individuals and context leads to a better and more informative model of electoral
participation. A model that allows the explanation of individual behavior, as well as variation
in turnout found at the aggregate level. This is therefore exactly what will be undertaken in
Chapter 2.
In line with recent researchers who have taken the same step (to be discussed in
Chapter 3), Chapter 2 will be a first exploration of the practical possibilities of
combining individual and contextual level information into a single model. Chapter 2
presents an analysis of electoral participation in the Netherlands. This choice of country
is arbitrary; any other democratic system would do as well, as long as empirical data is
available. It is therefore not the explanation of electoral participation in the Netherlands
per se that is of interest. It is the explanation of the electoral participation of voters in a
political system, utilizing information on those individuals and the political system they
find themselves in.
Chapter 2 presents an analysis of electoral participation in parliamentary elections in the
Netherlands in the period 1970 to 2000. In these three decades, nine elections were held in
the Netherlands, all of which have data available for analysis. This enables investigating the
influence on participation of individual effects in combination with contextual effects. A full
model, presenting all the usual suspects in explaining electoral participation is presented, to
which a number of contextual characteristics are added. 
The contextual characteristics included in the model in Chapter 2 aim to measure the
awareness of the election among the electorate, the perceived relevance of the election and
the link between the social cleavages in the country and the political system. Factors
influencing the awareness of the election are facilitative in nature, by influencing the ease
with which information is made available to the electorate. In Chapter 2, these facilitative
factors will be explored through the use of contextual characteristics that influence the
medias attention to the election. Factors affecting the relevance of the election are
motivational, as they influence the benefits to be reaped from participating. In Chapter 2,
these are indicated by characteristics influencing the clarity of the political consequences of
an election. Likewise, the time between elections is seen as an indicator of perceived
relevance, as quickly ensuing elections may undermine voter motivation. The closeness of the
election race may have a motivational function as well, by giving voters the impression that
their vote might just swing the balance. Lastly, a strong link between social cleavages and the
political party landscape may motivate people to participate as a way to express they belong,
as well as facilitate them by lowering information costs involved in seeking out a viable party
to vote for. If the church or the union recommends a party, why invest extra time in seeking
out other options?
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The choice of contextual characteristics in Chapter 2 is in line with the exploratory
nature of this chapter. The findings will be used as a starting point for further theorizing in
the subsequent chapters. The differential influence of contextual factors on individual voters
is explored through the use of cross-level interactions. 
The conclusions that can be drawn from the analyses of Chapter 2 are twofold. Firstly,
and importantly, adding contextual information to a model explaining individual behavior
improves the predictive power of the model substantially. This is illustrated in Chapter 2 by
comparing actual turnout rates in Dutch elections with predictions that are derived of models
with and without contextual information. The models including contextual information
consistently outperform models without such information, the difference being considerable.
The second conclusion to be drawn from the model in Chapter 2, is that the model does
not conceptualize the influence of context on the individual voter. Although the inclusion of
contextual information leads to a better predictive model of individual behavior, the implicit
assumption is that contextual characteristics are equally influential to all voters, regardless of
individual characteristics. This assumption is theoretically not very plausible, for various
reasons. First, context effects cannot influence voters who are already certain of voting on the
basis of their individual characteristics. And other voters may simply never vote, regardless
of any contextual influences. The influence of contextual factors will thus depend on
individual characteristics, and may be different for different voters. Much like rain will fall
down on all of us, yet somehow some get more wet than others. Some may carry an umbrella,
while some may stay inside. And some may be caught out in the rain and get thoroughly
soaked. 
1 .5 Ind i v i dua l i z i ng  Con tex t
Already in Chapter 2, a first attempt is made to tailor the influence of the context to the
individual. This is done by introducing interaction effects between some contextual and
individual characteristics. As virtually no theory on these interactions is available, however,
the theoretical logic of doing so is a matter that should be addressed first.
Chapter 3 gives an overview of how electoral participation may be explained at the
individual and the aggregate level. With the aid of a graphical representation of the
explanatory model, it is shown how both the aggregate level model as well as the individual
level model virtually ignore the other. Chapter 3 also shows how this can be amended, and
how the two levels of information can be used to explain individual and also aggregate level
electoral participation. It is shown how a simplistic form of adding contextual information
inherently implies that context effects are assumed to be equal to everyone. An untenable
assumption, as argued above. Therefore, Chapter 3 suggests an alternative model, in which it
is made explicit that the influence of the context is dependent on individual characteristics. It
is argued that such a depiction of the model forces the researcher to specify explicitly what
the expected influence of the context on different kinds of voters is. 
If contextual influences are not expected to affect the whole of the electorate in a
singular way, it becomes necessary to hypothesize how these effects are expected to vary. The
theoretical justification for the inclusion of a variable in an explanatory model - so natural at
the individual level - is often neglected when contextual level characteristics are concerned.
In Chapter 3 the risks of such a lazy way of theoretical modeling are elaborated. For
different contextual characteristics, differential effects are theorized. One of these, of
8
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particular importance for subsequent chapters, is the "closeness" of the election, a factor that
can play a facilitative as well as a motivational role.
Next to theoretical issues, Chapter 3 also addresses more practical issues. Not stopping
at theory alone, Chapter 3 also investigates which of the various contextual factors discussed
stands the best chance of generating differential effects in actual empirical analysis. It is
argued that the closeness of an election is the most promising, and theoretically interesting.
Chapter 3 subsequently examines more comprehensively on a theoretical level why it is that
some voters are, while other voters arent likely to be affected by the closeness of the election
race. Voters party preferences are of pivotal importance for the degree to which a voter is
likely to be affected by the closeness of the election. Chapter 3 argues that three categories
of voters are to be distinguished. These three categories will be identified as Convinced,
Confounded and Condemned voters. Convinced voters - who support only one of the parties
in the lead, while strongly rejecting the other - will strongly react to the degree of closeness
of an election, while Condemned voters - who do not support any of the parties in the lead -
are expected to be hardly affected. Confounded voters - who support both of the leading
parties - may prove rather unpredictable in their response to the closeness of the election.
Subsequent chapters will therefore focus on the differential effect of this contextual factor on
electoral participation.
1 .6 Mak ing  C lo s e  Ca l l s
If we know then from Chapter 3 who may be influenced by closeness, the next step is then
taken in Chapter 4: when might closeness be influential? In other words, in what kind of
elections can we expect closeness to be of influence? Obviously, in two-party elections the
race between these two parties is expected to be of influence. But in a more general way, we
may hypothesize that closeness can be influential in other systems comprising more parties
as well. Chapter 4 argues that closeness can indeed be of influence in a variety of party
systems. Chapter 4 examines how the concept of closeness can be operationalized in various
political systems, and shows that the common interpretation of closeness as pertaining only
to two-party systems is needlessly restrictive. 
Chapter 4 is consciously staying at the surface, it analyses closeness at the aggregate
level of turnout. This allows a quick scan of a variety of systems and preliminary conclusions
from where to embark on more detailed analyses at the individual level. Chapter 5 and Chapter
6 are dedicated to such in-depth analyses. The impact of closeness on individual voters will be
examined for Great Britain and Sweden, respectively. Here again the value of the quick scan
in Chapter 4 is made clear, as it was shown that these are two countries that prove susceptible
to closeness, at least at the aggregate level. The question to be answered in the two chapters
following Chapter 4 is therefore whether the hypothesized individual-level differences in the
effect of the contextual factors do indeed occur, and what magnitude they have. 
Great Britain is an interesting case where the influence of the closeness of an election
is concerned for more than one reason. First and foremost of course, it is a first-past-the-
post system dominated by two parties, where the closeness of the race between these two
main parties is a frequent theme in the election campaign, used by both the parties to mobilize
voters. Nevertheless, the two main parties are not the only actors on the political stage, and
they are not even the leading actors on some of the election stages: i.e., within the different
constituencies. Although elections are a national affair, in the end the influence of each
9
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individual voter is limited to the local constituency. As a consequence of this, the shape of the
political battle that a voter is confronted with in his or her local constituency may differ
substantially from what is going on at the national stage. 
Chapter 5 examines the electoral participation of individual voters in parliamentary
elections in Great Britain between 1970 and 2000. This analysis uses information relating to
both the national as well as to the local (constituency) level race. Thus, analysis will examine
whether voters are influenced more by the closeness of the race in their own constituency, or
the closeness between the two major parties at the national level. As it turns out, the findings
of Chapter 5 suggest that voters focus more on the national level than on the race in their own
constituency, even though the British electoral system provides voters only direct influence
on the local level.
In Sweden, the constituency level is not as significant as it is in Great Britain. More
importantly, Sweden has a multi-party system, and proportional representation elections.
Some analysts describe the Swedish system as a one-plus party system because of the
dominance of the Social Democratic Labor Party (SAP). Chapter 6 shows, however, that
Swedens multi-party system can be defined as a two-bloc system, pitching the social
democratic bloc against the bourgeois bloc. Swedish elections focus frequently on the
question which of these two blocs will gain government power, although perhaps a more
accurate phrasing for most of the second half of the twentieth century is "whether the SAP
will retain government power". As was shown in the aggregate analysis of Chapter 4, the
result is that the closeness between these two blocs is a factor of considerable influence in
Sweden. Chapter 6 demonstrates that this can also be shown at the individual level, by using
Swedish election studies for the period 1979-2000.
Chapter 6 shows a notable additional finding: the effect of closeness is of equal
magnitude for the whole of the Swedish electorate. This seems at odds with the hypotheses
from Chapter 3, which argue that closeness will only affect voters for whom the closeness of
the election matters. Section 6.6 of Chapter 6 points at some important data limitations that
could explain the absence of individual variation in the influence of closeness. However, even
from a theoretical point of view it is not unfeasible that we find closeness equally affects all
voters in Sweden. The absence of individual variation in the influence of closeness may well
be due to the fact that the two party-blocs comprise the whole of the Swedish political
spectrum. As a result of this, closeness affects the whole of the Swedish electorate in virtually
the same way. Indeed, if it rains in Sweden, everyone appears to get wet.
This study argues that contextual factors cannot be ignored when explaining individual
behavior. At the same time however, it also argues that this influence should be modeled at
the individual level - and not only at the aggregate level - as the strength of context effects is
dependent on individual characteristics. For some, the context may be irrelevant, namely for
voters who will turn out in every election held in the country, irrespective of political or
economic conditions. These dependable voters may well be called habitual voters. Equally
irrelevant is the context for a - typically much smaller - segment of the electorate that will
never vote in any election. Reasons for such complete lack of electoral participation might
include complete detachment from society (e.g., the homeless people, the mentally impaired
and so forth), radical opposition to the political system or simply a complete lack of interest.
These characteristics will ensure complete electoral abstention, typically unaltered as long as
personal characteristics also remain unchanged.
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That leaves the middle ground to the occasional voter, where there is room to maneuver.
This is where voters typically are inclined to participate, but no guarantees are given.
Occasional voters may participate in virtually every parliamentary election, but local
elections may at times be given a miss. Or they may express a genuine intention to vote, but
in the end find themselves missing out on Election Day for some reason or other. The
occasional electorate determines the ebb and flow of the turnout tide. We demonstrate for one
contextual factor, electoral closeness, how the occasional electorate is affected by it, and
under which circumstances this aspect of the electoral closeness makes them vote, or abstain.
11
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E l e c t o r a l  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e
N e t h e r l a n d s :  I n d i v i d u a l  a n d  C o n t e x t u a l
I n f l u e n c e s
2 .1 In t r oduc t i on
As discussed in Chapter 1, this research examines the interplay between contextual and
individual level characteristics on the individual voters decision to participate in an election.
The current chapter takes the first step in this undertaking, and investigates the possible
benefits of adding contextual information to a model aimed at explaining individual behavior.
It will be shown that adding contextual information to a model containing individual level
information increases the predictive quality of a model considerably. In addition, it will be
argued that the approach taken in this chapter is insightful as an initial exploration of context
effects, but nevertheless ultimately insufficient in showing the true influence of contextual
effects on individual voters.
In this chapter, an empirical analysis will be presented based on individual level data
collected for parliamentary elections in the Netherlands. The case of the Netherlands is
presented as an example; there is no reason to expect the Dutch political system to be a
special case where contextual characteristics have a particularly large or small influence on
the electorate. It is simply a country where sufficient comparable individual level data is
available. Through the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES), individual level data
for nine parliamentary elections is available to us for the period of 1971-1998. Contextual
level data, describing the characteristics of the parliamentary elections is sufficiently
available, so that the analyses will examine electoral participation in the Netherlands for the
last three decades of the twentieth century.
The electoral system in the Netherlands is a proportional representation system, with the
electoral quotient as the only threshold. This implies that the effective electoral threshold is
a relatively low 0.66 percent of the vote as the total number of seats in the Lower House is
150. Although not formally, with regards to the division of seats the Netherlands is effectively
a single constituency system, which ensures that the theoretical electoral threshold of 0.66
percent is close to the actual effective threshold. As a consequence, the Dutch system is a
multi-party system where typically between 8 and 15 parties are represented in parliament.
Since the 1970s, however, the period studied in this chapter, three to four parties tend to
dominate the party landscape and are commonly referred to as the large parties. These are
the liberal (right-wing) VVD, the Christian-democratic (center) CDA and the labor (left-
wing) PvdA. The fourth member of this set is the (left-liberal) D66, which is often placed
ideologically between the CDA and PvdA, although its unstable electoral appeal has made its
membership of the big parties set unwarranted at times. As a consequence of the Dutch
electoral system and its multi-party landscape, coalition government is unavoidable in the
Netherlands. No single party stands a chance of winning a parliamentary majority and the
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coalition negotiations are an unavoidable consequence of any election, as pre-election
coalition agreements are rare.
Table 2-1 The Netherlands - Turnout Figures for Parliamentary Elections, 1971-1998 (percentages)
Table 2-1 presents the turnout rates for national elections in the Netherlands from 1971
until 1998. It shows us that turnout in the Netherlands on average varies somewhere around
the 82 percent mark - a relatively high figure compared to other western democratic systems
(cf. Franklin, 2002). However, we also see that considerable between-election variation in
turnout exists, with a high of 88 percent and a low of 73 percent. As argued in Section 1.3 of
Chapter 1, it is not likely that these turnout fluctuations can be explained at the individual
level. Individual characteristics such as education or political interest can vary between
elections, but variation to such a degree that turnout levels will be affected is unlikely to occur
unless affected by an outside influence. The variation in turnout levels of Table 2-1 suggests
that contextual factors - outside influences - are at work, affecting the level of electoral
participation in the Netherlands. The aim of this chapter will be to identify these contextual
factors, and determine their influence on individual voters.
2.1.1 Exp la in ing Dutch E lec tora l  Par t i c ipat ion
To assess the influence of individual and contextual characteristics on electoral participation
in the Netherlands empirically, we will analyze the behavior of voters in parliamentary
elections the last three decades of the twentieth century, as described in Table 2-1. We will
start with a brief overview of the factors that have proved to be of importance in explaining
electoral participation in the Netherlands.
The notions of facilitative and motivational factors influencing electoral participation
have already been introduced in Chapter 1 (Cf. Milbrath & Goel, 1979; see also Verba &
Nie 1972; Oppenhuis 1995). Individual characteristics as well as contextual characteristics
can influence the ease with which a voter may cast the ballot, in other words facilitate the
act of voting. Individual and contextual characteristics can also influence a voters incentive
to participate, and thus affect the motivation - both positively and negatively - to go out and
vote. As will become apparent below, while the facilitative or motivational effect of factors
may be clearly distinguished theoretically, in actual empirical research many variables have
both a facilitative as well as a motivational effect. Although this may appear confusing at
first, it need not be an obstacle to the analysis. Rather, the various effects of variables may
help the reader to recognize that the simple act of voting is in the end not so simply
explained. 
The selection of explanatory variables to be introduced at the individual level has been
guided by previous research into electoral participation in general, and the Netherlands in
particular. Existing research on non-voting in national elections in the Netherlands can be
found in Schmidt (1981, 1983) Jaarsma et al. (1986), Castenmiller & Dekker (1987),
Schram (1989) Leijenaar (1989), Van der Eijk & Oppenhuis (1990), Smeenk, De Graaf &
Ultee (1995), De Graaf (1996), Aarts (1998) Castenmiller (2002) and Dekker (2002).
Year of election 1971 1972 1977 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 
Turnout 79.1 83.5 88.0 87.0 81.0 85.8 80.3 78.7 73.0 
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Although the analytical methods and aims differ, a number of comparable results are found.
These indicate that the chance of voting increases with age and religiosity, as well as with
income, education and class. Less consistent in their influence are the gender and occupation
variables, the influence of which is often found to be dependent on the other characteristics
controlled for. Next to these socio-demographic characteristics, political interest and
involvement have a strong positive influence on turnout.
Contextual effects have not been widely used in research on national elections in the
Netherlands2. Jaarsma et al. (1986), Schram (1989) and De Graaf (1996) use dummy
indicators to identify the separate election years in an aggregate analysis. This approach
allows election-related variance to be detected. However, the source of this variation cannot
be clarified: dummy indicators do not identify what may explain the variance detected. By
introducing theoretically interpretable contextual variables, improvement over the nominal
level information (and, indeed, proper name characteristic) of year-dummies is made. This
is in line with Przeworski and Teune (1970), who propose using theoretical constructs, rather
than nominal labels in comparative social research.
Whether, and if so how, individual and contextual influences interact is a matter that
will be investigated in this chapter. Individual voters, with all of their individual
characteristics, live and vote within the context of their political system. In the absence of
any relation between contextual and individual characteristics, the estimates of the effects of
contextual characteristics will be constant for all voters. However, as argued already, this is
not expected to be the case. To determine whether the impact of a contextual characteristic
varies between groups of voters, interaction terms between context and individual
characteristics will therefore be introduced into the model. If these interactions prove
statistically significant, they indicate that the influence of contextual characteristics varies
across individuals.
2 .2 A  Mode l  I n co rpo r a t i ng  I nd i v i dua l  and  Con tex tua l
Cha r a c t e r i s t i c s
An empirical model examining the influence of individual and contextual influences
simultaneously requires data on the behavior of individual voters under different
circumstances. To this end, DPES surveys held in concurrence with parliamentary elections
in the Netherlands from 1971 to 1998 were combined, yielding a coded dataset that
contains information on a large number of individuals under varying contextual
circumstances3. Such a combination of surveys allows us to assess the influence of
contextual characteristics on different groups of individuals, and to determine whether a
certain factor exerts equal influence for all voters or whether it is especially strong for
some, while less consequential for others.
2.2.1 Contextua l  Characte r i s t i c s  
The characteristics of the context that will be entered into the analytical model will refer to
three theoretical notions. First, it is expected that a voter is more likely to participate if their
15
2 Indeed, even in a recent study on explanations of an alleged trend of ever lower turnout rates in the Netherlands, Dekker
et al. (2002) state explicitly that their research will not focus on contextual (systemic) characteristics.
3 See the Appendix for documentation on the datasets used.
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awareness of the election increases. To vote, a voter needs to be aware that an election will
take place. The amount of information available concerning the election is expected to affect
electoral participation. Contextual factors that affect the amount of information available
through, for example, media coverage of the election, are therefore expected to affect the
voters awareness of the election, and hence electoral participation. 
Second, it is expected that voters are more likely to participate if the outcome of the
election is more consequential, in other words, if more is at stake. If the outcome of the
election will be a long and confusing series of coalition negotiations this is less likely to
induce electoral participation than clear government alternatives, in which the voters decides
between one or the other. 
Thirdly, voters are expected to participate in greater numbers if the likeliness to affect
the outcome of the election increases. A close election race, in which each vote could make
the difference, is more likely to make voters participate than an election race that is a
foregone conclusion. 
A large number of factors can influence the awareness or the consequences of an
election, some structural and some more election-specific. Selecting suitable variables for
empirical analysis is therefore a difficult task, and idiosyncrasy should be avoided. Structural
influences typically are systemic characteristics. As these change only infrequently, they are
mainly constants in an over-time comparison, and hence better studied in a country-
comparative model. Election-specific influences can be studied in the design proposed here,
but these influences are difficult to capture in indicators that can sensibly be used in each of
a series of elections. All sorts of affairs, ranging from political scandals to economic fiascos
and human or ecological catastrophes - as well as achievements - may have their influence
on an ensuing election. Finding a way to make such events comparable is problem ridden.
Based on the two theoretical notions set out above, a total of four contextual indicators
was selected4. These indicators refer to the salience and frequency of elections, the clarity of
the choice options offered in the election and the closeness of the election race. The expected
influence of each of these indictors will be discussed here. As will become apparent, a
contextual indicator can influence voters in more than one way, both facilitative as well as
motivational, and by increasing the awareness of the election as well as the consequences of
the election outcome.
Government Collapse
One election-specific characteristic that may be of consequence can be introduced into the
analytical model through hindsight: whether or not the government coalition fell before the
election. In the Netherlands, a fall of the coalition typically - though not necessarily - leads
to early elections; for the period under study here a fall of the government always lead to
early elections5. In any case however, high media attention will be the result of the fall of the
government. This makes government collapse a facilitative factor, as it reduces information
costs for the electorate in the upcoming election. In addition to this, coalition break-ups tend
16
4 The limited number of elections - i.e., contexts - available for study puts restrictions on the statistical model (see below).
The number of variables indicating contextual characteristics was therefore kept to a minimum.
5 An overview of elections that saw a government collapse, as well as the other contextual characteristics is presented in
Table 2 2.
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to increase between-party rivalries, clarifying choice options - at least for the short term.
Elections following the breakdown of a coalition are thus expected to see an increased
awareness - and consequently turnout.
The fall of the coalition can also function as a motivational factor, since more will be at
stake in the election. As a reconstruction of the old coalition is unlikely, the coming election
will most likely produce a change in government direction, often coinciding with a change in
leadership for some of the parties involved as well. These factors ensure that a fall of the
coalition increases the consequences of the election, and motivates voters to turn out.
Time Since Previous Election
The time since the previous election, the second contextual variable introduced in the
analytical model, may affect voters in two ways. One is facilitative, by affecting parties
ability to make voters aware of the election through campaigning. The second is motivational,
through election fatigue.
The awareness of the election can be influenced by campaign efforts of political parties.
Although parties first aim in electoral campaigning is to increase their support, the awareness
of the election among the electorate will automatically increase in the process. In the
Netherlands, parties receive subsidies based on their share in representative bodies, but no
direct campaign funding is made available by the state. A number of elections held shortly
after another may exhaust parties campaign funds and consequently restrict campaign
intensity, and thus also parties ability to increase the awareness of the election among the
electorate (see also Franklin, van der Eijk & Oppenhuis 1996, p. 313).
Parliamentary elections at short intervals may also create some sort of election fatigue,
decreasing the motivation of voters to participate (cf. Franklin, 2002). Voters may get the
impression their vote is less important, as their vote in a recent previous election was
evidently not sufficient to solve matters. Frequent elections, or rather a short period between
two elections, may have a negative effect on the consequences of the elections as perceived
by voters, and consequently a voters willingness to participate.
Coalition Seeks Re-election 
The consequences of the election will be influenced by the choice options a voter is confronted
with. As the Netherlands is a multi-party system, the number of choice options - political
parties - is large. However, as no party ever comes near to a majority, party choice options do
not easily translate into government choice options. Coalition negotiations take place only
after the result of an election is known, and are thus largely beyond the influence of the voter.
Both the electoral system and political mores in the Netherlands prevent a change in this,
except for the few occasions when major parties explicitly announce a coalition preference
before the election. This may occur when an incumbent coalition expresses the intention to
stay together after the election if an electoral majority can be obtained.
A coalition seeking re-election helps voters, by offering voters a clear choice of
government, not only of party in the election. Such a situation is expected to facilitate voters
in choosing for or against the incumbent coalition, and thus have a positive influence on
turnout. In addition, a coalition seeking re-election may have a motivational influence,
stimulating government supporters to keep their favored coalition in power, while voters for
the opposition may be induced to prevent this.
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Closeness of the Election 
The closeness of the election race influences the consequences of the election. If a clear
favorite for the election exists, voters may feel their influence can only be marginal, and
consequently decide to stay home. If, on the other hand, the outcome is uncertain and a close
race is likely, voters may feel that their vote could just swing the balance, thus enhancing their
influence and their likeliness to participate. Thus, the closeness of the election may have a
direct motivational effect on participation.
The closeness of the election can also create a facilitative effect, by increasing media
attention paid to the election. A neck and neck election race is attractive material for news
media, generating more media attention than would otherwise be the case. The increased
amount of information offered to voters reduces the cost of information and increases the
awareness of the election, facilitating electoral participation.
The Netherlands is not a majority system where the election winner automatically ends
up in government. The typical notion of a close race in which the two largest parties fight
each other for government power does not readily apply. The largest party need not end up in
government, or a new coalition might eventually contain both of the parties that were earlier
tied in a neck and neck race. Nevertheless, becoming the largest party is of consequence, and
the race for the lead is of significance in the Dutch political system. Since 1972 it is the
custom that the largest party initiates coalition negotiations. In a party system where the
typical election results in more than one coalition option, this custom is of considerable
consequence in coalition negotiations.
One contextual characteristic deserves some additional attention, although the variable
is a constant in the period of 1971-1998. A mandatory voting law was in effect in the
Netherlands in the period before 1971, making 1971 the first parliamentary election where
participation was not compulsory. The possible consequences of this will be examined in the
analysis, where relevant.
2.2.2 Ind iv idua l  Characte r i s t i c s  
At the individual level, the selection of variables included in the model was again based on
existing research. These individual level variables can be of a facilitative or a motivational
character as well, and, just as at the contextual level, some variables have both a facilitative
as well as a motivational influence. The variables included will now be discussed.
The variable education is facilitative factor. To understand the complex matter of
politics, and to make an informed decision whether to vote and for whom, a certain level of
cognitive skills is required. Education provides these cognitive skills. A positive influence of
this facilitative factor is therefore expected on electoral participation. Education may have an
added motivational effect since schools often encourage voting as a civil duty. Prolonged
education ensures a prolonged exposure to this norm.
A number of variables included in the analytical model function as proxy-indicators for
a motivational concept, namely social integration. In democratic societies, voting is one of
the main opportunities for citizens to collectively influence the political course of the country.
Integration into society increases the level of commitment to society, and will induce citizens
to participate in the political process (Cf. Verba & Nie, 1972; Milbraith & Goel, 1977;
Putnam, 2000). Therefore, a positive influence of social integration on the chance to vote is
expected. Social integration cannot be measured directly, so that proxy-indicators have been
18
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selected to indicate the degree of integration into society. Income, class and age are all
positively correlated with the degree of integration (Cf. Hout & Knoke, 1975; Rose, 1974)
Income, class and age are therefore expected to have a positive effect on electoral
participation. Apart form these three proxy-indicators for social integration, an even stronger
positive effect on turnout is expected from membership of specific groups in society that hold
strongly to a norm of voting as a civic duty. In the Netherlands, this is especially relevant for
members of the traditional religious denominations (Roman Catholics, Dutch Reformed and
Calvinist Protestants) as well as for labor unions members. Religious denomination and
religiosity, as well as union membership are therefore added to the set of independent
variables and expected to positively influence the chance to vote. Religiosity and union
membership can both have an additional influence on voters in case the church or the union
advice their followers to vote for a particular party. This may aide voters in determining what
party is best for them, and thus have a facilitative effect.
A strong positive influence on electoral participation is expected from Party attachment,
political interest and political efficacy. Political interest and political efficacy are both
expected to have a motivational effect, since elections provide an opportunity for voters with
high political interest and efficacy to influence matters that they care about. This motivational
effect is expected for party attachment as well, in addition to a possible facilitative effect,
since close party adherents will have an easier task in selecting the party to vote for.
As already mentioned, the influence of gender on turnout is not entirely straightforward,
and its impact tends to vary with the number of other characteristics that are being controlled
for (cf. Leijenaar, 1989, van der Eijk and Oppenhuis, 1990). Gender will therefore be
included in the model without prior assumptions towards both the existence and the nature of
a difference in turnout between men and women. 
2.2.3 Mediat ing  the  Context  through the  Ind iv idua l  
Combining data on the individual level and the contextual level may not only allow more
accurate estimates for characteristics on both of these levels. It also offers the opportunity to
examine whether contextual influences are equal for all voters, or more influential for some,
and less for others. In technical terms, this means that statistically significant interactions
may be found between contextual and individual characteristics. Since existing knowledge on
the interaction between contextual and individual characteristics regarding electoral
participation is limited, expectations will be of a general nature. 
The influence of the contextual characteristics included in the model is not expected to
be equally strong for all voters. It is expected that individuals with a relatively low chance of
participation are potentially more strongly affected by contextual characteristics than
individuals with a high propensity to participate. The latter group will most likely participate
in the election regardless of the specific circumstances, while voters who derive a smaller
likelihood to participate from their individual characteristics may require some added
incentive from the contextual level to actually participate. Part of this difference between
voters may be attributed to a ceiling effect: if the likelihood to vote derived from individual
characteristics is very high, it simply cannot rise anymore. The ceiling effect is handled by
the logistic regression model. 
In the analytical model, this variable influence of contextual characteristics on different
voters is explored by introducing interaction terms between a personal characteristic that is a
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strong predictor of electoral participation - political efficacy - and the contextual
characteristics in the model. If these interaction terms prove statistically significant this
means that the influence of contextual characteristics varies depending on individual
characteristics. As political efficacy is expected to be positively related to electoral
participation, higher political efficacy implies less influence for contextual characteristics.
The expected sign of the interaction terms is therefore the reverse of the sign expected for the
contextual effects. Since all of the contextual effects introduced in the model are expected to
be positive, all of the interaction terms are expected to be negative (see below). 
2 .3 Da t a  and  Ope r a t i ona l i z a t i on
To test the influence of contextual characteristics on turnout rates through their effect on
individual behavior, nine National Election Studies administered in concurrence with the
national elections held in the Netherlands in the period 1971-1998 were selected. These
studies offer variation at the contextual and individual level, while at the same time ensuring
a sufficient degree of comparability over all nine surveys. Of course, confining ourselves to
only one political system inherently introduces limitations on the variance to be explored as
well. Constitutional arrangements such as the existing electoral formula, the existence of
weekday voting and the absence of mandatory voting laws are all constants for the
Netherlands in the period under scrutiny. Their effects can therefore not be studied in this
analysis.
The nine Dutch election studies offer a total of 14,284 cases available for initial
analysis6. In the Netherlands, a relatively large number of respondents refuse to answer some
questions especially regarding personal income, creating the necessity to deal with the
problem of missing data. To minimize the number of cases lost, data imputation was applied
where missing values were replaced by the reference category score for the variables income,
class and education. To detect whether these substitutions were permissible and hence
whether respondents with missing data do not deviate in behavior from respondents with the
actual scores, the following procedure was applied. Dummy variables were created for the
variables income, class and education. These dummy variables were scored positive in case
a respondent failed or refused to answer the particular question, while the missing values in
the original variable were replaced by the imputed value. The dummy variables were then
included in the analytical model. A statistically significant effect of one of these dummy
variables then indicates that the respondents with missing data differ significantly from
respondents with the actual score on that variable. Listwise deletion was applied for variables
where data imputation was not acceptable. After deletion for missing data, 13,868 cases were
available for analysis (97 percent of all available cases).
To ensure that no bias was introduced due to different sample sizes in the aggregated
data set, each year was weighted to an equal sample size. In addition, the data were weighted
to reflect actual turnout rates. Although non-voters show a consistently lower rate of
participation in the Dutch election studies, no clear evidence has been found to assume that
the sampled fraction is not a correct representation of the total group7. Therefore, it is
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6 See the Appendix for details on the individual level variables employed in the analytical model.
7 Visscher (1995) disagrees with this, although Smeets (1995) found no evidence for his claims. See also Jaarsma et al.
(1986) The under-representation of non-voters is common to election research and not confined to the Dutch election
studies. See Katosh and Traugott, 1981.
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permissible to weigh the data according to actual turnout rates, allowing us to make
population predictions on the basis of our model.
Since a complete structural model is not our aim, a regression model is the most suitable
technique for our analysis. Since data at both the individual and the contextual level are used,
this needs to be taken into account as well. The main problem arising from this is that the
degrees of freedom at both levels differ. One remedy for this difference is to use multi-level
modeling, to take complete account of the nested data structure of individual voters within
electoral contexts. This will be done in chapters 5 and 6. In view of the exploratory character
of this analysis, a regression analysis with robust standard errors is applied8. The problem
with combining different contexts and modeling contextual characteristics as conducted in
this research is that the standard errors are estimated incorrectly because the assumption of
independent samples is not met, and contextual characteristics are operationalized as if they
were individual level characteristics. This results in a consistent underestimation of the
standard errors of estimated parameters, rendering estimates statistically significant where
this may not be warranted. To correct this, an alternative estimate of variance is used, known
as the Huber/White Sandwich estimator, which produces robust standard errors (Huber 1967;
White 1980). The typical result - compared to non-robust standard errors - is a larger standard
error.
In view of the dichotomous character of the dependent variable (did vote or not) and its
skewed distribution, a logistic regression rather than OLS regression will be used. Logistic
regression is a non-linear multiplicative technique that allows us to estimate the influence of
a variable on the chance that a person will vote, given all the other characteristics of that
person. So, the influence of a characteristic can change over different values of the other
characteristics. The result of this is that the predicted chance to vote will remain within the
logical boundaries of 0 and 1.
The four contextual characteristics that will be introduced into the model are
operationalized as follows. The Government Collapse indicator indicates that the election
follows the collapse of the government coalition. Government Collapse is expected to have a
positive effect on electoral participation through increased media attention and increased
perceived importance of the election. It is important to point out that this variable need not
indicate that the election is called early. In the Netherlands, it is possible for a coalition to
take on a caretaker role and keep to the original election cycle as occurred in 1977, although
there is a significant relationship between Government Collapse and Time Since Previous
Election.
The indicator labeled Time Since Previous Election indicates the years since a previous
parliamentary election was held, and performs a double role. It is a proxy indicator for
campaign efforts. Since no direct data on campaign efforts exist, the time since a previous
election will be used as an alternative, on the expectation that quickly ensuing consecutive
elections will deplete party funds. In addition, Time Since Previous Election is an indicator
for the perceived relevance of the election, as frequent elections may create election fatigue,
depressing turnout. For both interpretations, the expected relationship is positive, with longer
time between elections encouraging turnout numbers. To improve interpretation the indicator
has been transformed, by dividing the number of years since the previous election by the
21
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number of years of a regular parliamentary term (four years, in the Netherlands) so that a
score of one 1 corresponds to a full parliamentary term.
Coalition Seeks Re-election is a dummy variable indicating whether the incumbent
coalition made reelection an election goal. A positive influence on turnout is expected.
However, as this situation has only occurred twice in the period under study, in 1986 and
1998, caution is required in interpreting the outcomes for this variable.
The Closeness of the Election is measured with the aid of opinion polls9. These polls
are typically published in the media in the run up to the election. The measure is
constructed by taking the gap in percentage points between the two largest parties. The
relationship between the closeness of the election and electoral participation is not
expected to be linear: a 2 percent point change in the degree of closeness is relevant if the
gap is very small, but not of great importance if the gap between the two largest parties is
large. To reflect this non-linear character, the actual variable used is 1 divided by the gap
in percentage points. This creates a variable that becomes (much) larger in closer elections.
As a consequence, a positive influence is expected of the variable Closeness of the
Election.
Table 2-2 The Netherlands - Values of Contextual Characteristics for the Period 1971-1998
The individual characteristics have been operationalized as follows. Class is measured on
a five-point scale based on type of occupation. The categories are unskilled manual labor,
skilled manual labor, self-employed, routine non-manual labor and skilled non-manual
labor. The reference category is unskilled manual labor, to which all other categories are
coded as contrast. Those who could not be assigned to any class category were included in
the base category and identified through a separate variable. 
Education is coded into three categories, ranging from primary (base reference
category) through secondary to tertiary (polytechnic/university) level education. Each level
is coded as a contrast to the preceding level, to show the impact of an additional level of
education. To determine the difference of tertiary versus primary level education, the
parameters for secondary and tertiary education thus need to be added. Respondents who
failed or refused to give information regarding their education were included in the base
category (primary education) and identified through a separate variable.
Year of Election 1971 1972 1977 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 
Government Collapse no yes yes No yes no yes no no 
Time Since Previous Election
#
  1.02 .42 1.13 1 .33 .92 .83 1.17 1 
Coalitions Seeks Re-election no no no No no yes no no yes 
Closeness of the Election 
(gap in percentage points)
.213 
(4.7)
.103 
(9.7)
.303 
(3.3)
.667 
(1.5)
.714 
(1.4)
.122 
(8.2)
10 
(0.1)
.263 
(3.8)
.078 
(12.9)
Note #: Time Since Previous Election is indicated in four-year terms.
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Research.
10 As mentioned already the largest party typically takes the lead in coalition negotiations after the elections.
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Dummy indicators were constructed to signify respondents from the Lowest Income
Quartile and for Female voters, while Age was measured in years. Again, respondents for
which no income information was ascertained were included in the base category (not
lowest quartile) and identified through a separate variable. 
Religion was operationalized both according to denomination and religiosity,
measured by frequency of church attendance. In the Netherlands, three dominant religious
denominations exist: Calvinist, Dutch Reformed and Roman Catholic. In addition, an
other category is included. This category contains a wide variety of religious
denominations, some of which actually oppose electoral participation, as is the case for
Jehovahs Witnesses. This category is therefore expected to show a lower chance to vote
than the three main denominations. The reference category for religion is not-religious.
Since the 1960s, the Netherlands has shown a steady decline in church adherence,
especially in the Catholic Church. This has led to a situation where information on merely
the denomination could be misleading. To remedy this, a measure of religiosity in the
form of frequency of church attendance is introduced. Where useful, interactions between
denomination and church attendance were explored.
Party Attachment and Union Membership are indicated by dummy variables, coded
positive if a respondent expressed a preference for a political party or is a member of a
labor union. Political Interest and Political Efficacy are each measured on five point
scales from low to high11. 
2 .4 P r ed i c t i ng  I nd i v i dua l  E l e c to r a l  P a r t i c i pa t i on
Table 2-3 shows the results of the logistic regression analyses of electoral participation. Four
models are presented. It has been argued (cf. Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes, 1960;
van Deth 1989) that socio-demographic characteristics such as Class, Income or Education,
are mediated in explanatory models of electoral participation through psycho-political
characteristics such as Party Attachment, Political Interest and Political Efficacy. To assess
this, the first model contains socio-demographic characteristics only. In the second model, the
psycho-political characteristics are added. Socio-demographic effects that are mediated
through psycho-political characteristics are then expected to decrease, compared to the first
model. In the final two models, first contextual characteristics, then individual-contextual
interactions are added. Robust standard errors are presented in conjunction with the estimated
coefficients. Bold type indicates statistically significant estimates at α=.05. Pseudo R-
squared is based on Judge et al. (1985). 
23
11 The variables are additive index-scores, based on Mokken-scales of four separate items each. See Anker & Oppenhuis,
(1995) pp. 323-330 on the construction of these scales.
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Table 2-3: The Netherlands - Logistic Regression of Electoral Participation, 1971-1998 
(robust standard errors)
The socio-demographic model (Model I) shows a rather low pseudo-R2 of .083 although it
has to be noted that pseudo-R2 estimates tend to be low in comparison to normal OLS R2
values. A look at the parameter estimates shows that all statistically significant effects are in
the hypothesized direction. Age and education tend to have a positive influence on individual
electoral participation. The estimate for gender suggests that women show a higher
 
Model I   II   III   IV  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Age .021 .002 .012 .002 .017 .002 .017 .002 
Female .171 .071 .408 .075 .399 .076 .399 .077 
Class (reference: unskilled manual labor) 
Skilled manual labor .120 .109 .083 .114 .094 .115 .100 .115 
Self employed .381 .155 .246 .160 .221 .161 .216 .161 
Routine non-manual labor .330 .104 .128 .107 .131 .108 .129 .109 
Skilled non-manual labor .601 .116 .392 .122 .349 .123 .338 .124 
No class assigned .414 .093 .201 .096 .157 .099 .161 .100 
Education (reference: primary education)     
Secondary vs primary education .439 .075 .168 .079 .220 .080 .192 .080 
Tertiary vs secondary education .835 .133 .548 .139 .540 .139 .524 .140 
No education level ascertained -.162 .219 -.346 .230 -.240 .239 -.293 .237 
         
Lowest Income Quartile -.234 .081 -.157 .086 -.152 .086 -.144 .086 
No income ascertained -.015 .084 .086 .086 .067 .089 .065 .089 
Religion (reference: no religion)        
Catholic -.131 .079 -.077 .081 -.073 .081 -.071 .082 
Dutch reformed .318 .105 .290 .108 .280 .109 .259 .109 
Calvinist .849 .195 .670 .200 .676 .201 .666 .202 
Religious: other denomination -.209 .190 -.234 .197 -.236 .196 -.256 .199 
Church attendance: at least…         
Weekly church attendance .844 .117 .761 .120 .765 .122 .753 .122 
Monthly church attendance .464 .118 .387 .122 .392 .121 .389 .122 
Weekly church attendance with  
Religious: other denomination 
-1.520 .284 -1.218 .284 -1.251 .286 -1.227 .290 
Union member .479 .090 .395 .090 .380 .091 .372 .091 
Psycho-political characteristics        
Party attachment   1.085 .068 1.117 .068 1.095 .069 
Political interest   .355 .036 .340 .037 .325 .037 
Political efficacy   .225 .027 .240 .028 .855 .144 
Contextual characteristics        
Time since previous election     .455 .158 1.512 .278 
Government collapse     .374 .110 .846 .190 
Coalition seeks re-election     .532 .103 .144 .173 
Closeness of the election     -.026 .014 -.056 .026 
Interactions individual-contextual level 
Time since previous election with Political efficacy    -.632 .130 
Government collapse with Political efficacy    -.303 .083 
Coalition seeks re-election with Political efficacy    .185 .071 
Closeness of the election with Political efficacy    .019 .011 
Constant -.283 .127 -1.362 .142 -2.226 .240 -3.203 .340 
        
Pseudo R-square  .083  .163  .168  .173 
Log Likelihood -5984 -5461 -5430 -5394
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probability to vote than men, other characteristics held equal. Class proves influential,
especially with the higher classes showing a larger propensity to vote. Initially when
looking at religion, marked differences between the three denominations could be identified.
However, here the crucial factor proves to be church attendance. The analyses show that
especially weekly, but also monthly church attendance has a positive influence on electoral
participation. However, this is not a uniform effect: regular church attendance has a negative
influence for the religious: other category. This is demonstrated by the interaction term
between weekly church attendance and the religion: other indicator in Model I12. Only
weekly church attendants of the other denominations show a lower chance to vote; a
separate effect of the religious: other category itself is not statistically significant. A likely
explanation is that the religious: other category is indeed quite a mixed bag, consisting for
a substantial part of first and second generation immigrants that attend church regularly, but
are known to have a lower propensity to participate in elections (cf. Fennema & Tillie, 1999).
Another religious group showing comparable behavior are Jehovahs witnesses. The analyses
underline that especially for Catholics church attendance proves to be the determining factor.
Model I shows, when controlling for church attendance, that being Catholic by itself does not
affect the probability of voting, which indicates that Catholics who do not go to church
regularly do not differ significantly in their electoral participation from unreligious voters.
The other integration indicator, union membership, shows the positive influence on electoral
participation that was expected.
The non-significant effect of the no education level ascertained indicator suggests that
those who failed or refused to answer this question show behavior comparable to those
respondents with primary level education only. The most likely explanation is that for most
of these respondents their education is at primary level. For income, the no income
ascertained indicator also proves not to be significant. It is therefore unlikely that these
respondents belong to the lowest income quartile, an assumption that is bolstered by practical
wisdom of survey research, which states that it is those in the higher income brackets that are
more likely withhold information on this question. For class however, there is a substantial
effect related to not having a class level ascertained. This may be caused by the fact that a
substantial part of this group will have no class score since they have no full time or part time
occupation. These people show a distinct electoral behavior.
Adding psycho-political characteristics in Model II improves the pseudo-R2 value
substantially to .163. Model II also confirms that a large part of the socio-demographic
influence is indeed mediated through the psycho-political characteristics. This is reflected in
a decrease in the effect estimate for a number of socio-demographic characteristics, notably
class, education and income, and to a lesser degree age, union membership and religion and
church attendance. The noteworthy exception is gender, which shows a substantially larger
influence once the psycho-political effects are taken into account. This suggests that it is with
regard to political interest, political efficacy and party attachment where women trail behind
men. If we keep the level of political interest, political efficacy and party attachment equal
for men and women, which is what happens if we include the psycho-political characteristics
in the model, we see that women are more likely to participate than men.
25
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In Model II the influence of class is almost completely mediated through other
characteristics, with only the difference between unskilled manual labor versus skilled non-
manual labor remaining statistically significant. This suggests that, in line with the
expectations set out above, class is a powerful predictor of the psycho-political
characteristics, but has little additional influence on electoral participation in the Netherlands.
Education, religion and church attendance remain influential, although their influence is
reduced. The three psycho-political characteristics, political interest, party attachment and
political efficacy, show the expected significant positive influence on electoral participation.
2.4.1 Contextua l  E f fec t s
Model III makes the first step of adding contextual information to the model, by including
four indicators for contextual characteristics. The addition of the contextual characteristics
increases the pseudo-R2 value only minimally to .168, although the substance of this
improvement of the model will become more apparent in section 2.5 below. With the
exception of the closeness indicator, the estimates for the contextual characteristics are all in
the expected direction. Closeness, as operationalized, was expected to have a positive
influence on voting, but instead shows a negative effect. It should be noted however, that this
effect is not statistically significant.
In agreement with expectations, longer periods between elections have a positive effect
on turnout, as does a coalition seeking re-election, although caution needs to be taken with
the latter indicator, since it applies to only two elections. As hypothesized, a coalition collapse
does indeed tend to increase electoral participation.
The individual level estimates show only minimal change when the contextual
characteristics are added to the model. However, the control variable for an absence of class
information now proves to be no longer statistically significant, so that the only remaining
additional influence of class on electoral participation is for skilled non-manual labor.
2.4.2 Ind iv idua l -contextua l  In te ract ions
The model analyzed here does not allow extensive testing of numerous individual-contextual
interactions. The number of contexts available is simply not sufficient. This section will
therefore not present an exploration of all possible interactions between individual and
contextual level characteristics, but rather go for one safe bet. Interactions will be modeled
between all contextual characteristics and political efficacy, an important predictor of
electoral participation. If individual level variations in the influence of contextual effects
exist, they are most likely to manifest themselves through these interactions. 
The interactions between political efficacy and the contextual characteristics are
presented in Model IV. Again, the pseudo-R2 increases, though again only marginally to .173.
The estimates for individual level characteristics show very little change compared to the
previous model, with the obvious and unsurprising exception of the direct estimate for
political efficacy.
At the contextual level, the estimates show substantial change. Again this is to be
expected because of the interaction terms. The direct effects of the contextual characteristics
now indicate the influence on voters with the lowest level of political efficacy, to which the
composite terms of the interactions have to be added to complete the equation. Since the signs
for all interaction terms are indeed the reverse of the direct estimates of the contextual effects,
26
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this indicates that the influence of contextual effects decreases as political efficacy increases.
This finding is statistically significant for all four interactions, and in line with the
expectations set out in Section 2.2.3. Apart from this general corroborating finding, there are
some more specific findings that are a bit more confusing. Again the estimate for the
closeness of the election is opposite from what was expected. Moreover, it is statistically
significantly different from zero. The negative estimate suggests that turnout is actually
higher in elections where the gap between the two leading parties is larger. In comparison to
the previous model, the estimate for the direct effect of a coalition seeking re-election has
substantially decreased in size and is no longer statistically significant. 
2 .5 P r ed i c t i ng  Tu rnou t  L e ve l s
The previous section showed that the political context is not of equal importance to all voters.
The context-individual interaction terms proved that the influence of the contextual
characteristics is less for voters with higher levels of political interest and political efficacy
than for the less politically interested and for voters with lower political efficacy. This
improves our understanding of electoral participation. The question remains however,
whether adding contextual information gives us a better understanding of electoral
participation only, or whether it also improves our capacity of predicting who will vote or not.
To answer this, in this section turnout rates will be predicted, based on the models presented
in Table 2-3, specifically models II and IV. These two models represent the full individual
level model, and the model with contextual characteristics and interaction terms added.
For each individual, the predicted value was computed. The predicted value reflects the
probability that individual will participate, as predicted by the model. Because of the use of
logistic regression, this value will always be between zero and one. Aggregating the predicted
values produces the predicted turnout rate for the complete sample. As was mentioned
already, each of the samples has been weighted so as to reflect the actual turnout rate of the
election, so that sample composition will not obfuscate the predictions based on the statistical
model. Table 2-4 presents the predicted turnout rates per election in percentages, based on the
individual model (II) and the context and individual level model (IV). The actual turnout
figures are presented on the last row. 
Table 2-4 The Netherlands - Turnout (percentages), Actual and Predicted by Individual and 
Context & Individual Model and Average Absolute Deviance from Actual Turnout
(percentage points)
The two models produce clearly different turnout predictions. The inclusion of contextual
information does alter the predictive accuracy of the model, even though the difference in R-
square is minimal. It does not produce a consistent over or under-estimation of the turnout
level, as turnout rates are not consistently too high or too low. The last column of Table 2-4
shows that the predictions from the Context & Individual model are on average 1.69
Year 1971 1972 1977 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 Deviance
Individual model (II) 84.6 85.8 85.9 83.8 82.4 83.7 82.1 81.7 68.4 2.53
Context & Individual model (IV) 82.8 85.2 88.1 81.9 80.8 87.1 80.6 80.2 71.7 1.69 
Actual turnout 79.1 83.5 88.0 87.0 81.0 85.8 80.3 78.7 73.0 - 
27
binnenwerk.qxd  14-May-03  8:57  Page 27
percentage points off the actual outcome, while the Individual model is less accurate with
an average deviation of 2.53 percentage points. Indeed, as Figure 2-1 shows even more
clearly, the predictive power of the model greatly increases as contextual information is
added. The contextual-individual model outperforms the individual level only model in all
elections but one.
Figure 2-1 presents the deviation from actual turnout for the predicted turnout levels of
the two models. In essence, it shows how far the predictions are off, and whether they fall
short or overshoot the mark. For each election, actual turnout is represented by the zero-line,
with deviations given in percentage points. The improved prediction of the contextual-
individual level model is obvious. Only in 1981 is it further off the mark than the individual
level model.
Figure 2-1 The Netherlands - Predicted Turnout Levels, Deviation from Actual Turnout
2 . 6 Conc l u s i on s :  Doe s  Con tex t  Ma t t e r ?
This chapter explored the influence of contextual characteristics on individual electoral
participation in the Netherlands between 1971 and 1998. At the individual level, most
characteristics behaved in the way expected. The influence of gender proved to be interesting.
In the analyses presented here, women show a higher propensity to vote than men,
particularly when controlling for the relevant psycho-political characteristics (political
interest, political efficacy and party attachment). This is in contrast with findings in other
countries (Blais and Carty 1990; Lipset 1981; Verba et al. 1978; Wolfinger & Rosenstone
1980). Previous Dutch research did not come up with a single consistent outcome (Leijenaar
1989; van der Eijk & Oppenhuis, 1990). It appears that the influence of gender is strongly
dependent on the other characteristics included in the model, with the psycho-political
characteristics playing a key role. With regard to religion, the key factor appears to be
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religiosity, as indicated by church attendance. Only Dutch Reformed and Calvinists show a
greater likelihood to participate in addition to the separate effect of church attendance.
Catholics who do not attend church frequently do not distinguish themselves from the non-
religious, although the parameter estimate by itself suggests that Catholics that do not attend
church regularly vote less often than the not-religious.
There was strong support for the thesis that contextual characteristics affect individual
voters over and above the influence of individual characteristics. In addition, the interaction
terms showed that individual level characteristics determine the degree to which stimuli from
the electoral context affect voters. These findings help explain between-election fluctuations
in turnout figures. The accuracy of turnout prediction was increased considerably by
including characteristics of the election and the political system in which it was held.
There are also limitations to the analyses presented. The ability to draw unequivocal
conclusions on contextual influences on turnout is hampered by data limitations. The
relatively low number of contexts - i.e., elections - puts a restriction on the model, and
especially on the number of explanatory variables on the aggregate level. The next chapter
will treat this subject more extensively, and suggest a more in-depth exploration of the
influence of a single contextual characteristic - the closeness of the election - on individual
behavior, rather than a wide exploration of several contextual characteristics.
29
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R a i n  F a l l s  o n  A l l  o f  U s  
(But Some Manage to Get More Wet than Others)
I n d i v i d u a l  Va r i a t i o n  i n  C o n t e x t u a l
E f f e c t s
As Chapter 2 showed, individual electoral participation can be explained better when
information at the contextual level is included in the model. The accuracy of the analytical
model used in Chapter 2 was substantially increased when information at the individual
and the contextual level was included: prediction of actual turnout levels improved. The
improved predictions indicate that our ability to explain variations in turnout rates that
occur between elections has improved over that of models based on individual level
information alone.
In addition, Chapter 2 also showed that some voters may be affected by a contextual
effect more than others. This phenomenon will be further reflected upon in the current
chapter. Although the addition of contextual level information tends to increase the
predictive power of the model as a whole, caution should therefore be taken in this matter,
since the effect of contextual level characteristics is not necessarily a uniform effect.
Empirically, this was shown in the analyses of Chapter 2. Table 2-3 showed that the effect
of all contextual characteristics showed significant interactions with political efficacy.
This indicates that the influence of the contextual characteristics varies with individual
characteristics of voters - in this case political efficacy. This concept of a variable
influence of the political context - not to be confused with variability of the political
context - will form the main theme of this and the following chapters. This chapter argues
that combining the contextual and individual level of explanation is more than merely
adding extra variables to an equation that is to be estimated. Rather, it requires a complete
integration of the two levels in both theory and empirical analysis.
First, the theoretical framework that allows the integration of contextual and
individual level information will be presented here. The explanatory model at both levels
will be depicted, after which the integration of the two models is presented. Subsequently,
a theoretical exploration of the influence of three contextual characteristics on individual
voters is presented. In this exploration, the main focus is on individual variation of the
effect of these contextual characteristics. Can a theoretical argument be developed that
would lead us to hypothesize that the effect of contextual characteristics is unlikely to
affect voters uniformly?
On the basis of practical arguments, one contextual characteristic is then selected for
further empirical exploration: the closeness of the election. The effects of this aspect of
the (political) context on individual voters are elaborated empirically in Chapter 4,
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of this study.
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3 .1 The  Need  f o r  Con tex t
Chapter 2 showed that contextual information helps explain individual behavior. This section
will lay out step by step how electoral participation can be explained through these two levels
of information, and how these two explanation can be combined in a single model. 
Individual characteristics such as age, education or gender help us explain why some
people tend to vote, while others do not. They explain differences within the electorate, and
they tend to do so consistently across contexts. Higher education tends to go with an
increased tendency to vote, as does age, up to the point where health becomes an inhibiting
factor. Gender tends to have a varying impact between countries, but the effect is typically
very stable within a country. If women vote more - or less - than men, they tend to do so
consistently in the various elections held within a country. Figure 3-1 shows graphically how
individual characteristics explain electoral participation, which in term determines turnout1. 
Figure 3-1 Electoral Participation and Turnout Explained by Individual Characteristics
Although individual characteristics tend to have a very stable influence on electoral
participation, this does not mean that variations in turnout between elections do not occur.
Changes in the strength of the effects of individual characteristics are possible. Across
decades, we may find that, e.g., age becomes less powerful in the explanation of electoral
participation, as may gender or education. Such differences will be reflected by different
values of the effect parameters, depicted as the bottom arrow in the graph.
Equally, shifts in the composition of the electorate may cause changes in turnout
levels. Improved access to educational facilities may bring about an increase in the level
of education of the electorate, while an influx of young voters may shift the age
composition of the electorate. Such changes in the composition of the electorate will
affect the level of turnout, and are reflected by the right hand arrow of the graph.
Although theoretically they could, empirically these changes are not observed to
take place overnight, and they also do not tend to happen frequently. Especially where
socio-demographic characteristics are concerned, these changes are very gradual
processes. The level of education of a country does not increase or decrease greatly
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1 Note that the right hand arrow from electoral participation to turnout does not indicate a causal effect in the traditional
sense, but rather reflects that the sum of individual actions (electoral participation) determines the aggregate outcome,
i.e. turnout.
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between two elections, nor does the average age of the electorate. 
Other individual characteristics however, such as party evaluations, political interest
or political efficacy can theoretically change dramatically, and virtually overnight.
Although such dramatic changes are only seldom observed, they form a potential
explanation of between-election fluctuations in turnout that cannot be explained by socio-
demographic characteristics. But in practice this explanation is merely shifting the focus
of the question. To affect turnout levels, large numbers of voters would have to change
their behavior in similar ways. The question then becomes: why would the party
evaluation or the level of political interest of such a substantial amount of voters change
in unison?
Outside influences - beyond the individual voter - are a viable explanation for the
short-term, substantial changes in turnout that can be observed between virtually every
election. Contextual characteristics - characteristics describing the political, economic,
institutional and societal make up of the country - can affect the composition of the
electorate, as well as the influence of individual characteristics on electoral participation.
Thus, contextual characteristics can explain fluctuations in turnout that may not be
explained satisfactorily by individual level characteristics. Examples of contextual
characteristics that can explain short-term fluctuations are political and economic
characteristics such as incumbency of a candidate, (changes in) the party landscape,
economic factors and any type of gaffe or, conversely, success, of any of the main political
actors.
Contextual characteristics may also be of a more stable nature. Systemic
characteristics such as the institutional make up of a country, the voting system or the day
of the week elections are held are examples of these. Variations within countries in these
systemic characteristics are typically few and far between. They do however serve as more
plausible explanations for the variation found in turnout levels between countries than
individual characteristics do (cf. Lijphart 1999; Franklin 2002).
In short, contextual characteristics provide explanations for short-term turnout
variation within a country as well as long-term variation within and between countries.
However, as Figure 3-2 shows, this solution comes at a price. 
Figure 3-2 Turnout Explained by Contextual Characteristics
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Figure 3-2 shows that the contextual approach explains variation in turnout by differences in
contextual characteristics. It also shows something else: how the contextual approach ignores
the individual voter completely. Individual behavior is not part of the model, turnout is
presumed to be solely determined by contextual characteristics. Although it is unlikely that any
researcher focusing on contextual explanations will actually believe that turnout rates are the
product of voting systems, shifts in the party system and the economic mood alone, the absence
of the individual voter in an equation of which the outcome is ultimately dependent on this
individual voter is of course a structural flaw of the contextual approach. Contexts do not vote
- voters do. Turnout is the result of individual level behavior, and a contextual level explanation
will therefore have to make clear how contextual characteristics affect individual voters.
An integration of the two levels of information into a single model is therefore a
potentially fruitful exercise. The model will become more complete, by taking account of
influences at the contextual and individual level that voters are exposed to when deciding to
vote. The past decade has indeed seen the establishment of a research tradition that aims to
overcome the shortcomings of the individual as well as the contextual approach by
combining the two into one model (e.g., Franklin 1996; Anduiza Perea 1997; van Egmond,
de Graaf & van der Eijk 1998). Individual electoral participation and aggregate level turnout
is in this approach explained with the use of both individual and contextual characteristics.
This way, the voting decision is modeled at the individual level, while it is at the same time
acknowledged that an individual voter does not operate in a vacuum, but in a context that
influences the individual, through factors connected to the political system and the present
day situation in the society that the political system is part of.
The benefits of this approach are substantial. Fluctuations in turnout that cannot be
explained by changes in individual characteristics or in the distribution of those
characteristics alone may now be explained. And suggestions regarding the influence of the
political context on individual voters that cannot be tested in contextual level models - as in
these models the individual level is absent - may now be tested since the causal link between
the two levels is part of the model.
The graphical representation of this model is given in Figure 3-32. The causal link
between contextual characteristics and turnout is not a direct one, as the influence of the
context is mediated through the individual level, indicated by the dashed top arrow.
Figure 3-3 Electoral Participation and Turnout Explained by Individual and Contextual
Characteristics
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Empirical analyses that reflect the theoretical model presented in Figure 3-3 are typically cast
in the form of a regression model, most often a logistic regression to acknowledge the
dichotomous character of the dependent variable. Included in the model are indicators for
individual level characteristics (age, education, etcetera) explaining the dependent variable:
individual electoral participation. Added to this is information regarding the context of the
election, typically through the use of variables added to the model as if they were individual
characteristics. All respondents that are sampled from a particular context thus have identical
scores. In this way individual and contextual level information is used to predict individual
behavior, and both individual characteristics of voters and characteristics of the elections are
given their rightful place in the explanatory model. An example of such a model is found in
Chapter 2, for the analyses on participation in Dutch parliamentary elections.
Is the model in Figure 3-3 sufficient to explain electoral participation using contextual
and individual characteristics? Unfortunately, no. The model in Figure 3-3 contains a serious
theoretical flaw: contextual characteristics are assumed to be equally influential for all voters.
Regardless of their individual characteristics, the model of Figure 3-3 implies that all voters
are affected by the electoral context in the same way, without individual variation. The model
in Figure 3-3 imposes uniform contextual effects since it does not specify any interaction
between contextual and individual level characteristics. This is not a feasible assumption, as
can be demonstrated by way of a few examples.
Let us take the example of media attention. Awareness of the election, an obvious
individual-level prerequisite of electoral participation, is generally thought to be positively
influenced by the volume of media attention for an upcoming election. It is irrelevant what
causes media attention, economic or political scandal, an extremely close election race, the
entrance of a new player in the political arena and so forth. The main expectation is that
media attention positively affects voters consciousness of the election. However, for a voter
to be influenced by media attention, exposure to the media is required. Either directly, by
picking up a newspaper or not zapping away when the TV-news comes on, or indirectly
through discussions with friends or colleagues when politics is a topic of conversation. In the
absence of exposure, media attention will not reach, and therefore not affect voters. As not all
voters are equally exposed to media - directly or indirectly - the assumption of uniform
contextual effects lacks plausibility.
Another example can be found in the discussion about the effects of Sunday voting. A
number of authors have suggested that weekend voting may increase turnout figures (cf.
Crewe 1981; Oppenhuis 1995; Franklin 1996). Oppenhuis suggests that weekend voting may
be a facilitative contextual factor as the time pressure of the hectic working week is absent
and voters will therefore find it easier to participate. This is a plausible line of argument,
leading to the expectation that Sunday voting will indeed influence turnout rates positively.
Yet this effect only applies to some voters. It applies to those who have a hectic working
week, and a relaxed weekend. It does not apply to those who are far more flexible in their
daily schedule such as part-time workers, pensioners, students, the unemployed and perhaps
housewives (m/f). This part of the electorate may well be able to find the time to vote at any
day of the week, and hence will not be affected by the day of the week the election is held.
35
2 Cf. Coleman, 1990.
binnenwerk.qxd  14-May-03  8:57  Page 35
And obviously, Sunday voting will actually be an obstacle to those who have to work on
Sundays - bartenders, nurses, but also those working Sunday-shifts.
Lastly, argued from a different starting point, there must be room for influences of the
electoral context. For some parts of the electorate, however, the combination of personal
characteristics ensures that they always will participate - or that they never will - come hell
or high water. For such voters, contextual effects have no impact. For other parts of the
electorate there is room for contextual effects, as their (non-) participation is not fully fixed
by other factors. It follows therefore, that the influence of the electoral context is not
necessarily equal to all voters.
To accommodate the potential variability of contextual effects, an amendment of the
model presented in Figure 3-3 is needed. Such a model is presented in Figure 3-4. It is the
same model as presented in Figure 3-3, including individual and contextual level information
to predict individual level behavior. In addition, an interaction term between contextual and
individual level characteristics is made an explicit part of the model. It is represented by two
arrows: one arrow from contextual characteristics to electoral participation, with a second
arrow from individual characteristics pointing at it, reflecting the dependency on individual
characteristics of the contextual influence. These two additional arrows reflect contextual
influences that are dependent on individual characteristics. As argued above, this is a more
plausible representation of the influence of political context. In addition, the explicit
interaction term also forces the researcher to make explicit how the contextual characteristic
is expected to influence voters, rather than unthinkingly opt for the assumption of a uniform
contextual influence. 
Figure 3-4 Electoral Participation and Turnout Explained by Individual and Contextual
Characteristics, Allowing for Individual Variation in Contextual Influence
In Figure 3-4 contextual effects form an integral part of the model explaining electoral
participation, but the influence of contextual effects is not presumed to be equal for all voters.
By doing so, the model explicitly calls for hypotheses about possible variation of contextual
effects for different kinds of voters. The model still allows the context to be treated as a
uniform phenomenon, much like rain falling down on all of us. Yet this model also allows,
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and even invites, individual variation in the effects of this uniform context. Yes, rain does fall
on all of us, but some still happen to get more wet than others - determined by individual
characteristics. Some individuals carry umbrellas at all times, providing useful protection
against precipitation. But there are also some poor souls without anything to shield them from
the vagaries of the weather (or, the context of an election).
3 .2 Wha t  Con tex t ,  and  Wha t  E f f e c t ?  
The current section will explore how uniform contextual effects may have a variable
influence on the electorate, affecting voters in different ways. Three examples will make the
variable impact of contextual characteristics concrete.
Contextual characteristics can be determined by the institutional arrangements of the
polity, the (party-) political landscape or other politically relevant circumstances. Some of
these characteristics will be rather stable when viewed from within one polity, such as for
instance the electoral threshold, or Sunday versus weekday voting. As a consequence,
variation in such a contextual characteristic can usually be found between different political
systems, not within a single system over time. Other characteristics can be more variable, and
show considerable fluctuations between elections in a single system, as well as between
different political systems. Examples of such characteristics are the closeness of the election
race, or whether there is an incumbent candidate or a coalition endeavoring to remain in
office.
Three characteristics will be discussed here. First, Section 3.2.1 will discuss a
motivational contextual characteristic, the presence or absence of concurrent elections. Does
the combination of two elections held on the same day affect voter turnout? Secondly, the day
of the week elections are held will be discussed, a facilitative factor. Sunday versus weekday
voting was already mentioned briefly above, and will be further discussed in Section 3.2.2.
Lastly, the closeness of the election may have both a motivational and a facilitative effect on
voters. It will be discussed further in Section 3.2.3. The possible influence each of these
characteristics may have on voters will be discussed at the theoretical level. Expectations and
assumptions regarding the influence of the contextual effect on individual voters will be made
explicit. Subsequently, the practicalities of testing these assumptions and hypotheses
empirically will be discussed, taking into account restrictions regarding availability of data
and actual variation found in the contextual characteristics. 
3.2.1 Concur rent  E lec t ions
Political commentators often suggest - especially after an election showed a disappointingly
low turnout - that elections for several political bodies should be held concurrently, so as to
improve turnout. In this way, less prominent second-order elections may benefit from the
interest that first-order elections generate (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Reif 1984). It is not the aim
of this study to make policy recommendations about such proposals, but rather to show how
concurrent elections may have an effect on some, but not on other voters. 
The main argument for concurrent elections is that many people are inclined to vote in
some elections, but not in others. Voters will deem some elections important enough to turn
out, whereas other elections cannot generate such interest and are given a miss. For these
unpopular elections, turnout may be improved by combining them with more important
elections. However, concurrent elections need not be an incentive to all voters. Individual
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level research has shown that not all potential voters stand an equal chance to participate, or,
put differently, are likely to give the election a miss. Certain individual characteristics make
for habitual voters: voters that participate in virtually all elections. For these voters, moral
considerations, genuine political interest or loyalty towards a political party or social group
are incentives strong enough to ensure their participation in all elections, regardless of the
perceived importance of that election. Contextual influences - including concurrent elections
- will for these voters not affect their likelihood to participate, since they participate anyway.
If individual behavior is constant over contexts, characteristics of context become irrelevant. 
The above implies that concurrent elections as a contextual influence can only affect the
occasional voters: the complement of the habitual voters whose participation in the election
is not certain. Depending on the political system, a smaller or larger part of the electorate will
be immune to contextual influences, and the size of this segment of the electorate is actually
a system characteristic in its own right. In most western democratic systems, these
immunized voters are likely to share certain individual characteristics. One example of such
an individual level characteristic is having a high level of education. Apart from providing
cognitive skills, schools also teach pupils about the norms and values of a society. In
democratic systems, electoral participation is a civic duty that is part of the norms and values
of society. An extended education engrains this sense of civic duty, and, as a consequence,
highly educated citizens tend to be part of the immunized segment of habitual voters (cf.
Wittebrood 1995). The same sense of civic duty may ensure that religious voters will also be
habitual voters in certain countries. The church ensures that these voters participate,
regardless of the context of the election. Habitual voters may also be found among party
members, or strong party adherents, for whom an election provides an opportunity to express
their party loyalty. These are but a few individual characteristics that can ensure electoral
participation, regardless of whether elections are held concurrently - or, for that matter, any
other aspect of the electoral context.
The hypothesized variation in the impact of concurrent elections is testable in empirical
analyses. A significant interaction between the contextual characteristic - election is held
concurrently or not - and personal characteristics that identify habitual voters is expected.
Concurrent elections are expected to increase turnout, but only for occasional voters whose
participation is uncertain. A highly politicized system with many habitual voters is likely to
see a relatively small overall change, should it switch to concurrent elections to boost turnout.
3.2.2 Sunday Vot ing
A number of researchers have suggested that Sunday or weekend voting will have a positive
effect on electoral participation, although their theoretical explanations of this often remain
remarkably scanty. Crewe simply states that holding elections on a rest day "presumably
raises turnout by a fraction" (Crewe 1981, p. 241). Oppenhuis restates this, but adds "[i]t is
hard to tell why this would be so" (Oppenhuis 1995, p.30). Like Franklin (1996), he suggests
that it is because work or school does not get in the way of electoral participation on a free
day. This would imply that Sunday voting only has a positive influence on workers and
students. However, this distinction is not reflected in the analytical models, in which "Sunday
voting" is included as a dummy variable to influence everyone. An interaction term with
occupation, or a specific indicator signifying whether Sunday is a day off would be more
appropriate here, so that a positive influence on workers, and an absence of such an effect on
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non-workers could be detected. As was already discussed in Section 3.1, for some voters
Sunday voting will facilitate participation, while for other voters it will not make a difference,
or even hinder participation. Even then, however, matters may be more complicated. 
Research into European elections has shown that - regardless of occupation - Sunday
voting may for some people actually have an adverse effect on turnout. Some respondents
indicated that after a week of hard work, they were not going to sacrifice their day of
relaxation to the call of the voting booth (Blondel, Sinnott & Svensson 1996). Rather than
spending their valuable free time voting, the new worker generation indicated they would
opt for spending their leisure time outside in the park. If any, the effect of weekend voting
would not be positive for this group. This flies directly into the face of the previous reasoning,
as it pertains even to the same segments of the electorate who would, according to this
hypothesis, be less inclined to vote, rather than more inclined. However, this alternative effect
of Sunday voting need not necessarily affect the whole of the workforce: possibly, only the
younger generations share this leisure is sacred attitude, which would call for an interaction
term taking age or cohort into account, to fully tease out the differential impact of Sunday
voting. 
A different effect yet may exist for groups that hold Sundays as sacred, although in more
traditional terms. Devout Christians may be opposed to the conduct of such worldly affairs
as an election on a Sunday. If we take the Dutch case presented in Chapter 2 as an example,
we can see that the consequence of turning to Sunday elections will be twofold. Dutch
Reformed and Calvinist voters - staunch voters in the Netherlands - would cease to
participate, leading to a lower turnout in Sunday elections. As a sidestep, these voters are also
known to primarily support specific parties, notably the Christian parties, so that not only
turnout, but also the election outcome is likely to differ for Sunday elections.
Although it is unlikely that elections are actually held on Sundays in countries where a
large part of the population objects to this on religious grounds, the effect of Sunday elections
may still be a factor in countries where the religious section of society is less dominant. The
effect of Sunday versus weekday elections on religious voters therefore calls for interaction
terms to control for this. To make matters even more complicated: workers may turn out more
in Sunday elections, but not religious workers, or younger workers. Although politically
interested younger workers might participate in greater numbers on Sundays than they would
on weekdays. 
3.2.3 Closeness  o f  the  E lec t ion
A substantial amount of research includes the degree of party competition or the closeness of
the election race as a contextual influence on electoral participation (cf. Powell 1980; Crewe
1981; Rallings & Thrasher 1990; Flickinger & Studlar 1992; Franklin 1996, 1999; Blais &
Dobrzynska 1998; van Egmond, De Graaf, & van der Eijk 1998; Pattie & Johnston 1998).
Invariably however, a close race between the two largest parties is treated as a contextual
factor that is expected to have a generic, positive effect on turnout3. 
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contexts, or of contexts with no individuals." (p. 267) and express the explicit aim to bridge this gap, but then
nevertheless proceed to enter contextual indicators in an individual level model, without reference to possible individual
variation in this influence.
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It is not inconceivable that a close race between the two leading parties or candidates
will have a positive influence on turnout for the whole of the electorate. A close race is likely
to create extra media attention, which in turn is likely to increase awareness of the election
among the electorate and hence increase the chance to participate. However, as argued above,
this heightened awareness will only affect those voters who were not already certain about
participating. 
Another positive effect a close race may have on turnout is likely to affect an even more
specific segment of the electorate. Voters may be more likely to participate in a closely fought
election since they may feel their vote might just tip the scale and thus determine the outcome
of the election. However, this incentive will not affect all of the electorate. It is
understandable that strong supporters of the parties vying for the lead will regard a close
election as an extra incentive to vote. It is rather unclear, however, why a supporter of any of
the other parties should feel affected by the closeness of the election race - a race between
parties other than the one the voter cares about. For these voters, the closeness of the race is
a contextual characteristic that may well be without significance. Any analysis considering
the influence of a close election race on turnout should therefore include information on
support for the different parties. Based on this information, hypotheses regarding the
expected influence of election closeness on different voters can then be specified and tested.
3 .3 When  Theo r y  Mee t s  P r a c t i c e  
So far in this chapter, the discussion has remained at the theoretical level. As in Chapter 2,
however, it is the aim of this study to test theoretical assumptions with empirical analysis. But
when theory meets practice, problems abound.
3.3.1 Methodo log ica l  Cons iderat ions
Combining information at the individual and the contextual level in one model adds
complications to the empirical analysis4. Multiple levels of influence call for an analytical
model that takes into account that the information and influence on individuals stem from
separate levels - context and individual. This is the point that has been raised in Section 3.1
of this chapter, and led to the model presented in Figure 3-4. 
Many authors argue that logistic or OLS regression is unsuited as a method of analysis
for such data, and multi-level models should be used instead. The problem is of a statistical
nature. If individuals are influenced by their political context, and we take samples of
individuals in different political contexts, the individuals in each of the samples have
something in common: their political context. In survey-analytical terms this implies that
there is no independence of observations between the members of the same samples, as far
as the contextual variables are concerned. Independence of observations is one of the
underlying assumptions of regression analysis and related methods. If this condition is not
met - if the observations are clustered - the estimation of the standard errors is biased. The
typical result, in the case of positive correlation between the clustered observations (so called
positive intra-class correlation), is that the standard errors of parameters representing
contextual effects will be underestimated. Underestimated standard errors increase the risk of
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a Type I error. As a consequence, OLS regression may falsely suggest that contextual effects
are statistically significant where in reality they are not5. 
This problem has been recognized in the literature, and especially so in the literature on
educational research, where the influence of the school class on the achievements of
individual students is a comparable analytical problem. Here too, information at the level of
the individual - the pupil - as well as the context - the school class - is analyzed in a single
model. The statistical solution developed in that field is multi-level modeling, also known as
random effects modeling (cf. Goldstein, 1995). This solution is now becoming more popular
in political science as well (see for instance Steenbergen & Jones, 2002).
Multi-level modeling is essentially a regression model that allows for explanatory
variables at different levels. Using regression analysis parlance, the model is estimated based
on the individual level explanatory variables, but the intercept and/or the slope of the
regression are allowed to vary between contexts. Multi-level modeling assumes that the
contextual characteristics are values drawn randomly from a distribution of values describing
those contexts, which explains the alternative name of random effects modeling. The model
thus estimates a regression line based on individual characteristics, and a distribution around
that regression line based on variation that can be explained by the contextual characteristics.
In doing so, it also takes account of the different number of degrees of freedom at the various
levels of information. 
While multi-level modeling provides an elegant solution to the analytical problem of
how to take clustered contextual information into account, this solution does come at a price.
The emphasis on contextual variation in the model puts rather strict requirements on the
empirical data to be used in a multi-level analysis and on the way they are collected. Whereas
traditional data collection in political science aims for a large degree of variation at the
individual level, a proper multi-level design requires sufficient variation at the contextual
level as well. Depending on what is defined as the contextual level, the difficulties this can
create are clear. In analyzing the impact of the political context on electoral participation, the
contextual level is the election, which means that a substantial number of elections have to
be combined in one way or another, be it over time or between countries. As elections remain
rather infrequent events, and elections from which individual level data are available even
scarcer, this may imply that the analytical model is expected to do more than is technically
desirable. 
3.3.2 Empi r i ca l  Compl i cat ions
Apart from technical analytical problems, there are problems of an empirical nature to be
dealt with as well. Choosing the correct analytical method to analyze the available data is
only part of the problem. Making sure that those data are available and of sufficient quality
to enable empirical analysis is the other issue to be dealt with. In this section the practical
obstacles for testing hypotheses regarding concurrent elections, Sunday voting and a close
race empirically will be examined, to establish which of these contextual characteristics is
amenable to fruitful empirical analyses.
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To investigate the influence of a contextual characteristic of any kind, variation in that
characteristic is essential. Variation can be obtained by combining cases (i.e., elections)
between systems, by combining cases from one system over time or by a combination of the
two, provided of course that this actually yields contextual variation. As different political
systems tend to vary on more characteristics than just the one under study, comparison within
one system may be preferable so that the confounding influence of other system
characteristics is minimized. With this in mind, the possibilities for empirical analysis of the
three examples given above will now be evaluated.
Concerning concurrent elections, two cases immediately spring to mind: Sweden and
the USA. Perhaps the best example of a system with variation in concurrent elections is the
United States House elections. In on years, these elections are held concurrently with
presidential (and at times gubernatorial, senatorial and a slew of additional) elections, while
in off years no presidential elections are held. This is the perfect field experiment for
concurrent elections, since US House elections occur frequently, offering a large number of
cases for analysis at the contextual level. In addition, variation is within the political system,
which ensures that confounding influences, encountered when comparing countries, are kept
to a minimum. In addition, there is a large amount of individual level data available for US
House elections, both in on years as well as off years.
In Sweden, elections for government bodies at different levels (national, local) are at
present held concurrently, while before 1970 they were held separately. Swedish research
does indicate that turnout in local elections increases substantially held when these elections
are held concurrently with national elections (research by Oscarsson, personal
correspondence).
Outside the USA and Sweden, concurrent elections occur only sporadically.
Luxembourg has held elections for the European Parliament concurrent with national
elections ever since the former started in 1979, allowing for comparisons with other EU
member states that do not hold EP elections concurrently with national parliamentary
elections (cf. van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996). Because of the relatively limited number of
cases, the influence of concurrent elections is best analyzed in a within-country analysis.
Between-country comparisons of the effect of concurrent elections are much more difficult
to establish.
The day of the week elections are held is generally determined by law, and applies to all
elections held in a country, regardless of the body elected. This means that a comparison of
the influence of Sunday versus weekday voting will in practice only be possible between
political systems. The number of control variables required will then likely far outnumber the
number of countries available for analysis. Reducing the number of explanatory variables
increases the risk of an omitted variable problem. As a consequence, the analytical model
becomes unsolvable. To test the influence of Sunday versus weekday voting on the individual
level may therefore prove unsatisfying.
A close race suffers less from the limitations in variation found with the two previous
examples. Although certain party systems may show a structurally low or high degree of
competition, limiting within-system variation, a substantial number of polities remain in
which the outcome of the election may be an easy victory in one election, while a fierce battle
in the next. This ensures that comparison is possible both within and between systems, so that
an abundant amount of data is available for analysis. This is not to say that the modeling of
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individual variation of the influence of close election races will be simple and
straightforward, as other complications remain. Nevertheless, it appears that analyzing the
influence of a close election race offers the best chance of testing hypotheses empirically. The
remainder of this chapter will elaborate further on how a close race may affect voters -
individually.
3 .4 Up  C lo s e ,  and  Pe r sona l :  A  C lo s e  E l e c t i on  Race
How may closeness affect individual voters? This section aims to shed light on that question
by deriving hypotheses for specific categories of voters. As no research specifying the
workings of closeness at the individual level is available, the assumptions and hypotheses
will be based on broader notions regarding political participation. This exercise in
hypothesizing underlines the contention made earlier in this chapter, that the effects of
contextual characteristics should preferably be theorized at the individual level.
The influence of a close election race on voters may be of a motivational or of a
facilitative nature. The facilitative effect may follow from an increased awareness of the
election among the electorate as a result of increased media attention and intensified
campaigning. Voters may be made more aware of the election and, consequently, show a
greater propensity to vote. In todays mass media societies this facilitative influence may
affect nearly the whole electorate, although it is also the case here that individual variation is
possible, as media consumption is typically not uniform. This facilitative effect of closeness
will be returned to briefly in Chapter 4, but will not form the focus of this research. 
The motivational influence of closeness is based on an expected increase in the
perceived significance of the election to voters, as in a close election each vote may be seen
as being crucial. Voters may perceive the opportunity to swing the balance as an incentive to
vote. The focus of this research will be on this latter, motivational effect of a close election
race. 
Why then should the effect of a contextual constant in an election - the size of the gap
between the leading parties - vary between voters? After all, the facts that define the
contextual characteristic remain objectively the same and equal to the whole of the electorate:
a 1 percent gap between two parties (as indicated by opinion polls) is simply a 1 percent gap.
However, the influence of this context characteristic effect will not be the equal to all voters.
The explanation for that is quite simple: in general, voters do not care about all parties
equally. Neither need they therefore be equally stimulated by the gap between any two
parties. Voters may care for one, or for several parties, while they may not care at all for other
parties6. It is reasonable to assume that a close race will affect a voter if one of the parties in
the lead is a party he or she cares about. By the same token however, it is also reasonable to
assume that a close race will affect a voter rather less if the parties in the lead are parties that
voter does not care about. In that case, it actually does not matter how close the race is, since
it is a race between two options that are both unattractive. The motivational influence of a
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6 It is important to distinguish here between a choice made in the voting booth, which is usually restricted to a single party
in most western democratic systems, and a preference, that is not necessarily restricted to one party. Even though voters
will commonly have to limit their choice to one party or candidate, there is ample research underlining that voters hold
preferences for more than one party, and also that their dislikes for not-preferred parties vary between parties, which may
influence their behavior (Cf. van der Eijk & Oppenhuis 1991; Tillie 1995; van der Eijk & Franklin 1996).
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close election race will thus not affect these voters, but only affect voters who consider voting
for either of the parties in the lead. This implies that the motivational influence of a close
election race is dependent on individual characteristics, more specifically party preferences.
Put in simple terms, to be affected by the closeness of the race between two parties, a voter
will have to care for at least one of these parties, and thus consider at least one of the parties
in the lead as a viable option to vote for.
With this reasoning as a starting point, a threefold categorization of voters will now be
introduced. The three categories will be named the Convinced, the Confounded and the
Condemned voters. The determining factor in establishing which C will fit the voter is
preference for the political parties in the lead - or lack thereof.
3.4.1 Categor iz ing  Voters :  the  Conv inced Voters
The motivational influence of a close race is most obvious for voters who support one of the
leading parties. Obviously these voters will want to support their preferred party in the
election and thus will participate. They may therefore be aptly called Convinced voters. For
these voters, a close election is of most significance as their party stands a good chance of
winning the election - or losing it - and the opportunity to secure this victory or avert defeat
should work as an incentive to turn out on election day. Consequently, these voters are
expected to be most susceptible to the influence of a close race. This effect may even be
augmented for part of the Convinced voters, if the rival party in the lead is evaluated
negatively. Then it becomes a race not just about good, but about good versus evil, which
should enhance the influence of closeness.
3.4.2 The Confounded voters
The situation becomes somewhat more complicated for voters who are attracted to both
parties in the lead. These voters will be labeled Confounded voters, as their wealth of choice
may actually become a problem. As already mentioned, even though most political systems
allow their voters to choose only one candidate or party, this does not mean that voters will
consider only one option during the process of determining which candidate or party to vote
for. They may hesitate between several parties or candidates, all offering various attractive
policy standpoints. Voters may therefore find themselves in a situation where they have
narrowed down their options to a few, or even two parties, and these may be the two parties
in the race for the lead. 
Voters who are attracted to both parties in the race for the lead may show distinctive,
possibly even surprising behavior. These voters are cross-pressured: they are tugged at from
opposing sides as both their favored parties are in the race for the lead and thus in desperate
need of their vote. A vote for one party would be a vote against the other: they are damned if
they do, and damned if they dont. To make matters worse, it is an important vote as well,
since in a close election any single vote could tip the scales. The outcome of this conundrum
could be that the tugging from both sides results in no movement at all. Instead of
participating in the election, voters faced with an abundance of attractive electoral
alternatives may opt out and stay at home, so as not to vote against either of their favored
parties7. The severity of this predicament will increase with the intensity and balance of their
support for the leading parties, and the closeness of the election. Therefore, Confounded
voters are expected to show a reduced propensity to vote in close elections.
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3.4.3 The Condemned Voters
The third category is the Condemned voter. This concerns voters who find neither of the
parties in the lead acceptable at all as an option to vote for. The situation for these non-
supporters should be rather less complicated than for the Confounded voters. In essence,
Condemned voters are condemned to vote for a party they know will not win. They are
therefore not expected to be affected by the closeness of the election race. After all, why
meddle in a race in which none of the potential winners is attractive? To Condemned
voters, none of the leading parties are acceptable alternatives in the voting booth. It then
follows that such a voter will not derive a motivational incentive from a close election race,
since affecting the outcome of the race - by voting for one of the leading parties - is not a
valued option8. 
Table 3-1 Voter Categorization - Expected Motivational Influence of Closeness
Table 3-1 summarizes the expected motivational effect of closeness on the three categories
of voters. Convinced voters favor only one of the parties in the lead, they are expected to
be affected by closeness, by showing an increased propensity to vote in close elections.
Confounded voters favor both parties in the lead. Their chance to vote may, through cross-
pressure, be affected by closeness in a negative way. Condemned voters favor none of the
parties in the lead and are not expected to be affected by closeness - at least not the
motivational effect of closeness. An effect on participation is therefore expected to be
absent. 
Table 3-1 also underscores the risk of a Type II error in an aggregate level analysis.
As the aggregate level model assumes contextual effects to be uniform for the whole of the
electorate, it follows that variation of influence at the individual level will find its way into
such a model as an aggregation of these individual level effects. Table 3-1 shows that the
expected effects of closeness at the individual level do not all run in the same direction.
Depending therefore on the composition of the electorate - the ratio of the respective
Convinced, Confounded and Condemned voter segments - the individual level influences
may cancel out in an aggregate level analysis. The conclusion from an aggregate level
analysis could therefore be that closeness does not affect electoral participation or turnout
Type Description 
Affected by 
closeness? 
Effect on 
participation 
Convinced Favors one of the parties in the lead Very likely Positive 
Confounded Favors both of the parties in the lead Possibly Negative 
Condemned Favors neither of the parties in the lead Unlikely Absent 
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7 Compare Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954) and Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1948) who find that voters
under cross-pressure both delay their choice and tend to downplay the importance of the election.
8 Some might argue that a Condemned voter may be in a different position if they decide to 'vote tactically', in other words
vote for one of the parties that do stand a chance of winning. For Condemned voters this is not an option however, since
they do not prefer either of the parties in the lead. Tactical voters will at least have a certain preference for one of the
parties in the lead, although the party may not be their first preference.
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- but this would be a false conclusion at the individual level, as closeness may certainly
affect electoral participation, although differently for different kinds of voters. Whether
these different individual effects combine to an aggregate effect is, of course, only dependent
on the composition of the electorate
3 .5 Conc lu s i on s
This chapter aimed to integrate the two approaches to explaining electoral participation
generally used. The benefits of integration have already been brought to the fore in Chapter
2. But an integrated model is more than two levels of information simply added together. It
is the argument of this chapter that next to hypotheses regarding the influence of explanatory
factors on electoral participation at the aggregate and the individual level, an integrated
model requires hypotheses about the interaction between these two levels of influence. Figure
3-4 presented a graphical representation of such an integrated explanatory model.
Section 3.2 proceeded to make the argument of a contextual effect with a varying impact
at the individual level conceivable. Three contextual characteristics were selected that are
frequently included in models analyzing aggregate level turnout. For concurrent elections,
Sunday versus weekday voting and a close election race it was discussed how the influence
of these characteristics may vary between voters, depending on their individual
characteristics. 
The remainder of the chapter laid the groundwork for applying the theoretical model to
actual empirical analysis. Problems regarding the method of analysis, as well as empirical
data available for research were discussed, on the basis of which one contextual characteristic
- the closeness of the election race - was selected for further empirical analysis in this book.
The possible effects of closeness on different categories of voters were subsequently
explored. 
The descriptions of the categories of voters given in the previous section all implicitly
referred to an as yet not specified political system with at least two parties. The following
chapter will show that the party landscape is actually of crucial importance to the influence
of closeness as a contextual characteristic. In Chapter 4, the impact of closeness on turnout is
examined at the aggregate level. It will show from a theoretical starting point that closeness
may be an important factor in some political systems, but not in others. In some countries,
the closeness of the election is unlikely to affect any voter. No aggregate level effect can be
established for these countries, since there is no individual level influence. Confusingly
however, the absence of an aggregate level effect may also be caused by a balancing out of
individual level influences, or an individual level influence that affects too few voters to be
noted at the aggregate level. Chapter 5 and 6 will therefore investigate the influence of
closeness at the individual level in two systems, namely Great Britain and Sweden. In these
two countries an aggregate level effect can be established, as Chapter 4 will show. Since an
aggregate level effect can be established, the closeness of the election will affect British and
Swedish voters at the individual level as well. The only question to be answered in Chapters
5 and 6 after the aggregate level analyses of Chapter 4, is whether the closeness of the
election affects all voters equally.
One concluding remark concerns the generalizability of the argument presented here.
The remainder of this study will deal with the influence of closeness on electoral
participation. However, the general argument regarding the varying impact of context
46
binnenwerk.qxd  14-May-03  8:57  Page 46
characteristics on the individual is by no means restricted to the realms of electoral
participation, or political behavior in general. Far more broadly, the theoretical model used is
applicable to virtually all of the social sciences, or any research that chooses to look at the
behavior of individuals, while simultaneously taking into account the context these
individuals act in.
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D i f f e r e n t  R a c e s ,  D i f f e r e n t  O u t c o m e s ?  
A s s e s s i n g  t h e  I n f l u e n c e  o f  C l o s e n e s s  a t
A g g r e g a t e  L e v e l
Chapter 3 argued that the influence of contextual characteristics need not be uniform to
voters, and attempted to show how contextual effects vary in impact depending on
voters individual characteristics. This argument was elaborated for three contextual
characteristics: concurrent elections, Sunday voting and the closeness of the election.
The closeness of the election appeared the most viable variable for an empirical
demonstration of this general theory. The differential impact of closeness on different
segments of the electorate was hypothesized to be linked to differences in affect for
political parties. These differences were explicated in a threefold distinction between
Convinced, Confounded and Condemned voters. Specific expectations about the nature
and direction of the effect of closeness on these categories were derived.
The current chapter continues our exploration of the influence of closeness on
voters. But to go forward, first we have to take one step back. A more detailed description
of the influence of closeness on the individual voter will help our understanding of the
influence of closeness. Chapters 5 and 6 will examine the influence of closeness at the
individual level. The second part of the current chapter will examine the influence of
closeness at the aggregate level. We will therefore start out with an explanation of the
impact of closeness on the individual voter from the Downsian perspective (Downs,
1957), as well as from the viewpoint of expressive voting (Harrop & Miller, 1987). We
will see that a close election is likely to have an impact on all kinds of voters, irrespective
of whether they behave in Downsian or expressive manner. 
The next question that must be addressed is what is meant by a close election? There
is no single answer to this. The examples of various countries that will be presented
below demonstrate that defining closeness requires a country-specific approach. When
made concrete, the abstract concept of a close election refers to different specifications
of what is compared with what in a political system. The theoretical concept of closeness
therefore requires a practical specification tailored to specific political systems. And, as
will be shown, this custom-made concept of closeness may even require to be time-
specific, in order to take into account temporary features of the political arena or the
political agenda. After elaborating the concept of closeness, an additional section will
discuss when we may deem an election close. 
After having established how closeness affects voters, and what it is that makes an
election a close one, we will need to establish how to measure closeness. More than one
option is available here, and the choice between them will be determined by theoretical
as well practical arguments. The pros and cons of the different options will be discussed
in Section 4.2.2 below, and explored empirically in the analyses that make up the last part
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of this chapter. The outcome of the discussion will determine the empirical indicator of
closeness that will be used in the individual level analyses in Chapters 5 and 6.
The implications of the points introduced above will materialize in the second part
of this chapter. On a per country basis, the concept of closeness will be operationalized
and its impact examined. In doing so, we will follow an approach often taken in the
literature, by examining the effect of closeness on turnout levels. An aggregate level
approach, in other words. This approach allows us to get a quick and informative view
of the overall influence of closeness in various political systems, and is helpful in
selecting countries for the individual level analysis of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. If we
find at the aggregate level that closeness is influential, we know that closeness must also
be influential at the individual level. The next step, taken in Chapters 5 and 6, is then to
find out whether closeness is important for all voters, or only for some voters. It should
be noted that the aggregate level approach presented in this chapter has obvious
shortcomings when attempting to draw conclusions at the level of the individual voter
(cf. Chapter 3). 
The country analyses presented in the second part of this chapter will show that, at
the aggregate level, demonstrable effects exist of closeness on turnout, and hence on
voters - at least in some countries. But the analyses will not allow demonstration of the
opposite: that no effect of closeness on voters can be established, simply because no
effect on turnout levels can be established. As the previous chapter argued, individuals
need not respond to contextual effects uniformly. As a consequence, aggregate level
analyses cannot be tests of individual level hypotheses. Small segments of the electorate
may be affected - too small to yield unequivocal results at the aggregate level. Opposite
effects of contextual characteristics on different segments of the electorate may cancel
out, again falsely suggesting an absence of the contextual effect. And the presence of
aggregate level effects may even lull us into a false sense of certainty: that closeness
affects turnout figures, and hence all voters in the estimated fashion. Chapter 5 will show
that, in spite of the convincing aggregate level findings that will be presented in the
current chapter, the closeness of the elections does not affect all voters uniformly, or
equally. Subsequently however, Chapter 6 will show that this individual level variation
in contextual influence is not a uniform truth over different political systems. 
4 .1 Why  More  Tu rnou t  i n  C l o s e  E l e c t i on s ?
In the work of Downs (1957), closeness of an election is, ceteris paribus, expected to increase
turnout. Downs described a rational voter weighing the costs and benefits of his actions, set
within a perfect two-party system. Such a two-party system provides clear choice options -
there are only two parties to vote for. It also provides for clear consequences of the vote-
choice in terms of the allocation of government power following the election outcome. In this
setting, a neck and neck race between the two parties is expected to increase turnout, as a
voters expected benefit increase and the costs connected with voting fall.
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Figure 4-1 Effects of a Close Election Race
Figure 4-1 summarizes the effects a close election race. For the voter, the benefit of voting
consists of contributing - through ones vote - to the election of a government whose policy
standpoints and preferences best match those of the voter. The probability of this expected
benefit is highest in an election in which the two contenders are tied in a close race, since the
chance to swing the election is greatest. The possible influence of a voter is thus at its
maximum, and rational choice argues that as the probability of the preferred outcome
increases, while the costs remain unchanged, the probability of participation in the election
will increase. Moreover, a close election race is expected to increase the campaign and
mobilization efforts made by parties. With victory uncertain, yet within reach, candidates and
parties will go all out to win votes and get convinced supporters to the polls. This means that
in a close election a higher than average portion of the electorate may be expected to be
exposed to these campaign efforts.
Finally, resulting in part from increased party efforts, media attention devoted to the
election can be expected to increase the closer a race is. A neck and neck race is attractive
material for news reporters (cf. Norris, Curtice et al. 1999; Donovitz 1998; Brants & van
Praag jr. 1995) It produces a clear and easily conveyed summary of what the election is about,
which makes for captivating news-reports that quickly get the picture across. In addition,
candidates and parties will try their utmost to create attractive sound-bites and picture
opportunities to make sure that their efforts will be covered by reporters. Continuous updates
of the current standings through opinion polls (the horse race) will illustrate just how close
the candidates are. All in all, it ensures that more people are likely to hear or read about
elections the closer they are. The relatively low complexity of a news message when it is
framed to highlight the closeness of the race, ensures that even a modest interest in the news
is enough to get a grasp of what the election is about. Increased campaign efforts as well as
heightened media attention increase the awareness among the electorate of the election and
of what is at stake. Thus, both help to lower the information costs associated with making a
choice in the election, which will increase the chance to participate.
The Downsian approach has been criticized for being too strict a model of human
behavior, as its own reasoning could not account for the fact that people bother to vote at all.
The chance that a single vote would make the difference in an election is so small, that the
costs will always outweigh the expected benefits of voting. By definition, voting can
therefore not be rational behavior1. In reaction to this, the argument has been made that the
Downsian model should be read in a semi-collective way. Although the chances of one voter
determining the election outcome are minute, voters are likely to see themselves as part of a
    INCREASED EXPECTED BENEFITS 
CLOSE  
ELECTION   INCREASED PARTY EFFORT (LOWER COSTS) 
RACE 
    INCREASED MEDIA ATTENTION (LOWER COSTS) 
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group of voters that will respond in the same way to the electoral circumstances. The
probability that such a group will affect the outcome of the election is far more realistic2. 
Does the argument above imply that closeness can only be influential if one assumes
voters to be sensitive to (changes in) expected costs and benefits? What influence can
closeness exert if the act of voting is not regarded as instrumental, but rather as an expressive
deed reflecting sociological of socio-psychological loyalties that are not affected by costs or
benefit considerations? Actually, the outcome is rather similar to that predicted by the rational
choice model. If the act of voting is seen as an opportunity to express ones allegiance to a
political party (or social class, or religious group, etcetera) then the possible influence of
closeness is dependent on the steadfastness of that allegiance. 
For steadfast backers of their particular political party, closeness should not be of
influence. Indeed, if nothing can keep loyal voters from turning out to support their party, by
the same token no room is left - nor required - for an additional incentive such as a close
election. However, some voters may typically identify with a party, but not always make it to
the polls, for example because their loyalty is less strong. These occasional voters may still
see elections as an opportunity to express their loyalty to a political grouping, but their
electoral participation is less stable than that of the habitual voters discussed above. For the
occasional voters, for whom participation is uncertain, the closeness of the election can be a
significant influence, as it may give them the extra push they sometimes need.
In essence then, an expressive explanation of voting will predict comparable effects of
closeness as the rational choice model does. If voting is seen as wholly expressive with all
voters having exceedingly strong loyalties to parties, then voters will participate regardless of
anything else, including closeness. If voters loyalties prove themselves to be of all kinds of
degrees, then closeness will be of influence, just as it will be in the rational choice model. 
4 .2 De te rm in ing  the  C lo s ene s s  o f  t he  E l e c t i on
After having established how a close election may influence voters, the next natural question
is: when is an election close? This question contains two further ones. First: which
phenomena are to be compared for establishing closeness? Second: is closeness a dichotomy,
or a continuous variable, and how do we expect it to be related to turnout? With respect to
the first question, when comparison is being made, the party landscape will be the deciding
factor. In a two-party or two-candidate system, it is relatively easy to perceive what the
election race will be about. There are only two contenders, so if they are neck and neck, the
election is going to be a close one3. If support for the two contenders is less equal, the election
will be less close.
Few countries, however, exist that have pure two-party systems, and consequently we
may also say that there is more than one form of closeness, although in practice it is more of
a variation upon a theme. Party systems with more than two parties may complicate the
practical definition of who competes with whom, but it does not mean that the concept of a
close election race is not applicable to these systems. A straightforward extension of the two-
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2 It is important to notice that such a group of voters need not be organized in any way. The knowledge among groups of
voters that other voters will act "just like me" suffices.
3 There is a - near academic - caveat here. If the two contenders derive their support from an electorate that is extremely
stable in its choices, then even if the election is close, the outcome will still be a foregone conclusion, since the (slightly)
smaller party will not overtake the (slightly) larger one. 
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party race is a competition between two groupings of parties. Such groupings can be long-
standing associations - the left vs. the right, religious vs. secular, et cetera - but they may also
be less long-lived alliances, such as for example an incumbent government coalition versus
the opposition. If the alternative party groupings are discernable to the electorate, the
competition between these blocs can meaningfully be interpreted as the closeness of the
election. Section 4.3 below, will present several of such long-standing or ad hoc party
groupings.
But there is a third alternative operationalization of an election race conceivable, one
that does not even require more than one contender. A party need not necessarily compete
with other parties, but may also race to beat a threshold. Such a threshold is sometimes
imposed by the electoral system of the country, to limit the number of parliamentary parties.
But, perhaps less easily recognized, such thresholds may also be self-imposed. A party that is
part of an incumbent government coalition may exit the coalition if it fails to retain its share
of the electorate or any other self-imposed target. A dominant party may refuse to take up
governmental responsibility if does not win an absolute majority, or a certain share of the
vote. If these thresholds are recognized by the electorate and are conceived as real thresholds,
not just empty campaign rhetoric, the same concept of a close election is applicable as the
more readily recognizable one in a two-party race.
From the above it is clear that the concept of the closeness of an election is not limited
to the traditional two-party race. Different political landscapes can create different sorts of
races, and Section 4.3 will present a number of empirical examples. It is unlikely that each
and every political system (let alone each election) can be characterized as more or less close
in one respect or another, as will become evident in Section 4.3. But the applicability of the
notion of closeness is not limited to two-party systems alone. In Section 4.4 we will return to
the question of which circumstances make the closeness of an election a relevant factor for
voter participation.
4.2.1 Close  Enough?
Thus far, the closeness of the race and close elections have been used rather arbitrarily to
describe the same concept: an election in which two competitors are running neck and neck.
As we have seen in the previous section, that need not be limited to two competitors, and it
could even be one competitor in a race of its own, but the important question is: when do we
call a race close? 
There is no reason to regard closeness as a dichotomous variable. Even though elections
may be dubbed close or not close, in reality this will mean that the race is close to a certain
degree. It may vary from extremely close to not close at all. The closeness of an election is a
continuum, with the degree of closeness expected to influence turnout. The nature of the
relationship need not be linear, however: if a party is far ahead, it does not make much
difference whether the lead is, say, 20 or 25 percent. It becomes a different story if the lead
is not so large: a 7 percent lead is considerably different from a lead of 2 percent. When it
gets this tight, the closeness of the election is likely to be of influence to voters.
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Figure 4-2 Closeness and Turnout - Hypothesized Relationship
Figure 4-2 shows the hypothesized relationship between closeness, indicated in this example
as the gap between the two leading parties, and turnout. As the gap between the parties
increases, the election becomes less close, and turnout is expected to fall. There is no clear
theoretical lead that may suggest beyond what point along the horizontal axis an election will
no longer be considered close by the electorate of a given country. This point is to be
established empirically, and is likely to vary between different systems. However, the
complicated nature of the hypothesized relationship between closeness and turnout implies
that a substantial amount of data (i.e., a large number of elections) is required to provide us
with unequivocal answers. The analyses presented below will not allow us to establish the fall
off point for the influence of closeness, since we will not be able to control for other factors
affecting turnout. Figure 4-2 is therefore a stylized picture: other factors influencing the level
of turnout are assumed to be controlled for. We can only expect to empirically find the pattern
of Figure 4-2 in countries where contextual factors other than closeness are not of influence
- an assumption that is not feasible. In addition, the pattern of Figure 4-2 can only be detected
empirically if all voters are affected by the closeness of the race, a matter that is contested in
Chapter 3.4 In inspecting the empirical data presented below, the reader may want to keep in
mind that Figure 4-2 reflects the relationship at the individual level.
4.2.2 Measur ing C loseness  
Measuring closeness is not an easy task. Argued very strictly, it should be done on an
individual basis: closeness is an impression that is in the eye of the beholder. Often, such
thorough measurement is unattainable, and alternative indicators have to be sought. Part of
the contradictory empirical findings regarding closeness and turnout (cf. Blais, 2000, p. 59)
may actually be based on the data used to indicate closeness. A discussion of conceivable
indicators is therefore appropriate.
Blais (2000, p. 58) argues that closeness can be measured in two ways, namely
objectively and subjectively. Subjectively, it refers to a subjective perception of the closeness
of the election, i.e. how close the individual voter expects the election to be. Such data would
indeed be most preferable, as indeed the individual perceptions, not the actual facts, will
count when voters make up their mind. This however, requires survey data collected shortly
before the election.
The objective measures of closeness that Blais refers to are actual election results. The
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4 Actually, the upper boundary of the inverted s-curve, the point beyond turnout will not rise, is determined by the
proportion of consistent non-voters in the electorate. The lower boundary, the point below turnout will not fall, is
determined by the proportion of constant voters in the electorate. See also Chapter 7.
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assumption is that the electorate will correctly anticipate these actual results (Blais, ibidem).
Actual election outcomes seem at first instance attractive for indicating closeness. As election
returns are usually well documented, data availability is typically not a problem, which
means that virtually all elections ever put on record can be analyzed. In addition, election
outcomes are also the most correct information in determining (retrospectively) how close the
elections actually turned out to be. Not surprisingly therefore, election returns are commonly
used to assess the influence of closeness on turnout. There is a drawback to this, however,
which appears to elude many researchers who use election results for indicating closeness:5
election outcomes tend not to be known before the actual affair is over. As the actual result
of an election is not available to voters before the election, voters cannot base their behavior
on this result. Consequently, the actual election outcome need not be an indicator of the
closeness of the election, which we expect to affect voters behavior. This point is most
clearly brought out in elections with surprising outcomes. If the actual outcome differs
substantially from prior expectations, closeness based on actual outcomes would give us an
incorrect value. If an election is commonly perceived as particularly close, we expect turnout
to be positively affected, at least among some segments of the electorate (cf. Chapter 3). If
actual election results subsequently show that it was not that close a race after all, analyses
of closeness and turnout based on the election outcome would suggest that turnout was
uncommonly high for an election that was not very close. An example if this is found in the
1992 elections in Great Britain. For the elections of that year, the opinion polls predicted a
dead heat, with Labour leading the Conservatives by as little as one percent. The actual result
saw a Conservative lead of over 7 percent. Based on actual election outcomes, we would
conclude that the election was not very close, and a high turnout would not be expected. The
opposite is equally possible: an election that was expected to be a forgone conclusion could
turn out to be a dead heat between the main contenders. In such a case, turnout would be
strikingly low for an election that proved very close in hindsight. Both situations obscure our
view of the influence of closeness. The British election of 1992 is an example of a false
negative: an election appears not close in hindsight, but was experienced as very close by the
electorate when it decided to participate or not. The second case is an example of a false
positive: an election that proved in retrospect to be very close, but was not expected to be so
beforehand. However, since the election was not expected to be close, and voters were not
aware of how close it would turn out to be, the closeness of the election can not have
motivated people to participate. 
Other sources of information regarding the closeness of the election are therefore
preferred, sources of information in line with the theoretical concept of closeness as an
impression in voters minds. For this impression to take form, the information needs to be
available before an election. A valid indicator of closeness should therefore be based on
information that is available before the election. Such an indicator before the facts that is
often readily available can be obtained from opinion polls. Opinion poll data is often
available to the electorate before the elections. Indeed, in many countries, the race as
reflected by the polls has become a central part of the media coverage of elections.
Newspapers and TV news programs thus ensure that the latest figures are directly brought to
55
5 Note Cox (1988) as an exception. 
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the public, typically in conjunction with the changes since a previous poll. Any voter
interested in politics is thus likely to be informed about the parties standings of the moment,
and the easily digestible character of the information ensures that even a marginally interested
audience is likely to pick up some of the information in passing. In as far as these data are
still available after the election, they are a much better indicator of closeness as conveyed to
and perceived by the electorate at the time of the election. 
For opinion poll data to form an acceptable indicator for the closeness of the election,
some requirements have to be met. First, the data will have to be available to the public, in
other words published in the media, and published shortly before the elections. Opinion polls
published six months before an election are of no use, since voters preferences can change
substantially in the intervening period. Second, the opinion polls will have to show a certain
degree of consistency. Typically more than one poll is presented in the run up to the election,
often from competing polling agencies. Contradictory opinion polls result in a situation that
is difficult to interpret, for both voters and researchers of electoral participation. Thirdly, the
polls need to be reliable and credible. Implausible opinion poll predictions will be dismissed
by voters, and will not influence them.
The final part of this chapter will compare the closeness-turnout relationship for actual
outcome data and opinion poll data, respectively. Based on the argument set out above,
closeness based on opinion polls is expected to be a better predictor of turnout than closeness
based on election outcomes, if indeed closeness is of influence at all.
Ironically, the actual accuracy of opinion polls is not of real importance. Opinion polls
by themselves create the reality (i.e., the character of the context in which an election takes
place) to which the electorate may respond in the run up to the election. If the polls turn out
to be wrong, voters will only find that out after they have already acted on them. The
exception to this argument is of course a track record that is so bad that voters lose confidence
in the polls, and will no longer regard them as valid indicators of the political situation. In
such a case, it is likely that the attention devoted to opinion polls by the media will also
decrease.
While opinion polls are more widely obtainable than subjective measures of closeness,
their availability is still not universal, especially in comparison to election outcome data. Not
all countries have an established history of polling, moreover, their transient news value often
leads to poor documentation and archival of polls. All of this puts restrictions on the number
of elections that may eventually be analyzed.
4 .3 D i f f e r en t  Coun t r i e s ,  D i f f e r en t  Race s
This section will make the step from theory to practice. The potential influence of the
closeness of an election on turnout will be analyzed for a number of political systems. As was
argued in Section 4.2, different political systems call for different operationalizations of the
closeness of the election. Determining what the race is about in each country will therefore
form an important part of the current section.
As mentioned already, the analyses presented here are all at the aggregate level. Turnout
rates will be compared to see the extent to which the election was close. This allows a quick
but informative overview of the influence of the closeness of the election on turnout in
different political systems and of different interpretations of closeness. But, as was already
mentioned in the first section of this chapter, these analyses are inconclusive with respect to
56
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the effect of closeness on individual voters. Where there is reason to do so, we will discuss
this in the analyses below, which may help the reader to get a better understanding of the
concept of closeness, and how it may affect some parts of the electorate, but not others. The
implications of these explorations at the individual level will further be analyzed in Chapter
5 and 6.
The political systems and elections that will be analyzed are the US Presidential
Elections, and parliamentary elections in the UK, the Netherlands, Ireland, Norway, Sweden
and Germany. This selection allows us to explore the relationship between closeness and
turnout in several political systems, varying in several characteristics such as party landscape
and electoral system. The limited number of elections available for each of these systems
implies however that the analyses are exploratory in character: when data are available for a
small number of elections to study, the number of degrees of freedom is small, so that the
complexity of models is restricted here. The following analyses therefore present plots of
turnout vis-à-vis the closeness indicators, measured by election outcomes and opinion polls,
respectively. Linear regression lines are included in the plots. Although the actual relationship
between closeness and turnout is not expected to be linear (cf. Figure 4-2, above), a linear
relationship will be used as a heuristic in describing the relationship. A visual inspection of
graphs and regression lines will indicate whether or not this way of summarizing the
relationship falls short. In inspecting the following plots, the reader may therefore want to
keep Figure 4-2 in mind.
4.3.1 U.S .  P res ident ia l  E lec t ions
The one-dimensional, two-party system that was used by Downs to develop his original
model of rational interactions between voters and parties is a very favorable context for the
notion that a close election will increase turnout levels. There are two parties that compete
for a single prize, which is indivisible. Niche parties that cater to the preferences of small
segments of the electorate are not natural to, or encouraged by, the system. Accepting the
assumption that a close race mostly affects voters who support one of the parties in the race,
and that the two main parties cater to the preferences of the majority of the electorate, such a
two-party system ensures that a close race will affect a large portion of the interested voters
and not just a small segment of the electorate. As turnout is the sum of the actions of all
voters, the influence of an election race affecting a large part of the electorate will most likely
be visible in a statistical analysis at the aggregate level.
True two-party or two-candidate systems are rare: against all odds, third-party
candidates with absolutely no chance of winning6 seem bound to appear wherever an election
is called. This is true for the USA as well, where third party candidates often vie for the
presidency. For all practical purposes however, these minor party candidates may be ignored,
not in the least since the far majority of the electorate does so as well. Taken this into account,
the Presidential elections of Downs native USA usually qualify as a two-party system7.
Presidential elections can justifiably be viewed from a national perspective, and they also
57
6 Winning is defined here in the narrow sense of the word, of capturing (some of) the office(s) to be filled by the election.
Of course, a third party can deem its quest fruitful with smaller successes: in the 2000 US presidential elections Ralph
Nader was content with a vote share that would win him federal funding, rather than the presidency.
7 With a few notable exceptions, such as the candidacies of McCarthy, Anderson and Perot.
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tend to be the dominant political race in the country, which makes them very suitable for
testing the influence of closeness on turnout.
Figure 4-3 USA - Presidential Elections
Figure 4-3 indicates that the expectation of an aggregate effect of closeness on turnout is not
warranted on the basis of either national election outcomes or opinion poll predictions.
Moving from left to right, turnout is expected to fall, and a downward sloping regression line
is expected. This is clearly not observed. Moreover, the regression model is unable to explain
the variance in turnout at all. A visual inspection of the separate data-points does not suggest
that the poor fit is caused by forcing a linear equation on a non-linear relationship.
An explanation for the apparently absent influence of closeness on national turnout
levels may be found in an erroneous implicit assumption. Although the presidential election
is a race between two national candidates, the Electoral College ensures that it is rather a
situation of 50 simultaneous statewide elections than a single national race. Even in the
closest race, only a few states are battlegrounds where the race is close and where the states
results may determine the national outcome. A state-level analysis may therefore be more
appropriate than the national analysis presented here.
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Figure 4-4 USA - Turnout per State in 2000 Presidential Elections as Compared to 1996 Turnout,
Battleground versus Non-Battleground States (solid line indicates non-battleground
average, dotted line indicates battleground average. USA average = +2.2%)
Figure 4-4 presents such a state-level analysis, comparing turnout rates per state for the 2000
and 1996 presidential elections8. For conciseness of presentation, rather than presenting
closeness as a continuous variable, a somewhat crude dichotomy has been introduced:
whether or not a state was regarded as a battleground state in the final weeks of the 2000
elections9. Battleground states are states that are expected to show a very close election race,
and are often the focal point of the electoral campaigns of both candidates. Figure 4-4 shows
that the increase in turnout from 1996 to 2000 indeed is higher in the 17 battleground states
than elsewhere. All but one (Maine) show an increase in turnout over the 1996 election, and
all but four (Arkansas, Maine, Washington and West Virginia) show an increase in turnout
that exceeds the average increase in turnout of 2.2 percent for the USA as a whole. Where the
non-battleground states show an average increase in turnout of 1.9 percent (lower line), the
average turnout increase is 3.3 percent for the battleground states (upper line). These figures
suggest that closeness is of importance for turnout in the American system - but only if one
knows where to look: at the level of the actual races rather than at the (artificial) national tally.
At the national level, the impact of closeness is negligible. At the state level however, it
significantly influences turnout, at least in 2000.
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8 Figure 4 4 presents the turnout rate per state as compared to turnout in that state in the previous Presidential election.
Structural turnout variations between states, caused by different levels of education, voting regulations and so forth
would render a state by state comparison of turnout rates fruitless. 
9 Selection of battleground states based on Erikson and Sigman, 2000.
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4.3.2 Great  Br i ta in
Apart from the United States, there are other examples of two-party or two-candidate
competitions, such as the parliamentary elections in Great Britain. In Britain, two large
players, Labour and the Conservatives, dominate political competition. These are the only
two viable alternatives for a majority in the House of Commons, and the majoritarian
electoral system almost ensures that the race will therefore be between these two parties,
with all other parties being close to insignificant as far as the prize of wining a
parliamentary majority is concerned. That part of the electorate which considers voting for
either of these parties is the part that is most likely to be affected by the closeness of the race
between the Conservatives and Labour10. This is however not the entire electorate. For
supporters of the smaller parties such as the Liberals and Social Democrats, and national
parties such as SNP and Plaid Cymru, a close election may be far less relevant. Closeness is
thus likely to affect a large part, but not necessarily the entire electorate. 
Figure 4-5 Great Britain - Two Largest Parties
The influence of closeness at the national level is much more apparent in the British than in
the American case. There is a clear linear relationship between closeness and turnout, without
any trace of nonlinearity, which is highlighted by the regression line and the substantial
explained variance. One could even consider the 2001 elections an outlier11. The linear trend
does not contradict the relationship hypothesized in Figure 4-2, as that figure refers to the
individual level. The influence of closeness appears strongest if opinion poll data is used, as
was hypothesized.
In Britain too, we may consider the election itself a multi-level one (like in the USA),
with separate constituencies, and an overall result in parliament. This raises the question
whether closeness matters more from a national perspective or from a local one. This
question will be left for later (Chapter 5) where it will be discussed in detail.
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10 See also the discussion in Chapter 3, summarized in Table 3 1.
11 If the 2001 elections are removed from the analysis, the b estimate is -.48, with an R2 of .32 for the actual outcome data,
while b is -.43 and R2 is .43 for the opinion poll data. Although the concept of outliers may appear non-applicable to an
analysis of actual election outcomes, the reader is reminded that other contextual factors may influence the election and
are ignored in this analysis.
binnenwerk.qxd  14-May-03  8:57  Page 60
4.3.3 Cal l ing  a  Mul t i -par ty  Race  -  The  Nether lands
The straightforward nature of closeness in a two-party system is changed dramatically if
closeness is applied to a multi-party political system. Determining what the race is about,
and determining who is in the lead and by what measure, can become very complicated.
In the Netherlands, single-party governments are inconceivable and the political
landscape is sufficiently fluid for coalitions to be formed from a relatively large collection
of parties. This makes the outcome of an election, in terms of coalition formation by no
means a predictable affair. As not even the largest party is guaranteed a place in
government, parties tend to keep their options open before the election, merely hinting at
coalition preferences and only rarely ruling out any options before the election takes
place. Never say never is a vital rule for prospective coalition partners in Dutch politics.
Obviously, this presents serious problems in operationalizing the concept of
closeness in such a political landscape. Indicating closeness by measuring the gap
between the largest two parties lacks substantive political meaning. Although it is an
unwritten rule that the largest party takes the lead in coalition negotiations, in the end the
largest party may still not even be part of the coalition. Any relationship between turnout
figures and closeness measured as the gap between the two largest parties is therefore
likely to be weak, at best.
Figure 4-6 The Netherlands - Two Largest Parties
Figure 4-6 present a rather mixed image. If we look at the actual outcome data, a linear
relationship can be detected, but only if we consider the elections of 1972 and 2002 as
outliers. A strong negative trend can then be detected. However, for the opinion poll data
there is no argument for removing the 2002 data from the model. The 1972 data could still
be regarded an outlier, but so could the 1986 data. Indeed, if a strong negative slope is not
hypothesized, then the elections of 1998, 1981 and 1977 may also be regarded outliers. Since
the removal of one or two data-points has such a strong impact on the relationship between
closeness and turnout, the conclusion will have to be that the influence of the closeness of the
election is not straightforward in the Netherlands. However, this does not mean that factors
apart from closeness may explain the particular results for 1972, 2002 or any of the potential
outliers. Explaining these is not the particular aim of this chapter.
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An alternative form of closeness can be conceived of as well for the Netherlands. This
would look at elections as a race between the incumbent government coalition versus the 50
percent mark of parliamentary seats. The question then becomes whether or not the governing
coalition is able to maintain its majority in the elections. This presupposes, of course, that a
coalition actively seeks a renewal at the end of its mandate to govern. This is actually
relatively rare in the Netherlands: in the last three decades, only two of a total of nine cabinets
made continuation their election-goal12. Defining closeness as the gap between coalition
support and a 50 percent majority mark presents us with only two cases. To make matters
more complicated: usually there are no alternative coalition alliances or shadow cabinets
presented as alternative to the incumbent coalition. Parties may hint at coalition preferences
before an election, but only on one occasion (1972) were firm commitments made before the
election. Figure 4-7 presents the influence of closeness defined as the gap between the two
largest parties, as in Figure 4-6, with the exception of 1972, 1986 and 1998, when closeness
is defined as the gap between the incumbent or proposed coalition and 50 percent of the vote.
Figure 4-7 The Netherlands - Parties and Coalitions
Figure 4-7 shows that the relationship remains weak and susceptible to the influence of
outliers. Although the results improve somewhat, closeness still appears a concept of limited
value in explaining Dutch turnout figures. It appears to be a concept that needs to be defined
for each election.
4 .3 .4 I r e l and :  One  o r  Mo re  Pa r t i e s ?
The Irish political party system can be described as a multi-party system, although the
balance of power is far more skewed than in the Dutch political landscape. Since gaining
government power in 1932, Fianna Fáil has dominated the political system, only infrequently
handing government power over to a coalition formed by Fine Gael and the Labour Party.
Well into the 1980s, the Irish political landscape showed Fianna Fáil pitched against the rest
of the field, reinforced by Fianna Fáils refusal to enter into any coalition governments
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12 This occurred in the 1986 elections, when the incumbent CDA/VVD coalition sought re-election, as well as in 1998,
when the PvdA/VVD/D66 or 'purple' coalition vied continuation (Cf. Table 2 2, Chapter 2).
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whatsoever (cf. Mair & Marsh 1999). Forced by electoral misfortunes, this stance was
abandoned from 1989 onwards, after which the Irish political landscape became considerably
more open. Consequently, government formation have become far less predictable as old
barriers gave way and coalitions previously unthinkable were formed.
For the period until the mid-1980s, closeness may be operationalized as the gap between
Fianna Fáils support and a majority13. From the mid-1980s onward, any influence that this
sort of closeness may have had is likely to diminish, as by that time a Fianna Fáil majority
had become unlikely. It is hard to provide an acceptable alternative to this race, as no other
single party has come close to a majority and as the coalition preferences of parties were
rarely proclaimed before an election (the sole occasion is 1997, when Fianna Fáil and the
Progressive Democrats proposed a coalition before the elections were held). Closeness - as
depicted by the gap between Fianna Fáils share of the vote and 50 percent - may therefore
show an influence on electoral participation in Ireland until into the 1980s, although its
impact is likely to diminish after that. 
Figure 4-8 Ireland - Fianna Fáil vs. 50%
The difference in findings based on actual outcomes and opinion poll data is remarkable, and
contrary to expectation. A healthy relationship between turnout and closeness exists based on
election outcomes, while the opinion poll data suggests an absence of any relation. Apart
from suggestions that the Irish would simply tell opinion pollsters one thing and then do
something other at the polling station, an alternative explanation might be found in the
specific operationalization of closeness in Ireland. Imagine a frozen electorate where
between-party fluctuation at elections is zero. The degree to which the - otherwise stable -
voters turn out will determine each partys share of the vote. Differential turnout between
party adherents will determine who will win or lose, and how close the race is14. As a result,
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13 Actually, 50 percent of parliamentary seats are essential in a parliamentary system, not necessarily a majority of the
popular vote. The complicated nature of Irelands STV system makes the exact translation of electoral support measured
in opinion polls into seats virtually impossible. Therefore, in the analyses undertaken popular vote share was used as
indicator.
14 Although the absolute deviation is used, for the period observed here only once did Fianna Fáil actually gain more that
50 percent of the vote. A decrease of closeness therefore implies a decrease in Fianna Fáil's support.
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closeness will be dependent on differential turnout of party loyalists, not vice versa. The
degree of closeness will be associated with the willingness of the different segments of the
electorate to participate in a particular election. This process may elude us when using
opinion poll data if no provision for individual turnout probability is made, and could
therefore explain the findings of Figure 4-8. As a provision for turnout probability is
inherently reflected in actual election outcomes, opinion polls may thus prove confusing,
rather than illuminating. In addition to this, the race in Ireland is actually a multi-level race
as well, with elections taking place in multi-member constituencies. Aggregate analyses seem
therefore insufficient in determining the influence of the closeness of the election on turnout
in Ireland.
4.3.5 A Scand inav ian Two-b loc  Race
As in Ireland, the party system in Norway and Sweden has been dominated for most of the
modern era by a single large party, in both countries the Social Democrats, opposed by a
number of smaller parties. In such a multi-party political landscape the concept of closeness
as a race between the two largest parties is not meaningful, since the gap will be too large to
be meaningful if a relationship at the individual level is hypothesized as illustrated in Figure
4-2. However, in both countries it has become commonplace to look at the party system in
terms of two opposing blocs. On the one hand, the social-democratic bloc formed by the
social-democratic party combined with parties further to the left, and a bourgeois bloc
consisting all other parties on the other hand. In Norway, these two blocs are composed of
Det Norske Arbeiderparti (Labor party) together with the Sosialistik Venstreparti and the Rød
Valgallianse on the left, and Høyre, Kristelig Folkeparti, Senterpartiet, Venstre, and the
Fremskrittspartiet on the bourgeois side, together with small (and usually short-lived)
emerging parties on both sides. For Sweden, the left side is made up by the SAP (labor party),
the Vänsterpartiet and in recent years the green Miljöpartiet, while the bourgeois camp is
made up of the Center party, Moderaterna, Folkpartiet, Kristdemokraterna and, for a short
period, the Ny Demokrati party. 
The political landscape in Norway and Sweden is viewed as a two-bloc structure - by
both the electorate and the political elite.15 Elections are therefore seen as competitions
between blocs, frequently focusing on whether or not the social democrats will be strong
enough to form the government. In periods that bloc-discipline is high, the multi-party
political landscape in these countries overlays a more basic division in two camps. By
defining closeness of an election as the gap between these two blocs, this concept is
applicable to the Swedish and Norwegian cases. Defined in this way, closeness may affect
turnout levels, especially because the bloc competition involves virtually the entire electoral
spectrum, in other words almost the entire electorate.
64
15 Especially in Norway, the strength of 'bloc-discipline' varies over time. Sometimes parties do not opt or only temporarily
commit themselves to a bloc. In the nineties, there appears to be a downward trend in bloc-discipline, as the European
community issue consistently splits the traditional party alignment. 
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Figure 4-9 Sweden - Two Blocs
For Sweden, the data suggests an aggregate level relationship between closeness and turnout,
as can be seen in Figure 4-9. This relationship is visible when looking at election outcomes,
and even more so when looking at opinion poll data. 
Figure 4-10 Norway - Two Blocs
Although the Norwegian party system shows a bloc division similar to that in Sweden, the
bloc adherence of political parties is typically not as strong. The issue of EU membership
proved a challenge to the bloc structure particularly in the elections of 1973 and 1993, when
pro and con positions cut straight through bloc-lines. In spite of this, Figure 4-10
demonstrates the presence of a relationship between closeness and turnout for both opinion
poll and actual outcome data.
Excluding the EU dominated elections of 1973 and 1993, the effect of closeness on
turnout in the Norway is very strong: b is -.90 with an R2 of .84 for the actual outcome data,
while b is -.87 with an R2 of .65 for the opinion poll data. This finding supports the thesis that
the EU-membership issue cuts across the traditional bloc structure, making these elections
less susceptible to the effect of closeness as defined between blocs.
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4.3.6 Germany:  a  Race  between Par t i es  o r  Coa l i t ions?
Closeness can be defined in several ways in the German political system. The traditional
close race is about government power, but that does not yet solve the question how to define
it. Two large parties dominate the political landscape: the Christian Democratic CDU/CSU
and the Socialist SPD. Absolute majorities are rare: only once, in 1957 did the CDU/CSU
obtain 50.2 percent of the vote. Neither of the two large parties can expect to attain an
absolute majority by themselves. Grand coalitions are equally rare, and have happened only
once (from 1966-1969). Consequently, the competition for government power is between
these two large parties, where each strives to be the leader of coalitions with one of the minor
parties, while the chancellor is either the CDU/CSU or SPD leader. From this view, closeness
concerns the gap between the two dominant parties.
Figure 4-11 Germany - Two Largest Parties
Figure 4-11 shows that closeness defined as the gap between the two largest parties appears
to have little influence at the aggregate level in Germany. However, using actual outcome
data, a weak relationship can be detected. If opinion poll data is used, virtually no relationship
between closeness of the election and turnout can be established. 
Alternatively, competition for government power - and hence closeness -may be defined
as a race between coalitions, or one coalition against the 50 percent mark of the vote. German
governments are virtually always coalitions, and from the 1960s until 1998, these coalitions
were typically between the FDP and either CDU/CSU or SPD. Rather than wait for the
outcome of the election and then determine their choice between either of the two large
political parties, the coalition preference of the FDP was virtually always known before the
election (cf. Bawn 1999; Roberts, 1988). Therefore, closeness of the race may also be defined
as the gap between the coalition - the incumbent or a newly proposed coalition - versus a
legislative majority.
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Figure 4-12 Germany - Coalition vs. 50%
Neither of these interpretations of closeness appears fruitful in explaining turnout fluctuations
in Germany. Figure 4-12 displays a largely unstructured pattern, regardless of whether the
race between parties or coalitions is examined, and regardless of whether opinion polls or
actual outcomes are used. Closeness does not appear to be a relevant concept in German
political participation - at the aggregate level. Whether closeness is without influence at the
individual level cannot be established from these aggregate level analyses.
One explanation for a possible absence of an effect of closeness on turnout in Germany
may be found in the particular make-up of the German political landscape, in which the two
largest parties have for a very long time been at the mercy of the FDPs coalition preferences.
Having fallen from grace with the FDP, the only route to government power left open to SDP
or CDU/CSU is an absolute majority, an outcome never achieved after 1957. The red-green
coalition of 1998 is the first example of a break in kingmaker role of the FDP (apart from the
Grand Coalition of 1966). For the electorate, it therefore appears that there is not much left
to choose after the FDP has made up its mind, while the FDP is unlikely to opt for a coalition
that is not certain to gain a majority. As a result of this, closeness measured as the gap
between the two largest parties or coalitions is a concept that may lack substantive meaning
and influence in the German system. 
There are, however, other possibilities for looking at close races in the German system.
For each of the smaller parties, there is a race that involves whether or not they gain
parliamentary representation. Such races typically involve the FDP, but in a somewhat less
comfortable position. The German electoral threshold of 5 percent was consciously set up to
prevent a host of splinter parties from entering - and potentially paralyzing - parliament, a
reaction to the experiences of the Weimar republic. This device has indeed proved successful
in keeping the number of parties relatively limited. Occasionally, however, it also proves a
hurdle for some of the parties that have already been well established as part of the regular
German landscape, notably the FDP, the Grünen and recently the PDS16. A close race for
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16 Gaining a minimum of 5 percent of the nationwide vote is not the only way to enter parliament: gaining at least 3 seats
directly through 'Erstimmen' is sufficient as well, an approach that has proved successful for the (regionally
concentrated) PDS. For the 'other' minor parties this is an even more remote option than the 5 percent hurdle.
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these parties and their supporters means making sure they get enough votes to make it into
the Bundestag. When their support threatens to fall below the 5 percent, these parties are
forced to engage in extra campaign efforts to avert this, which in turn leads to additional
media attention. Considering the vital role the minor parties play in the coalition formation,
their exclusion from parliament is not an altogether trivial affair. The impact of such a form
of close race on turnout rates at the aggregate level is however likely to be small, as it will
affect only a limited section of the electorate, namely those who sympathize with these
parties and - possibly - their potential coalition partners. At the aggregate level the effects of
closeness defined in this way will therefore be marginal, although at the individual level they
may well be of importance, be it only to specific segments of the electorate. At the aggregate
level, significant results are therefore unlikely to show up. Empirical analyses confirm this:
for both the FDP and the Grünen the explained variance is very small, while the b-estimate
is often positive where it is expected to be negative17. 
4 .4 Compa r i ng  C lo s ene s s
The aim of this chapter was to determine whether closeness affects turnout levels in different
political systems, going beyond the two-party setting originally described by Downs (1957).
In the empirical journey of this chapter, a few findings stand out. For one, it has become
apparent that the concept of closeness is useful in different poolitical and electoral systems.
Closeness is a concept that can be applied in different systems and under different
circumstances. That is not to say that the specification of this concept is identical in all
systems. In the approach taken in this chapter, it was not attempted to force closeness into the
straightjacket of one identical universal operationalization, which would have been the gap
between the two largest parties. As we have seen already, for certain countries, e.g., Sweden,
Norway, such an approach would hardly make sense. Rather, cross-cultural equivalence or
comparability was sought in which closeness is comparable in meaning and practical
operationalization, allowing for comparisons between countries that a strict identical
operationalization would not allow18. In practical terms, this means that the operationalization
of closeness applied in this chapter varies from one system to the other. Indeed, in some
systems it varies even from one election to the next. These variations are based on a single
theoretical concept of closeness, which will be discussed further below. But first let us see
how the different concepts of closeness match up in a combined analysis. 
A combined graphical analysis of closeness versus turnout for the political systems
treated in this chapter is presented below. All but one system is presented; as was already
established above, for the USA closeness should not be measured at the national, but rather
at the state level. As sufficient information at the state level was not available, especially
regarding opinion polls, the USA is left out of this comparative analysis. 
68
17 Estimates for the FDP are .05 for b, R2 equals .00 for actual outcome data, b is .25 with an R2 of .01 for opinion poll
data. For the Grünen b equals .67 with R2 of .03 for actual outcome data, b equals -.51 and R2 equals .05 for opinion poll
data. Only in the last case is the relationship in the expected direction.
18 On the notion of cross-cultural equivalence or comparability see Mokken, 1971, who also refers to Przeworski and
Teune, 1966.
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Figure 4-13 Closeness and Turnout - Between-Countries Comparison
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In this overall analysis, a clear downward trend can be detected, as Figure 4-13 shows. The
explained variance shows that here is a moderate relationship between closeness and turnout.
The relationship is of about the same magnitude for the two indicators for closeness, actual
election outcome data and opinion poll data. 
In the analysis of Figure 4-13 we are no longer focusing on one country, but comparing
between countries. As a consequence, the influence of contextual characteristics is likely to
increase. Differences between elections from different countries are typically greater than
differences between elections within a single country. In the graphs of Figure 4-13 this is
reflected by patterns in the data from a single country. For example, the Irish elections tend
to cluster in the lower half of the graphs. These patterns are an indication of omitted variables,
explaining turnout differences between countries. Ideally, variables describing contextual
differences should explain this between-country variation in a comparative analysis such as
that presented in Figure 4-13. However, such an analysis falls beyond the scope of this
chapter. In Figure 4-14 we nevertheless attempt to correct for these country characteristics.
Figure 4-14 attempts to balance out the between-country differences. The graphs again
present closeness vis a vis turnout, but this time turnout is presented in an amended form. For
each country, turnout per election is presented as the deviation from the average turnout for
that country. A positive turnout figure thus indicates that turnout for the particular election
was above average for that country, while a negative turnout figure indicates that turnout was
below the country average turnout. The expectation is that close election will see a positive
turnout figure, while turnout is expected to drop in less close elections. The interrupted line
indicates the zero line, or average turnout. The uninterrupted line is again the linear
regression estimate.
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Figure 4-14 Closeness and Turnout - Deviation from Average Country Turnout
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The graphs presenting turnout as deviation from the average per system turnout present a
somewhat tighter pattern, especially in the case of actual election outcomes. For the opinion
poll predictions, the pattern is about the same as in Figure 4-13, although a clear linear trend
can still be detected. Our efforts to establish a comparable notion of closeness have thus paid
off. 
4.4.1 Def in ing C loseness
So what then is closeness? What defines a close race, if we decide to go beyond the
needlessly restrictive definition of the gap between the two largest parties? Elements of the
answer have already been suggested in our discussion of closeness for the different political
systems in this chapter.
Closeness as treated in this chapter can be broadly defined as a race for something. It
is a race in which a party strives to make it beyond a certain hurdle. This hurdle may take
different shapes, making closeness a flexible concept. In the classic case, closeness is
regarded as the horse race between two parties or candidates. The hurdle to overcome is thus
a relative one: the vote share of the competing party. This implies that in this case the line is
not drawn at 50 percent, but could well be lower, if third parties manage to gain a sizable
share of the vote as well.
In other forms of closeness the line may well be drawn at 50 percent, the hurdle to
overcome being a majority of the popular vote19. In the case of a pure two-party or two-
candidate race, this amounts to closeness to ones opponent. If more than two parties are
involved, several forms of closeness may be defined. It may be a simple race of the two
largest parties fighting for the lead. Alternatively, one party may be pitted against a number
of other parties. The latter group may propose to form a coalition government, but that is not
a requirement. Thirdly, groups of parties may compete for a majority, as seen in the case of
Sweden and Norway. Lastly, closeness may be defined as the race of one or several parties
against a self-imposed or constitutionally imposed hurdle. 
A constitutional hurdle is introduced in some political systems if electoral regulations
impose an electoral threshold that will have to be met, making elections for small parties a
race against parliamentary extinction if they fail to beat the threshold. Closeness for these
parties and their electorate is about making it beyond the hurdle of the electoral threshold.
Lastly, the hurdle to overcome may be self-imposed. To aim to better their electoral
chances, and convince their electorate that the heat is on this election, parties may sometimes
connect political consequences to their electoral success that are not necessarily imposed by
the electoral system or the political landscape. A large (or even the largest) party may indicate
in advance that it will refuse to take part in government if it does not win a certain share of
seats in the election. Smaller coalition parties may also adopt this strategy. Even though an
electoral majority may not be at stake, the message communicated to the electorate is still that
there are hurdles to be overcome, where their vote is vital.
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19 Of course, for parliamentary elections parties will generally be more focused on gaining a large share of the seats that
of the popular vote. In general, however, the latter is required for the former, even in so-called non-proportional and
district systems.
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4.4.2 What  Makes  C loseness  Work?
Determining what different forms and shapes closeness may take is one thing, but it is not
enough to ensure that the electorate will be receptive to it. For that, a few more conditions
will have to be met.
First, the race will have to be relevant and significant to the electorate. The gap between
the two largest parties can always be determined in any established democratic system, but
this does not mean that it will be important for the electorate. In the Dutch multi-party
landscape, coalition negotiations following the election play a crucial and determining role.
Being the largest party after an election is at best a good hint that the party will end up in
government. However, the shape and course of that government is strongly dependent upon
other parties - frequently including the runner-up in the race as well. Closeness in the form
of a race between the two largest parties may therefore bear little significance to the Dutch
electorate. A declared intention of the incumbent coalition to continue after the election may
make closeness a very relevant concept, especially if an electoral victory for the coalition is
in peril20. 
Second, the aspect of the election to which the concept of closeness applies will have to
be recognizable or identifiable for some segments of the electorate. This means that is has to
be clear to voters what the race is about, and who is a viable contender in the race. That may
sound trivial in a two-party or two-candidate system, but this merely underlines the advantage
these systems have when it comes to the possible influence of closeness in comparison to
systems with a more complex party landscape. It seems plausible that an electorate that is
accustomed to a certain concept of closeness - be it two competing parties, two competing
blocs, or one party trying to beat the threshold - will be more likely to respond to the degree
of closeness, not only because of the actual political reality of the race, but also because they
have learned to understand elections and the political process in the terms that define
closeness in their system. An electorate that is unaccustomed to closeness in a particular form
is likely to react less strongly to it or in a less predictable or uniform way. In other words,
closeness is likely to be more influential if it grows on the electorate. 
Thirdly, closeness will need to be communicated to the public. As closeness is in
essence dependent on the behavior of others, a voter will need to be "informed" of this
intended behavior of others in some way or another. One mechanism for this is, of course,
everyday conversations, but the most important role is likely to be played by the mass media.
If the concept of closeness, and the closeness of the race is a frequent news item, its influence
is potentially far greater than in a situation where media attention is focused on other aspects
- be they substantial policy standpoints or candidate-focused human-interest items. Horse-
race journalism and the frequent presentation of opinion polls convey a clear message to the
electorate that something is at stake and this is the race to follow. This point is of course not
unconnected to the previous two points. Even though one might be an optimist and expect the
(news-) media to play an educational role, it is unlikely that the choice of topics presented in
news bulletins and on front-pages will be wholly unconnected from the way the public is
accustomed to view elections and the political process. Thus, in systems where the race is not
73
20 This is a hypothetical condition, of course. In practice, the political instinct of the professionals that make up the
government coalition concerned will certainly think twice before committing themselves to a coalition that is in danger
of losing its majority.
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between the two largest parties, the media are unlikely to focus on this aspect of the election.
It is therefore not unlikely to assume that different political systems create different media
styles as well. In a system with two large dominant parties such as Great Britain, horse race
journalism and a strong emphasis on opinion polls is in some sense encouraged by the
political reality and its party landscape. That is not to say however that trends of
internationalization in the media, where national news providers tend to copy the approach
taken by international news providers such as CNN or BBC World, may not introduce an
aspect of horse-race journalism which is initially unfamiliar to a country. This could in turn
influence the way the electorate perceives the election and the campaign (Cf. de Vries & van
Praag, 1995).
4 .5 D i s cu s s i on
This chapter aimed to do two things: to determine whether closeness is a concept that can be
applied fruitfully outside two-party or -candidate systems, and whether some previous
confounding findings regarding closeness might be better explained with the aid of data from
opinion polls, rather than actual election outcomes. The answers derived for the first question
have proved themselves to be valid when applied in empirical analysis. With regard to the
second question the evidence provided by data analysis is ambiguous.
4.5.1 Read ing Opin ion Po l l s
The findings of this chapter do not allow for a single straightforward interpretation regarding
the comparison between opinion poll and actual election outcome data. While in certain
countries the fit of the model was better based on opinion poll data (e.g., Sweden, Great
Britain), in other countries this pattern was not found. A number of factors stand in the way
of a clear and unambiguous judgment, although these factors may prove to be useful leads in
future work.
Data quality may be one of our problems. One of the major advantages of actual election
outcome data is that it is widely available, and of very dependable quality. Election outcomes
simply tend to be documented very well, for obvious reasons. This is less true of opinion poll
data, although this has improved considerably in recent years. However, especially for earlier
decades, data from opinion polls may be hard to come by, and if retrieved, its quality may be
dubious. Their timing may be poor (e.g., polls held very early in the campaign), the exact
wording of the question may be an unfortunate one or not comparable over time. It is hard to
ascertain to what degree the opinion poll actually gained media exposure before an election.
As was already mentioned, opinion polls are important as means for voters to gain
information about the potential outcome of elections that are still to be held. Communication
of this knowledge through the media is therefore vital. If media attention to results from an
opinion poll is poor, then it cannot be expected to influence the electorate, and closeness
measured by it cannot be a good predictor of aggregate turnout. Ideally therefore, a
measurement of the degree of media exposure for each opinion poll should be included in the
analytical model. Such information is currently unavailable. Therefore, the analyses in this
chapter are based on the assumption that all opinion polls utilized have had sufficient media
exposure. This may have been an overly optimistic assumption.
Apart from the quantity of media attention to opinion polls, the quality of this attention
may also be of influence. The presentation and interpretation of polls in the media may not
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always be unequivocal. Election outcomes are objective facts over which ultimately no
discussion is possible. Opinion polls tend to be presented in the form of predictions, which is
of course why they are of interest to the media, voters and parties. Predictions, however, are
not objective facts, and as we all know, few things lend themselves better to subjective
interpretation than electoral predictions based on opinion polls. What is presented to the
public may thus be information that is packaged in a multitude of different interpretations,
which is likely to lower the polls impact.
Perhaps however the findings of this chapter lend insight to a matter that has been
touched upon already in section 4.4.2 and the current section. We argued that the impact of
closeness is likely to be dependent on horse-race journalism and media attention given to
opinion polls. This style of campaign coverage by the media is not equal over countries. The
superior performance of opinion poll data in certain political systems may indicate that media
coverage of opinion polls reinforces the perception of an election as a race, with important
political consequences. As was suggested already, this is more likely to be the case in systems
where the definition of the closeness of the race is relatively unambiguous and transparent,
such as in two-party systems.
4.5.2 Analy t i ca l  L imi tat ions
A second important consideration when putting the findings of this chapter into perspective
is the issue of omitted variables. This has been referred to implicitly in some of the
discussions of country findings, and explicitly in the country comparison of Figure 4-14 that
presented turnout relative to country average.
It has not been the assumption of this research that closeness is the sole factor
determining turnout for the countries and elections analyzed. As has been discussed in
Chapter 2, a multitude of variables exist that may explain turnout variations at the aggregate
level and the aim of this chapter is not to slight their importance. The reasons to focus on one
contextual characteristic instead of several have been set out in Chapter 3. But this choice
may have had important consequences for the analysis presented in the current chapter.
Outlying data points that now work against the fit of the simple model presented may
be explained by factors not included in the model. It may be that we incorrectly attribute little
explanatory power to closeness, because of under-specification of the model. A clear example
is Norway, where the EU-issue cut across the traditional two-bloc division in the 1973 and
1993 elections. Less easily identifiable factors should not be ruled out for all of the systems
presented in this chapter. Nonetheless, the consequences of omitted variables should be seen
as grounds for moderate optimism. This is because omitted variables cause false negatives,
in other words, a relationship that actually exists may be hidden from view. The findings in
this chapter may thus constitute a minimum that may be improved upon should relevant
control-variables be included in future models.
The alternative, a relationship incorrectly attributed to closeness - a situation of a false
positive - is worrisome too. Since the analyses presented here are bi-variate, the possibility
that effects attributed to closeness should be ascribed to other factors cannot be denied. It
seems unlikely however that the findings presented here are completely spurious. 
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4.5.3 A Fur ther  Look  at  C loseness
The focus of this chapter was on the comparability of closeness between systems. It was
shown that closeness is of relevance in several political systems - not just the typical two-
party polity. But the aggregate level approach adopted in this chapter means that part of the
influence of closeness remains beyond our view here.
In the German example presented, it was argued that closeness may be of influence for
small parties as well. The electoral threshold is not a trivial obstacle for a number of parties
in the German system, and it is not unlikely that it affects the behavior of voters and potential
voters of these parties. Yet, in the analyses presented in this chapter none of this showed up
- no significant relationship whatsoever could be detected. This is not very surprising in view
of the fact that these parties cater to small segments of the electorate. It is unreasonable to
expect effects on turnout in these small segments to show up in the midst of the much larger
complement that may be unaffected by the race for survival of small parties. An individual
level analysis is required to investigate the influence of closeness on these smaller groups
within the electorate.
Individual level analysis is also a requirement for another goal of this research:
determining individual variation in the influence of closeness on voters, as argued in Chapter
3. The current chapter showed that several political systems are affected by closeness, at least
at the aggregate level. For such a relationship to become visible at the aggregate level large
sections of the electorate will have to be affected - the reverse of what was the case for the
small party race in Germany. Sweden and Great Britain did show strong effects of closeness
at the aggregate level, suggesting that sizable segments of the electorates of these countries
do indeed respond to closeness. The following two chapters will investigate whether these
electorates react to closeness in a single, uniform way, or whether the hypotheses formulated
in Chapter 3 can be supported, namely that contextual factors (such as closeness) affect
different kinds of voters in different ways. 
The individual level analyses for Sweden and Great Britain will be executed on a
country-by-country basis. The reason for this is to keep to a minimum the otherwise
disturbing effects of differences in system characteristics. Chapter 5 will analyze the
influence of closeness at the individual level in Great Britain, while Chapter 6 will do the
same for Sweden.
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C l o s e n e s s  a n d  E l e c t o r a l  P a r t i c i p a t i o n
i n  G r e a t  B r i t a i n
This chapter investigates the influence of a close election race on individual voters in Great
Britain. While the previous chapter looked at the impact of closeness on turnout at the
aggregate level, the focus of this and the following chapter is on the individual level. Chapter
3 argued that on theoretical grounds closeness is expected to be of influence in Britain, and
Chapter 4 showed this to be true at the aggregate level. This chapter therefore need not prove
that closeness is of influence in Great Britain. It will however analyze what individual-level
effects produce these  aggregate results, and in doing so demonstrate that the influence of
closeness is not uniform at the individual level.
Suitable empirical data at the individual level are available for the national
parliamentary elections during the period 1970 until 19971. Turnout figures for that period are
presented in Table 5-1. As was the case for turnout figures presented for the Netherlands in
Chapter 2, turnout rates show a decided amount of stability in Great Britain, although there
is still a fair amount of variation, ranging from 71 to 78 percent.
Table 5-1 Great Britain - Turnout Figures in Parliamentary Elections, 1970-1997 (percentages)
In the British party system, the Labour and the Conservative parties dominate and
provide the only two viable parties for forming a government at the national level. However,
since MPs are elected in local constituencies, the constituency level offers an additional
arena for competition. The two parties leading the national race need not necessarily be the
leading parties in the local constituencies. The interplay between races at the national and
local (constituency) level will therefore be an important aspect of the analysis in this chapter.
5 .1 C lo s ene s s  o f  E l e c t i on s  i n  B r i t a i n
5.1.1 What  i s  the  Race?
First we need to determine what comprises the closeness of an election in Britain, in other
words what the race is about. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the political consequences of
finishing first in an election vary according to the make-up of the electoral system. It may be
less consequential in a system where coalition government is necessary, as representation and
Year 1970 1974Feb 1974Oct 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997
Turnout 72.0 78.1 72.8 76.0 72.7 75.3 77.7 71.2 
77
1 The political situation in Northern Ireland is so different from the situation in Great Britain that inclusion in the analytical
model would not prove informative. The analyses in this chapter are therefore limited to Great Britain only. See Curtice
(1994) for an overview on the history of British election studies.
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participation in governing power is conceivable for the number two party - or for numbers
3 to 15, for that matter - as well as for the leading party, just as being the largest party does
not guarantee the acquisition of government power2. The British system, with its first past
the post system with single mandate constituencies and a long tradition of single party
government leaves little room for questions about the prize that is at stake. Moving into
10 Downing Street requires achieving a majority - plain and simple. There are no prizes for
finishing second. Secondary race, such as the struggle of a small party to pass an electoral
threshold, or a self declared minimum number of seats to be won in an election are not
applicable to the British system3. It is gaining a majority that matters.
While the grand prize is national government, that prize is to be won through winning
separate races at the level of the local constituencies. It is thus important to establish which
of these two levels to focus on.
5.1.2 Double  Vi s ion?
Winning a majority of the seats in Westminster is vital in the British system - it is the way
to acquire government power in a system that does not require coalition government. As
the consequences of winning control in Westminster are far greater than winning any
single constituency, it is to be expected that attention will gravitate to this national level,
rather than the constituency level. The voters direct influence, however, is restricted to
the constituency level. Voters have no way of influencing the race beyond the borders of
their constituency. This leads to a rival expectation, namely that closeness at the
constituency level, and not the national level, is most influential on voter behavior. These
two expectations are not, however, mutually exclusive. If the race is very close at the
national level this may have a spillover effect on participation at the constituency level,
enticing people to turn out and vote. If, however, the chances of ones preferred local
candidate are effectively nil, then no matter how close the race is at the national level,
ones choice for that candidate will only be a token influence. In a constituency where the
gap between the leading parties is very large, or where the two leading parties do not
correspond with the nationally leading parties, the potential influence of a close national
race may be limited4. But whether in practice the influence of the national level will
indeed be subordinate to the influence of the local constituency is a matter that hinges on
another factor: information.
The initially trivial observation that voters can only be influenced by a close race
when they know about the closeness of the race becomes less trivial when the information
potency of the election at the national level and at the constituency level is considered.
The most obvious way of obtaining information on the closeness of the race before the
actual election is of course an opinion poll. Opinion polls held at the constituency level
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2 As was the case for example following the 1977 elections in the Netherlands.
3 Although the Liberal Democrats' attempt to become the second party in the land in the 2001 election might arguably
qualify as a secondary race.
4 This argument foregoes of course the possibility that people may have other reasons to decide on their vote, apart from
electing their preferred party into government, such as electing the Member of Parliament that will be most effective in
representing heir local interests. Such motives would enhance the influence of the closeness of the race at the local
constituency level.
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that are actually available to the public tend to be very scarce5. Information on the
closeness of the race at the constituency level is thus limited, certainly when compared to the
information available at the national level, where opinion polls make up a substantial part of
news reporting in the mass media. In this way, voters are offered a lopsided information
package: abundant information on the national race, and only a limited amount on the local
race. Voters may then easily confuse or mix these two levels, or use information from one
level as a cue for the other. In this mix, the national level with its abundance of information
is prone to be dominant. Without wanting to do so, or even being aware of it, voters may act
on information from the national level, which may actually show little relation to the situation
in their own local constituency. Taking these considerations into account, it is not unthinkable
that the national level will dominate voters behavior, even though the electoral system in
Britain determines that voters can only exert influence in their local constituency. Because of
these considerations, both levels of competition will therefore be examined in our analyses in
the remainder of this chapter.
5.1.3 Who i s  A f fec ted?  
Contextual characteristics, though constant at the aggregate level to all voters within that
context, will not be equal at the individual level, as individual characteristics shape the
personal context. A close race between Labour and the Conservatives will mean a close race
for supporters of those parties, but it will not mean the same thing - in effect, it may not have
any meaning at all - to staunch adherents of, say, Plaid Cymru. Hesitant voters of Labour or
the Conservatives may be affected by the context, but voters of Plaid Cymru will have to find
their motivation elsewhere. 
Chapter 3 already argued that party preference and party evaluation play a crucial role
in determining who will be affected by a close election race, and in what way. Three
categories of voters were distinguished, each of which can be expected to show a specific
reaction to closeness. Voters with a strong preference for only one of the leading parties are
expected to be strongly affected by closeness. It is not clear what those who hold strong
positive feelings for both of the leading parties will do. People who have no preference
whatsoever for either of the leading parties, in effect respondents who expressed a dislike for
the leading parties, are not expected to be influenced by the closeness of the election. A
summary of the expected effects was given earlier in Table 3-1.
In the analyses that follows, the categories of voters will be indicated by the labels
introduced in Chapter 3: Convinced, Confounded and Condemned voters. To make the
distinction more explicit, the Convinced label was only applied to voters that combined
support of one of the leading parties with an expressed dislike of the other leading party. In
addition to these three categories of voters, a sizeable group exists that does not fit in these
categories. This remainder consists of voters who hold moderately positive feelings for both
leading parties, or a moderately positive feeling for one leading party, combined with a
positive or negative feeling for the other leading party. It is tempting to extend the alliteration
and call this category the constant voters. However, this would be misleading as the term
79
5 Polls held at the constituency level may well be funded by local candidates or their organization, in which case it is
unlikely that this information will be freely available to the general public.
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constant implies unaffected - which is not necessarily the case. Consequently, this segment
of the electorate will be referred to as the Base category of voters. These Base category voters
are still expected to be positively affected by the closeness of the election through across-the-
board effects that a close election generates, for instance by way of increased media attention.
Although this effect of closeness is expected to be smaller for Base category voters than for
Convinced voters, it is expected to be more influential for Base category voters than for
Condemned voters. To avoid incorrect associations, this group of voters will therefore not be
labeled constant voters, but referred to with the somewhat technical label of Base-category
voters.
As both the national and the constituency level will be taken into account, voters may
be Convinced voters at the national level, but Condemned voters in their local constituency.
In terms of the British party landscape, this could be the situation for a Tory supporter in a
Scottish constituency where Labour and the SNP are the two leading parties. A Scottish
nationalist in that same constituency would then be a Condemned voter nationally, but
Convinced at the local level.
5 .2 Ana l y s i s  
The individual level data used for the analyses stem from the British Elections Studies (BES).
These studies have been held from 1964, and preferably all of these would have been
included in the analyses to provide as much context level variation as possible. Unfortunately,
not all of these studies contain preference scores for all political parties, a prerequisite for our
analyses. As a consequence, we can analyze only 8 parliamentary elections, held in the period
1970-1997.
To classify respondents in the Convinced, Confounded, Condemned or Base categories,
an evaluation of all of the parties is required. The actual choice made at the election, the party
voted for, is not suitable for this classification6. A good party evaluation indicator would
consist of a rating of the likelihood that the respondent will vote for each party in the political
system, preferably measured on an interval scale. In this way, not only the likes, but also the
dislikes of respondents, and the intensity of their preferences can be taken into account when
classifying the respondents. 
Table 5-2 Great Britain - Categories of Voters per Election at National Level (percent of sample)
Election Convinced Confounded Condemned Base 
 
1970 32.2 1.0 5.4 61.4 
1974 Feb 28.5 2.8 2.5 66.2  
1974 Oct 24.0 3.2 2.6 70.2  
1979 26.5 5.4 1.7 66.4  
1983 30.0 5,0 0.9 64.1  
1987 24.2 0.1 4.0 71.7  
1992 22.9 0.0 3.2 73.9  
1997 33.9 0.6 5.6 59.9  
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6 Using the party actually voted for would of course be impossible where non-voters are concerned.
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Based on party evaluation scores, dummy variables indicating the three categories of voters
were constructed7. Table 5-2 presents the distribution of the sample over the categories of
voters at national level. Table 5-3 presents the same distribution, but at the constituency level.
Rather than leaving election studies with poor operationalizations of the party preference
indicators out of the analyses (notably, the 1983 elections), it seemed preferable to look at the
outcomes for all elections, albeit with caution. This is further warranted by the fact that
variation in the distribution of the Convinced, Confounded and Condemned voters ought to
be a normal feature of a dynamic political landscape instigated for instance through changes
in the degree of political polarization. Distinguishing this actual fluctuation from artifacts
caused by questionnaire differences is not possible, given the limited information available.
The irregular distribution pattern of the dummy indicators may, however, have an effect on
estimates for in particular the Confounded and Condemned voters
Table 5-3 Great Britain - Categories of Voters per Election at Constituency level (percent of sample)
As Tables 5-2 and 5-3 show the size of the Base category ranges from 60 to 91 percent for
the constituency level, and from 60 to 73 percent of the respondents at national level. The
very high number of 91 percent at the local level is for 1987, and is most almost certainly an
artifact of the poor scale that was used in that election study.
The impact of closeness on electoral participation is of course greatly dependent on the
actual degree of closeness, both at the national and constituency levels. As Chapter 4 already
argued, closeness should not and need not be viewed as a dichotomous variable. In the
analysis undertaken in this chapter closeness will therefore be treated as an interval variable
that is expected to have a relationship with turnout as depicted in Figure 4-2.
Table 5-4 presents figures for closeness as predicted by opinion polls and as realized in
the actual election, at the national level. An indicator of the closeness in constituencies is
provided by the percentage of respondents (not of the whole electorate, see note 9 of this
chapter) residing in constituencies where the gap between the leading parties was less than 5
percent8. Turnout is presented in the last column of Table 5-4.
Election Convinced Confounded Condemned Base 
 
1970 18.4 0.7 11.4 69.5  
1974 Feb 25.0 2.4 17.3 55.3  
1974 Oct 26.4 1.5 17.2 54.9  
1979 25.5 2.8 16.2 55.5  
1983 7.7 2.8 0.4 89.1  
1987 7.6 0.1 1.1 91.2  
1992 21.9 4.4 2.4 71.3  
1997 25.5 3.1 11.7 59.7  
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7 See the Appendix for details on the construction of the dummy variables.
8 The five percent figure is an arbitrary, but reasonable figure for what may be called a close election. It is presented here
for ease of presentation, and will play no role in the actual empirical analyses. Note that interpreting the figures of Table
5 4 as representative indicators of the degree of closeness at constituency level for each election is hazardous because of
variation in the (number of) constituencies selected
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Table 5-4 Great Britain - Degree of Closeness at National and Constituency Level (percentages)
If we look at closeness based on opinion poll data, the table shows three close elections in the
period under study at the national level (the 1974 and 1992 elections). Three other elections
(1979, 1983 and 1997) were certainly not close elections. Comparing the actual gap with the
gap predicted by the polls, a striking six out of eight elections turn out to be closer than
predicted. The correlation between predicted and actual closeness is a strong .78. For the
elections that were predicted to be close, only the 1992 elections - which saw Major win an
unexpected Tory victory - proved not at all close. The correlation between the predicted gap
between the leading parties and turnout is -.68, while the correlation between the actual gap
and turnout is considerably weaker at -.38.
Between 10 and 18 percent of the respondents reside in what may reasonably be called
a close constituency, where the gap between the leading parties is less than 5 percent. The
closeness at the constituency level can show a far greater variation than closeness at the
national level: in constituencies where one single party (or candidate) dominates all others,
the gap may well be over 50 percent. Table 4 in the Appendix presents an overview for each
election of closeness at the constituency level9. However, in the analyses to follow the five
percent mark will play no role, since closeness will be entered into the model as an interval
variable.
5.2.1 The Mode l  -  Theory  and Expectat ions  
As Section 3.3.1 of Chapter 3 already discussed, to analyze a model containing
individual and contextual level information, an analytical technique that takes these
separate levels of information into account is required. Multi-level modeling is such a
technique. The analyses in this and the following chapter are therefore carried out using
MLwiN, a program that allows for multi-level modeling, including models for
dichotomous dependent variables. The hierarchical data structure for the analysis is
represented as follows. Individuals, the respondents of the election studies, make up the
lowest level of analysis. The top level of analysis is formed by the constituencies in
which the respondents reside. The middle level is made up of the election that is
analyzed. The fact that not all constituencies have been included in all election studies is
Election Gap in Polls
Actual
Gap
Constituency 
Gap <5%
a
 
Turnout
1970 7.0 3.4 18.9 72.0 
1974 Feb 2.0 0.8 13.9 78.1 
1974 Oct 5.0 3.4 12.7 72.8 
1979 10.0 7.0 11.6 76.0 
1983 19.0 14.8 12.3 72.7 
1987 7.0 11.7 10.3 75.3 
1992 0.5 7.1 14.4 77.7 
1997 16.0 12.5 10.6 71.2 
Note a: Percentage of BES respondents where the gap at constituency level is smaller than 5 
percent. 
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9 Table 4 in the Appendix presents percentages for respondents, rather than constituencies. As not all constituencies have
been sampled, descriptives of the actual dataset analyzed are presented rather than figures for Great Britain as a whole. 
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not a problem for the multi-level model. This data structure suggests that, over different
national elections, the elections held in a single constituency have more in common than
the elections in all constituencies for a single national election do10. The data structure
acknowledges that individuals reside within constituencies, with different elections
providing variation in the circumstances of the election. 
The variables used at the individual level have been selected on the basis of existing
research into individual electoral participation. Because of incompatibilities of the
datasets used, only a limited number of individual level variables have been introduced
in the model. Nevertheless, the most commonly used explanatory variables of electoral
participation have been included. These are age, gender, education, political interest and
income. All, with the exception of gender, have consistently shown a positive and
significant relation with electoral participation. The influence of gender has not been
consistent, and has been shown to differ dependent on country and additional variables
included11. This variable will be entered into the analysis without any explicit
expectations. Education has been transformed to improve comparability between studies,
using a linear transformation12. The same procedure has been used for political interest,
where the varying indicators included in each election study make standardization
necessary13. For both the education and political interest indicators, the respondents
scores where subsequently transformed to deciles. This was done only to counter multi-
collinearity in the analyses. To standardize income, centralization around the mean value,
followed by a log transformation was used. Prior to this transformation, missing values
were replaced with the mean income value, while a dummy variable was created to
distinguish respondents with missing values on income (cf. Chapter 2). All these
transformations enable comparability.
At the aggregate level, the number of variables was kept to an absolute minimum,
in view of the limited number of degrees of freedom at the national election level. As it
is not the aim of this research to present the best explanation of electoral participation,
but rather to demonstrate that closeness of the election interacts with individual level
characteristics, only aggregate level information concerning the closeness of the election
was included in the model. To account for the assumed non-linear character of this data
(cf. Chapter 4, Figure 4-2) the indicator used for closeness of the election race is a
transformation of the actual gap between the leading two parties, namely 1 divided by
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10 The latter model would require the top level of analysis to be elections, while constituencies would make up the middle
level. Respondents (voters) remain at the lowest level.
11 See the discussion in Chapter 2.
12 Actually, a transformation was chosen where the education indicators available were regressed on a standardizing
variable, in this case electoral participation, enabling maximum use of the information available. The predicted value of
electoral participation for each case - in essence a linear transformation of all education indicators - was then taken as
education indicator. This proved to be the most useful manner of increasing comparability among the different indicators
of the various editions of the BES. 
Although this may appear to artificially inflate the explained variance in the subsequent analysis, this is actually
not the case: in the original regression equation (yi = ai + b*xi + ei) the predicted value yi ('y-hat') is determined by ai
+ b*xi. In the subsequent analysis, yi takes the place of ai + b*xi. The variance explained is determined by ei, which
remains unaltered. Hence, the explained variance ('the R2') remains unaltered by the transformation. See van der Brug,
van der Eijk and Franklin (2002), and van der Eijk and Franklin (1996, Chapter 20).
13 To keep information loss to a minimum, in this transformation missing values on any of the separate indicators were
recoded to the lowest interest category, in effect treating missings as not politically interested.
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the gap in percentage points. The result of this transformation is a variable that attains
higher values as the race is closer, which is therefore expected to be positively related to
electoral participation14. 
In the traditional way of modeling contextual influence, in which no distinction is
made between voters, information regarding the closeness is added to the model through a
single indicator for closeness. As argued above, such an analytical approach treats all voters
as influenced by closeness equally. This across-the-board effect of closeness will then be an
amalgam - a weighted average, in a sense - of the various individual effects. In the analyses
presented below, several terms (one for each category of voters, plus an interaction term for
each category) are added to the model. As a result, the blanket effect is likely to diminish. It
need not evaporate completely, as some of the influence of closeness may well be shared by
the whole of the electorate.
The source of information regarding closeness would preferably be data from opinion
polls that were conducted - or at the least published - shortly before the election, as this would
represent the information available to voters at the moment of the election. Such data is
available at the national level. At the constituency level, however, such information is
virtually impossible to obtain, to a large degree because such data was never gathered for a
number of constituencies15. This creates two problems, one practical and one theoretical.
Both have been countered by assumption. The practical obstacle that this lack of information
at the constituency level presents is that no data exists about the expected closeness of the
election. As a proxy for this, actual election outcome data has been used, based on the
assumption that people will have had some indication about the outcome of the election. The
theoretical problem is that if no opinion poll data were available before the election, voters
will not have had the opportunity to use such information to estimate the expected closeness
of the race. We assume therefore that the actual outcome will generate leading cues in local
press and radio from which voters will have some inkling of the closeness of the election in
their constituency. To the degree that this assumption does not hold, and people are indeed
unaware of the closeness in their local constituency, we cannot expect closeness at the
constituency level to have any systematic impact on voters chance to participate. 
The expected individual variation in the influence of closeness on voters is
introduced into the model by the use of dummy indicators, distinguishing the three
categories of voters and the Base category. The dummy variables are called Convinced,
Confounded and Condemned, respectively, according to the conceptualization presented
in Chapter 3. The effect of closeness on these voters - additional to the blanket effect - is
introduced through the interaction between these dummy-indicators and the closeness of
the election, dubbed Convinced*Closeness Interaction, Confounded*Closeness Interaction
and Condemned*Closeness Interaction, respectively. It is important to realize that only the
interaction terms take closeness into account. The dummy variables themselves indicate
how a respondent relates to the parties that are in the race for the lead, not whether it is a
close race for the lead.
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14 Because the gap between the parties is the denominator, with a constant numerator of 1, the resulting transformation is
non-linear.
15 Crewe (1997) reports 78 single constituency polls were held in 52 constituencies in the 1987 campaign, while in 1997
there were 29 polls published in the media, held in 26 constituencies. 
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The political landscape being what it is in Britain, a Convinced voter at the national
level invariably indicates that the respondent is a supporter of either Labour or the
Conservatives, disapproving of the Conservatives or Labour, as appropriate. At the
constituency level, the range of leading parties is not limited to Labour and the Conservatives.
A local Convinced voter could therefore back any of the three main national parties, as well
as Plaid Cymru or the SNP, as long as they disapprove of the other leading party - whichever
one that may be. As Chapter 3 argued, Convinced voters are likely to show a higher overall
turnout rate independently of the closeness of the race, which will be indicated by a positive
Convinced dummy effect, and they are also expected to be strongly and positively affected
by the closeness of the race, which will be indicated by a positive parameter for
Convinced*Closeness Interaction.
Confounded at the national level identifies voters who consider both Labour and the
Conservatives as a viable option to vote for. Not surprisingly, the number of respondents in
this category is rather small. Although there is no real logical reason for this, inspection of
Table 5-3 reveals that Confounded voters are a rarity at the constituency level as well. As was
argued in Chapter 3, Confounded voters may react to closeness in two possible ways. If these
voters see their choice between two leading parties as an impossible predicament, their
chance to participate is expected to be low (small Confounded estimate), and fall even with
a close election (negative Confounded*Closeness Interaction parameter). Alternatively, if
these respondents see no objection in voting against one of their favored parties, their
behavior should resemble that of the Base category voters, which will result in statistically
non-significant estimates. As statistical non-significance may to a large degree be the result
of group size, rather than an actual non-existent effect, it is in this case important to look at
the parameter estimate, as well as at statistical significance 
Condemned voters at the national level will be third party voters (e.g., SNP, Plaid
Cymru, Liberal/Democrat etcetera) or respondents that object to all of the political parties. At
the local level, Labour or Conservative supporters may also find themselves in constituencies
where their party is not among the two largest, and thus find themselves to be Condemned
voters as well. Condemned voters are not expected to be affected by the closeness of the race,
although it may well be - especially at the constituency level - that they show a lower chance
to participate in an election race in which they know their candidate will not win. The lower
chance of participation will be reflected by negative parameter estimates for the Condemned
voters indicator (since the blanket effect affects these voters as well), while the
Condemned*Closeness Interaction term may be close to zero and/or not significant.
Whether it will make a difference that the local political arena resembles the national
political arena, in other words whether, for instance, one is a Convinced national but
Condemned local voter, or other possibilities, will be explored in section 5.2.4, where such
cross-level interactions will be analyzed.
5.2.2 Outcomes  -  Nat iona l  Leve l  
The first results are presented in Table 5-5. The interpretation of a multilevel model is largely
comparable to that of a standard OLS regression or, in our case, the logistic regression model.
For the models presented here, the difference with standard logistic regression results is the
estimates of variation at the different levels of analysis. The estimates of variation at the
different levels can be interpreted as the amount of variation that can be explained by the
85
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grouping variables: in our analyses the constituency (level 3) and the election (level 2). 
The second and third column present what may be called the traditional model: the
aggregate level effect of closeness is included as a single variable, thus of equal influence to
all, although the model uses multi-level analysis. The last two columns present the integrated
model, in which the influence of the context effect is dependent on individual characteristics.
Estimates are unstandardized b-estimates; standard errors are presented in italics. Bold
figures indicate statistical significance at the .05 level. Likelihood values, as well as the
dichotomous R2 value (Snijder & Bosker, 1999) are presented in the bottom row. 
Table 5-5 Great Britain - Traditional Model vs. Individual Context Model (national level)
The logistic transformation that is required because of the binary character of the dependent
variable makes the interpretation of the parameters a little less straightforward than in OLS
models. Put in simple terms, the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable
is contingent on the values of the other independent variables; the change in propensity to
vote between men and women is different for, high and low levels of education, for example.
Nevertheless, the effect will invariably be in the direction of the model estimates.
For the traditional model all estimates for the individual characteristics, presented in
the top part of Table 5-5 are statistically significant and show positive signs, with the
exception of the dummy-variable that indicates a no-answer on the income question. The
estimates indicate that the chance to vote increases with higher age, education, political
interest and income, and that women have a greater propensity to vote than men, when
controlling for these characteristics. The negative and significant estimate for the income-
missing dummy variable indicates that those who refused inidcate their income are actually
‘Traditional’ ‘Individual Context’
s.e. B s.e.
Age 0.014 0.001 0.013 0.001 
Female 0.206 0.040 0.197 0.040 
Education 0.071 0.008 0.074 0.008 
Political interest 0.245 0.008 0.232 0.008 
Income 0.255 0.030 0.260 0.030 
Income missing – dummy -0.121 0.061 -0.112 0.061 
National level:     
Closeness  0.231 0.035 0.212 0.038 
Convinced voter   0.385 0.059 
Convinced*Closeness Interaction   0.220 0.104 
Confounded voter   -0.054 0.183 
Confounded*Closeness Interaction   0.741 0.889 
Condemned voter   -0.495 0.112 
Condemned*Closeness Interaction   0.159 0.160 
Constant -0.560 0.070 -0.544 0.071 
Variation constituency (3
rd
) level 0.057 0.020 0.055 0.020 
Variation election (2
nd
) level .061 0.028 0.064 0.028 
Likelihood, R
2
dicho 11753 .175 11229 .188 
Standard errors in italics. Bold figures indicate statistical significance at p < .05. 
B
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somewhat less likely to vote than those with an average income. With the exception of this
last finding, the findings for individual characteristics are very much in line with results as
generally found by individual level research into electoral participation.
The next estimate presented from the traditional model is for closeness of the election
at the national level, as measured by opinion poll data. The transformation applied (1 divided
by the opinion poll gap in percentage points) creates a variable that increases with closeness.
The positive estimate is therefore in line with expectations. It is statistically significant and
of substantial size. 
The bottom pane of the table presents the variation explained by the constituency and
election level, since the multi-level design takes the variation at these levels into account. The
figures reported are small although significant, indicating that there is some between
constituency and between-election variance left in the model16. This is not unexpected, and
neither is it of paramount interest for this research.
Based on this traditional model, and leaving the very small level 2 and 3 variation
aside for a moment, a female respondent of about average education, political interest and
income, aged 45 would have a probability of voting of 86.8 percent in an election where the
gap predicted by the opinion polls is 10 percent, as was actually the case in the 1979
elections17. In the October elections of 1974, where the gap was 5 percent, the likelihood for
such a voter to participate would, on the basis of this model, rise slightly to 87 percent. In the
1992 elections, whcih were predicted to be a dead heat at 0.5 percent - even though the
pollsters were forced to eat their words later - such a voter would have a chance of 91 percent
to turn out. Clearly, the model indicates that a close race makes a difference to voters.
Were this a traditional individual level analysis, this would be all to report. Closeness
indeed has a positive, statistically significant influence on electoral participation. The next
two columns of Table 5-5 show, however, that there is more to closeness that just an across-
the-board effect. 
The last two columns of Table 5-5 show the Individual Context model, i.e., the
traditional model with indicators for Convinced, Confounded and Condemned voters added.
This model acknowledges the fact that voters will be affected by their context in different
ways. The dummy variables for the voter categories identify the influence of whether or not
a respondents preference (or lack thereof) for the leading parties, while the interaction-terms
indicate how this effect is increased or decreased as the race becomes closer or less close. The
non-interacted closeness indicator is left to identify the influence of closeness on the Base
category voters, to which the other categories of voters are set against.
The top pane of the table shows virtually no change from the traditional model. The
stability of the estimates for the individual characteristics is striking: differences are minimal.
The dummy indicator for a missing income answer is now no longer statistically
87
16 For random effects, as variation at level 2 and level 3 is commonly referred to in multi-level modeling, an approximate
Wald hypothesis test of the significance of this variation is more appropriate than looking at the parameter
estimate/standard error ratio alone. This test is used when reporting statistical significance of the level 2 and level 3
variances.
17 The predicted value yi is defined as (EXP(ai + b*xi) / (1 + EXP(ai + b*xi)). For the example presented, the sum of
coefficients (ai + b*xi) equals -.56 (constant) + 45*.014 (age) + 1*.206 (female) + 5*.071 (average education) + 5*.245
(average political interest) + 0*.255 (average income) +0*-.121 (income not missing) + .1*.231 (closeness = 1/10% gap
between parties) = 1.8791. EXP(1.8791)/(EXP(1+1.8791))= .8675 (86.8%).
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significant, however, indicating that, other variables taken into account, the propensity to
vote of these respondents does not deviate from average income voters. The small
decrease in the estimate for political interest can be explained by the relation between the
indicators for Convinced, Confounded and Condemned voters and political interest. To
qualify for one of the three voter categories, an opinion on the parties in the political
system and thus some political interest is required. The very small change in the estimate
suggests that this makes only a very small difference.
In the middle pane of the table, the estimate for the across-the-board effect of
closeness is slightly smaller than in the traditional model. This should come as no surprise
since the interaction terms that have been added reflect closeness at the individual level.
Since a substantial part of the expected influence of closeness is mediated through these
interaction terms, the aggregate effect is expected to decrease somewhat18. 
The estimates for Convinced voters show a very clear pattern. Convinced voters
show a greater propensity to vote than the Base category, indicated by the positive and
statistically significant estimate for Convinced voters. This high propensity to vote
increases in close elections, as indicated by the positive and significant effect for the
Convinced*Closeness Interaction. So not only do Convinced voters vote more often in
close elections, they evidently vote more often in any election, even in those elections that
are not close.
The pattern for Confounded voters is less straightforward. Here, neither the dummy
estimate nor the interaction effect is statistically significant. Three alternative
explanations can be considered for this. The relationship may genuinely not exist in the
population, which means that Confounded voters show behavior that is not significantly
different from Base category voters. Alternatively, some relationship may exist or more
precisely, several relationships may exist: some of the Confounded voters may show an
increased chance to turn out, while others may not be able to make a choice and stay
home. These two contradicting patterns will produce an effect that cannot be
distinguished, and will therefore not show statistical significance. Lastly, there may be a
problem of sample distribution. As very few Confounded voters are included in the
samples (see Table 5-3), the number of respondents may be too small to render the
difference of their behavior with that of the Base category significant. On the basis of the
data available, it is not possible to distinguish between these options.
The Condemned voters do behave according to expectation, in that
Condemned*Closeness Interaction does not show a statistically significant effect. These
respondents are thus not affected by the closeness of the election, at least not more so than
Base category voters. This is in line with expectations, as the race is between parties that
these respondents do not care about. In addition, these respondents show an overall lower
propensity to vote, as indicated by the negative estimate for the Condemned dummy,
which is statistically significant. Two things may cause this. Firstly, these voters realize
that they do not stand a chance to see their favored party win the elections, and therefore
they decide to stay home. Including information from the constituency level may shed
light on this, as in some constituencies Condemned voters at the national level may still
88
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see their favored party win locally. Secondly, it may also indicate that within the group of
Condemned voters, a substantial segment consists of people who do not care for any
political party on offer. Without any party they appreciate, these respondents may show a
high rate of abstention.
5.2.3 Outcomes - Constituency Level
Although the national level is what ultimately counts in British parliamentary elections to
determine government, individual voters elect a representative for their local constituency,
and in that sense the constituency is the limit and scope of their influence. As the local
race may well see other parties in the lead than the national race, it is worthwhile
examining whether British voters focus more on the local or on the national level when
deciding whether to vote. 
As mentioned, there are some handicaps for the constituency level to exert its
influence. The predominance of the national level in the media has already been
mentioned. This predominance is reflected in part by opinion polling: a dominant feature
of national level news reports, but which are invariably rare at the constituency level.
Information on the closeness of the local race will thus be scarcer and harder to come by
for voters. It is not assumed here that such information will be completely unavailable to
voters, as campaign efforts by local candidates and local news reports are likely to contain
clues about the closeness of the election. Technically this means that such pre-election
closeness information is also not available for this analysis. As a proxy, actual election
outcome data is therefore used.
The estimates for the models including the constituency level are presented in Table
5-6, below. First the model for the constituency level is presented, next the constituency
and national level combined. The constituency model with only closeness, and without
dummy indicators or interaction terms is not presented, as virtually all parameter
estimates remain unchanged compared to the first model presented in Table 5-6. Again,
standard errors are given next to the parameter estimates in italics, while bold figures
indicate statistical significance.
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Table 5-6 Great Britain - Constituency and National Level Analysis
The top pane of the table once more shows the stability of the estimates for the individual
characteristics in the model. None of the parameters show a substantial change in size or
direction, when compared to the previous models. The estimate for closeness at the
constituency level is extremely small, and not statistically significant. This indicates that, at
the local level, no across-the-board effect of closeness exists, while such an effect does exist
at the national level19. 
The indicators for Convinced, Confounded or Condemned voters and the interaction
terms now reflect the situation in the constituency of each respondent. A Convinced voter on
the national level need not be a Convinced voter at the local level, and a close race at the
national level need not be close at the constituency level, and vice versa.
There is one striking pattern when regarding the local voter categories and their
interactions with closeness. The closeness of the race does not come out as a statistically
Constituency 
National & 
Constituency 
B s.e. B s.e. 
0.014 0.001 0.014 0.001 
Female 0.199 0.040 0.195 0.040 
Education 0.073 0.007 0.075 0.008 
Political interest 0.242 0.008 0.232 0.008 
Income 0.263 0.030 0.265 0.030 
Income missing – dummy -0.110 0.061 -0.110 0.061 
Constituency level:     
Closeness  0.003 0.005 0.002 0.005 
Convinced voters 0.369 0.063 0.142 0.071 
Convinced*Closeness Interaction 0.228 0.186 0.233 0.186 
Confounded voters 0.269 0.148 0.148 0.155 
Confounded*Closeness Interaction -0.203 0.477 -0.119 0.483 
Condemned voters -0.167 0.074 -0.130 0.082 
Condemned*Closeness Interaction 0.025 0.072 0.027 0.077 
National level:     
Closeness    0.195 0.039 
Convinced voters   0.317 0.067 
Convinced*Closeness Interaction   0.233 0.104 
Confounded voters   -0.092 0.183 
Confounded*Closeness Interaction   0.519 0.880 
Condemned voters   -0.435 0.119 
Condemned*Closeness Interaction   0.157 0.161 
Constant -0.496 0.069 -0.549 0.071 
Variation constituency level 0.058 0.020 0.053 0.020 
Variation election level 0.083 0.028 0.067 0.028 
Likelihood, R2dicho 11707 .175 11204 .190 
Standard errors in italics. Bold figures indicate statistical significance at p < .05. 
Actual election outcomes used for constituency level closeness, opinion poll data used for 
national level closeness. 
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19 Excluding the dummy indicators from the model, as in the first model presented in Table 5 5, does not alter the parameter
estimates for closeness.ut to cast a vote. Where specifically 'voters' or 'non-voters' is meant, this will be made clear in
the text.
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significant influence, neither as an across-the-board effect nor as interaction with any of the
three indicators. Closeness does not appear to influence voters at the local level. This is
reflected by the interaction terms that fail to come up statistically significant for any of the
three categories. However, two of the three dummy indicators do prove statistically
significant, with Convinced voters showing a greater chance of participation and Condemned
voters showing a lower chance to participate, regardless of the closeness of the election. The
estimates for Convinced and Condemned voters are thus comparable to the pattern at the
national level, although Condemned voters tend to fall less behind on the local level.
The pattern that emerges from this analysis is that at the local level, it is not closeness
but location that matters. Location in this case indicating being in a constituency where a
respondents favored party stands a chance of winning. The margin of that victory does not
appear to matter. Possible explanations for this may be that the margin, i.e., the closeness of
the race, is - contrary to what was assumed - not actually known to the electorate. Second, it
may be that the margin is known, and is actually rather too well known, for instance, because
it hardly fluctuated over the last number of elections held in the constituency. This may give
voters the impression that no matter what, the outcome is certain, meaning that the effect of
closeness on turnout will be negligible. Thirdly, it may be that it is not the constituency level,
but the national level that dominates the minds of the voters. 
The latter two columns of Table 5-6 certainly endorse the explanation that the national
level dominates the local level. As indicators for the national level are added to the
constituency level model, only the local Convinced voters estimate remains statistically
significant. In addition, the estimates for the national level parameters are very close to the
estimates for the model without constituency level data presented in Table 5-5. This clearly
suggests that it is the national level that influences voters. One possible pitfall remains,
however: cross-level interactions.
5.2.4 Cross - l eve l  In te ract ions  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the categories of voters at national and constituency
level need not coincide. A Convinced voter at the national level may well be a Confounded
or Condemned voter in his or her constituency. If cues from both these levels are used in
determining participation in the election, the effect of being a Convinced voter at the national
level may be dependent on the category of voters the respondent belongs to at the
constituency level. This means that the interaction between the national and constituency
categories should be taken in to account in the evaluation of which of these levels is most
influential. As there are three categories at both levels, and all of the combinations can occur,
nine possible interaction-terms exist20. Table 5-7 gives an overview of the possible
interactions terms, and reports percentages of respondents of the total sample that belong to
each of the categories.
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Table 5-7 Great Britain - Possible National/Constituency-level Interactions, 
Percentages of Respondents in Total Sample
On theoretical grounds, the combinations of voter categories presented in Table 5-7 can be
divided into two categories. The combinations on the diagonal are not necessarily true
interactions, but may actually be simple additive effects. Convinced national level voters
living in constituencies where they are also Convinced voters (denoted as interaction I in
Table 5-7) find an incentive to vote at both the national level and the local level. These two
incentives add up, but there is no direct theoretical argument as to why these two incentives
would interact. The same holds true for the other diagonal combinations.
The off-diagonal combinations are expected to be true interactions, in which the
combination of the two categories at national and constituency level influences the actual
behavior. Three examples will be discussed here. Convinced national level voters living in
constituencies where they are Condemned voters (denoted as interaction II in Table 5-7) have
no hope of electing a favored candidate in their constituency. As a consequence, they cannot
help their favored party to national victory. For these voters, their participation can be no
more than a token entry - they might as well stay home. This combination can therefore be
regarded as a true interaction: Convinced national level voters should be positively
influenced by the closeness of the election, but Condemned local voters should not. Whether
one level dominates the other should become clear form the interaction effect.
The interactions III and IV present two other examples of theoretically interesting
interaction effects. Interaction III concerns national level Confounded voters. For these
voters, their constituency may function as a tiebreaker for the difficult choice between the
two nationally leading parties. The combination should therefore function as a positive
incentive to participate, when compared to other national level Confounded voters.
Comparing to constituency level Confounded voters, the interaction III voters may be less
likely to vote, because of the national level effect. 
Interaction IV concerns national level Condemned voters, who are not expected to be
affected by closeness, and constituency level Convinced voters, who are expected to be
affected by closeness. Again, the interaction effect can inform us as to whether the national
or the constituency level takes precedence, and how the behavior of the interaction IV voters
compares to that of voters who share their national or constituency level category, but not the
combination of the two.
The interactions may therefore offer us a number of benefits. Interactions may show
how a group of voters in theoretically interesting circumstances responds. We may establish
whether the national level or the constituency level takes precedence in conflicting situations.
Moreover, by modeling interactions we may get a clearer view of the behavior of voters in
more straightforward circumstances, since the (hypothetically) distinctive behavior of
interactions group voters is isolated.
National
Constituency
Convinced Confounded Condemned
Convinced I   12.7 III   0.5 IV  0.3 
Confounded      0.5 0.6 0.0 
Condemned II    3.2 0.0 1.6 
Roman numerals refer to interactions discussed in text. 
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Although theoretically the model should become more accurate with the introduction of
interaction terms, Table 5-7 shows that in practice we can expect difficulties testing the model
since most combinations only concern a small number of respondents21Six of the nine
possible combinations involve less than one percent of all respondents. We are therefore
unlikely to find any statistically significant results for these combinations, as empirical
analyses (not presented here for the sake of brevity) confirm. Consequently, only two of the
possible combinations are analyzed further and discussed here, namely those denoted by
combinations I and II in Table 5-7.
Table 5-8 Great Britain - National Level Convinced/Constituency Level Convinced Interaction
(condensed table)
The introduction of cross-level interaction terms brings changes to some parts of the model,
but not to the full model. Table 5-8 therefore presents only a condensed overview of the first
interaction model. In this table, only the parameters affected are presented, so as to give a
better insight into the impact of the interaction terms. For a complete presentation of the
model, the reader is referred to Table 5 in the Appendix. To aid comparison, the estimates for
the model without cross-level interactions, presented in Table 5-6, have been added to the
table.
The results must be interpreted with caution, since only a few of the estimates show
statistical significance. Bearing this in mind, the picture Table 5-8 seems to convey is that of
an increased influence of the constituency level. Although the overall effect of closeness at
the constituency level does not change, the estimates for Convinced voters and
Convinced*Closeness Interaction at the local level do increase substantially. At the national
 No interactions Interactions 
 B s.e. B s.e. 
Constituency level: 
Closeness  0.002 0.005 0.002 0.004 
Convinced voter 0.142 0.071 0.358 0.104 
Convinced*Closeness Interaction 0.233 0.186 0.371 0.320 
National level:     
Closeness  0.195 0.039 0.179 0.038 
Convinced voter 0.317 0.067 0.459 0.080 
Convinced*Closeness Interaction 0.233 0.104 0.153 0.128 
Interaction: National Convinced * Constituency Convinced voters 
Interaction effect   -0.490 0.151 
Interaction * Constituency closeness   0.230 0.201 
Interaction * National closeness    -0.274 0.395 
Condensed table. Complete table presented in Table 5 of the Appendix 
Standard errors in italics. Bold figures indicate statistical significance at p < .05. 
Actual election outcomes used for constituency level closeness, opinion poll data used 
for national level closeness. 
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sample may not be representative of all British constituencies. A nationally representative sample need not be
representative at the constituency level. 
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level, the estimates for closeness and the interaction with Convinced voters decrease in size,
while the direct effect for Convinced voters at the national level increases. This suggests a
shift of impact from the national to the constituency level, especially regarding the closeness
of the race at the constituency level. This is underlined by the estimates for the cross-level
interaction, at the bottom of the table. There too closeness at the constituency level shows a
positive effect, while closeness at the national level shows a negative influence, as does the
direct interaction effect. These last two findings may appear puzzling at first sight, as they run
counter to expectations. It is necessary to understand, however, that to these parameters the
estimates at constituency level as well as national level need to be added to come to the
complete effect for this national level cross-level interaction term. The estimates and standard
errors for the additional (interaction) effect of national closeness, 0.153 (0.128) and -0.274
(0.395) respectively, suggest however that an extra effect of closeness on top of the overall
effect is absent for the cross-level interaction. This first cross-level interaction thus suggests
that the model of Table 5-6 underestimates the importance of the constituency.
Table 5-9 Great Britain - National Level Convinced/Constituency Level Condemned Interaction
(condensed table)
Table 5-9 presents the estimates for the second cross-level interaction model. This interaction
term denotes voters who stand a chance of winnig at the national level but find themselves
without any chance in their constituency. Again the table only presents the parameter
estimates that are affected, and a complete overview is presented in the second part of Table
5-in the Appendix. The first two columns of Table 5-9 again present estimates from the non-
interaction model of Table 5-6 for ease of comparison.
As in the previous interaction model, the results are not readily interpreted. Again, the
No interactions Interactions 
 s.e. BB  s.e. 
Constituency level:  
Closeness  0.002 0.005 0.002 0.004 
Convinced voter 0.142 0.071 0.162 0.071 
Convinced*Closeness Interaction 0.233 0.186 0.231 0.180 
Condemned voter -0.130 0.082 -0.216 0.094 
Condemned*Closeness Interaction 0.027 0.077 0.020 0.059 
National level:     
Closeness  0.195 0.039 0.191 0.038 
Convinced voter 0.317 0.067 0.262 0.070 
Convinced*Closeness Interaction 0.233 0.104 0.282 0.107 
Condemned voter -0.435 0.119 -0.385 0.122 
Condemned*Closeness Interaction 0.157 0.161 0.152 0.160 
Interaction: National Convinced * Constituency Condemned voters 
Interaction effect   0.152 0.160 
Interaction * Constituency closeness   0.389 0.234 
Interaction * National closeness    1.301 1.278 
Condensed table. Complete table presented in Table 5 of the Appendix 
Standard errors in italics. Bold figures indicate statistical significance at p < .05. 
Actual election outcomes used for constituency level closeness, opinion poll data used 
for national level closeness. 
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estimate for closeness at the constituency level remains stable. However, the estimates for
Convinced and Condemned voters do change. The estimate for Condemned voters becomes
even more negative. As the group of Condemned voters at constituency level now no longer
includes national level Convinced voters - isolated by the interaction term - this is not
surprising: the remaining Condemned voters have less to expect form the election and are less
inclined to vote. Thus the slight increase in the estimate for Convinced voters cannot be
explained. 
At the national level, we see that Convinced voters nowhave a lower tendency to turn
out at consistently higher rates. Instead they exhibit stronger responses to the degree of
closeness. This is reflected in the table by a decrease in size of the Convinced voter estimate,
while the accompanying interaction term increases in size. Apparently, the remaining
Convinced voters at the national level are less stable voters that react more to the added
incentive of a close race. Condemned voters at the national level do not change in their
response to the closeness of the race, although they do fall less far behind the Base category
voters in this cross-level interaction model - this is indicated by the decreased negative
estimate.
In conclusion, the cross-level interaction models present a somewhat mixed outcome.
On the one hand, the sample distribution suggested beforehand that any model findings
would be problematic. Data analysis confirms this suspicion. At the same time however, the
cross-level interactions do suggest that the influence of the constituency level may be
underestimated if such interactions are excluded from the model.
5 .3 P r ed i c t i ng  E l e c to r a l  P a r t i c i pa t i on
What then does it matter whether one is a Convinced, Confounded or Condemned voter, or
whether one can be classified as a Base category voter? To emphasize the impact of
closeness on the different categories of voters, this section will depict the influence of
closeness on the different categories graphically, for different degrees of closeness. First,
the female mainstream voter presented earlier in Section 5.2.2 of 45 years of age, about
average education, political interest and income (scores of 5, 5 and 0 respectively) is
presented as a Base category voter, and also as a Convinced, Confounded and Condemned
voter. The predicted chance to vote for such respondents is presented for different degrees
of closeness of the election. These closeness figures are based on actual opinion poll
predictions, published before the elections of 1983, 1979, October 1974, February 1974
and 1992, and with gaps between the two largest national parties of 19, 10, 5, 2 and 0.5
percent, respectively. Calculation of the predicted chance to vote is analogous to the
calculations presented in Section 5.2.2 and note 17 above)
Figure 5-1 shows the propensity to vote for our respondent under different contextual
circumstances. To aid transparency, the predictions are based on the national level model
only, which is comparable to the model presented in Table 5-5 (last columns). However, the
model used for the actual predictions had all estimates removed that were not statistically
significant, since it cannot be claimed that these effects will exist in reality. Unfortunately,
this may also mean that effects are removed from the model that show no statistical
significance because of sample distribution and size reasons only, and not because these
effects are in actuality absent. The amended prediction model is presented in Table 6-in the
Appendix
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Figure 5-1 Great Britain - Predicted Chance to Vote for Different Categories of Voters (left), and
Deviation from Chance Predicted for Base Category Voters (right).
The three lines in Figure 5-1 represent, from top to bottom, Convinced voters, Base category
voters and Condemned voters. Confounded voters follow the same pattern as Base voters, since
the estimates for Confounded voters proved not to be statistically significant. The left hand
panel presents the likelihood of voting for our 45-year-old respondent under different degrees
of closeness. Two things are clear right away: a Convinced voter has a consistently greater
probability of voting than a comparable Base or Confounded voter, who in turn is more likely
to vote than Condemned voters. In the model, this was reflected by the direct effects of the
category indicators. Additionally, it is clear that the closeness of the election does affect the
probability to vote, for all categories of voters. All three lines show an upward curve to the right,
i.e., as the election becomes closer. In the estimation model, this is reflected by the significant
and positive direct effect of Closeness, as well as the interaction of Closeness with the
Convinced voters. But is this increased probability to vote uniform for the three categories?
The right hand panel of Figure 5-1 depicts this more clearly - although the picture
requires some explanation. The right hand panel of Figure 5-1 shows the predicted
probability of voting for the various categories, contrasted against the predicted chance to
vote for Base category voters. The zero-line represents the predicted chance to vote for Base
(and Confounded) category voters, while the top and bottom lines show the predicted
deviation from that line for Convinced and Condemned voters, respectively. The upper line
shows that Convinced voters have a probability to participate that is almost consistently 4
percent points higher than Base category voters, while this increases to a little over 5 percent
points in extremely close elections. This is in line with expectations. 
The lower line of the right hand panel of Figure 5-1 shows the probability to vote for
Condemned voters. This probability is consistently lower than that of Base category voters,
as was expected from the estimated model. However, the line also shows a curve upward at
the extreme right hand side, indicating that as the election becomes extremely close,
Condemned voters are more affected by this than Base category voters. This seems odd, even
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counter-intuitive, as Condemned voter were expected to be least affected by the closeness of
the election. However, this can be explained as a ceiling effect. As the election becomes
extremely close, the chance to vote increases for all voters - but already high probabilities of
voting have less scop to increase  than lower probabilities. This explains the pattern of Figure
5-1, and it is a reflection of the s-curve which is typical for a logistic regression model. This
effect will be shown to be even more pronounced in section 5.3.1. The reason that Convinced
voters show an increase in the predicted probability to vote in close elections in Figure 5-1
as well is of course due to the additional, statistically significant interaction with closeness
for Convinced voters.
5.3.1 High versus  Low Invo lvement
Figure 5-2 depicts the effect of being a Convinced or Condemned voter vis-à-vis Base or
Confounded category voters - now for high turnout potentials. Ceiling effects play an even
greater role in these analyses. The predictions are once again based on the national level
model presented in Table 6-of the Appendix. However, the simulated voter now has a higher
probability to turn out and vote on the basis of her individual characteristics: predictions are
made for a 50 year old female, of high education, high political interest and high income
(scores of 8, 8 and 1, respectively)22. As Figure 5-2 clearly shows, for such a voter the
contextual influence of closeness are minimal. The lines in the left hand panel of Figure 5-2
show only a minimal incline, while in the right hand panel the pattern of Figure 5-1 is
repeated: Convinced voters are more likely to vote than Base category voters, and even more
so as the election draws closer. Condemned voters catch up somewhat in close elections.
Figure 5-2 Great Britain - Predicted Chance to Vote for Different Categories of Voters with High
Involvement (left), and Deviation from Chance Predicted for Base Category Voters
with High Involvement (right).
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A different pattern can be detected at the other end of the scale, where voters are decidedly
less inclined to participate. Figure 5-3 presents turnout predictions for a 20 year old male, of
low education, low political interest and low income23. 
Figure 5-3 Great Britain - Predicted Chance to Vote for Different Categories of Voters with Low
Involvement (left), and Deviation from Chance Predicted for Base Category Voters
with Low Involvement (right).
Figure 5-3 not only shows that it matters a great deal whether one is a Convinced,
Condemned or Confounded or Base category voter at the low end of the scale. The plots also
show that for these voters the political context - the closeness of the race - matters a great
deal. For Convinced voters the probability to vote rises from under 50 percent to almost 70
percent in a dead heat election race. In other words, the chance to participate for Convinced
voters is 10 percent in excess of the turnout likelihood for Base category voters and this
increases to 20 percent. In contrast, Condemned voters are 20 to over 30 percent behind. The
right hand panel also shows that these less involved Condemned voters fall even further
behind as the election becomes very close.
5 .4 P r ed i c t i ng  Tu rnou t  L e ve l s
The previous sections showed that closeness affects different voters differently, and that we
should allow for individual variation in the influence of closeness on voters. In this section
we will examine whether our ability to predict turnout at the aggregate level improves if we
allow the influence of closeness to vary at the indvidual level. Does the Individual Context
model provide more accurate turnout estimates that the traditional model does?
The predictions are analogous to the predictions presented in Table 2-4 and Figure 2-1
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in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2. We estimate the predicted turnout based on our analytical models,
and for each election compare the turnout estimates with the actual turnout24. The basis for
the predictions is the traditional model presented in Table 5-5, and the prediction model
(including statistically significant results only) already employed in the previous section and
presented in Table 6-of the Appendix. The predictions will therefore be based on the national
level model25. 
Table 5-10 presents the turnout level as predicted by the traditional model and the
Individual Context model, followed by actual election turnout. The last column presents that
average absolute deviation in predicted and actual turnout per model. 
Table 5-10 Great Britain - Turnout (percentages), Actual and Predicted by Traditional and
Individual Context Model and Average Absolute Deviance from Actual Turnout
(percentage points)
An inspection of Table 5-10 shows that the differences in predicted turnout between the two
models are small, in most cases only appearing in the second decimal. This should not
surprise us - the amendments to the model are limited. No clear winner can be determined,
although the average deviation score shows a slightly more accurate prediction for the
Individual Context model than for the traditional model. 
Year 1970 1974Feb 1974Oct 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 Deviance
Traditional model 73.9 78.1 74.5 75.6 74.4 75.9 79.1 72.9 1.19 
Individual Context 74.0 78.1 74.5 75.9 74.4 75.9 79.1 73.0 1.17 
Turnout 72.0 78.1 72.8 76.0 72.7 75.3 77.7 71.2 - 
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24 The prediction procedure requires the sample to be weighted, since voters are typically over-represented in election
surveys (cf. Note 7, Chapter 2). Weighting ensures that sample turnout (as reported by the respondents) reflects the actual
election turnout, enabling aggregate level predictions. Since sample weighting is problematic in the MLwiN software,
the individual level predictions were produced in MLwiN, after which sample weighting and aggregate level predictions
were performed in SPSS. 
25 Additional analyses showed findings to be comparable for the national and constituency level models, and where
therefore not presented here. For consistency the same model used in section 5.3 was presented.
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Figure 5-4 Great Britain - Predicted Turnout Levels, Deviation from Actual Turnout
Figure 5-4 presents the deviation of the predicted turnout rates from the actual election
outcome. We see that the model tends to over-estimate the actual turnout. Figure 5-4 confirms
the pattern of Table 5-10: differences in prediction accuracy are small between the two
models. Only for the 1979 and 1987 elections does the Individual Context model provide
markedly more accurate estimates.
5 .5 Conc lu s i on s  
Does closeness matter in Great Britain? Yes it does. The previous chapter already suggested
this at the aggregate level, and the analyses in the current chapter show that indeed closeness
affects turnout at the individual level as well. The figures in Section 5.3 illustrate this for the
national level. But the aim of this chapter went further: to show that the impact of closeness
is dependent on individual level characteristics. This too was confirmed by the analyses
presented in this chapter. Graphically, this differentiation in the impact of closeness was
depicted in the right hand pane of the figures of Section 5.3. The graphs showed that it
matters whether one is a Convinced, Confounded or Condemned voter, and moreover, that
this matters even more if ones individual characteristics make electoral participation less
certain.
Although these findings do support the theoretical expectations set out in Chapter 3 and
this chapter, there is still need for caution. The aggregate level turnout predictions of Section
5.4 showed only small differences, albeit in favor of the Individual Context model. In
addition, a number of parameter estimates at the national and constituency levels, as well as
for the cross-level interactions, were not to be statistically significant in contrast to prior
expectations. Of course, this could mean that our expectations were wrong. However, as was
already mentioned, the characteristics of the sample available for analysis meant that the
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quality some of the variables used in this chapter was less than that desired. In addition, the
number of respondents qualifying as Confounded or Condemned voters was extremely low:
an unavoidable feature of standard survey sampling when segments of specific research
interest in the population are small. Attaining enough respondents from these categories
would require oversampling - or extremely large sample sizes. As a consequence, it is
difficult to determine whether it is indeed these sample limitations that caused the estimates
to remain statistically not significant, or whether the theory outlined is wrong. This proved to
be especially problematic in the interpretation of the constituency level estimates, and the
cross-level interactions.
Limitations of the sample distribution hamper conclusions which might be drawn
regarding the constituency level as well. Whether the influence of the constituency level is
fully overshadowed by the national level, as Table 5-6 suggests, is a question that for the
moment must remain unanswered. However, some clues for an answer to this question were
offered by the cross-level interaction analyses. Although only two of the possible nine cross-
level interaction terms could be explored, indications were that the constituency level is of
consequence. Or, to put it more accurately, voters are likely to focus on the arena that gives
them the most favorable outlook - be it at the constituency or the national level.
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S w e d e n
The previous chapter presented an analysis of the influence of closeness in a two dominant-
party system. In such a system closeness is expected to have a clear and significant influence.
The current chapter presents analyses for Sweden, a country where not two but several parties
determine the political landscape. Sweden is a multi-party system where the political
spectrum has traditionally comprised of five, and in recent times seven to eight political
parties. The notion of closeness is not directly associated with elections in multiparty
systems. In this chapter we assess the possibilities of generalizing this concept beyond the
two-party context in which it is usually applied. This effort is not only of relevance for
Sweden, but potentially also for other multi-party systems. Before focusing on this, we first
give a brief overview of the Swedish party-system
The Swedish political landscape is not composed of two large parties, but only one. The
Social-Democratic Party (SAP) is the largest one and its primacy has been unassailable. Apart
from the dominating SAP party, a number of smaller parties fill the political spectrum from
left to right. As was already discussed in Chapter 4, the Swedish party spectrum is well
structured. The consequence of this is not that party competition in Sweden is a game of all
against all, or of all parties against the dominating party. Instead, a clear divide has for a long
time determined Swedish politics that distinguishes the political parties in Sweden into two
groupings: the left versus the right. On the left one finds the social democratic and left wing
parties, and on the right the parties that are commonly referred to as "bourgeois" parties.
Since the introduction of general suffrage, the SAP successfully maintained its unrivaled
position of as largest party, typically wining around 45 percent of the vote. As a consequence,
the social democrats managed to maintain government power for nearly all of the twentieth
century (cf. Hancock, 1993).
The two-bloc structure of the Swedish party landscape has proven extremely rigid up
until the end of the twentieth century. The left party bloc is made up of the SAP and what
originally was the communist party Vänsterpartiet, to the left of the SAP, and the green
Miljöpartiet, which appeared on the political stage in the early 1980s. 
The right, or bourgeois, side is composed of the Center (agrarian) party, the
conservative Moderaterna and the liberal Folkpartiet. The 1990s saw the rise of the
Christian-democratic Kristdemokraterna into what now appears a firmly settled addition to
the bourgeois camp. A quick shot at electoral success by the right-wing populist Ny
Demokrati party in the early 1990s proved to be short-lived.
The image of a two-bloc structure is reinforced by the fact that the SAP, although
invariably the largest party and frequently polling over 45 percent of the vote, has since 1921
managed only twice to win an absolute majority. Much like the Fianna Fail party in Ireland,
it refused for decades to enter into a coalition government, preferring instead to form a
minority government with the almost assured support (or at least not opposition) of the left-
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wing Vänsterpartiet. When particular political issues would so require this single-party
government would rely on temporary brokered coalitions with the bourgeois parties. Although
Vänsterpartiet supporters may not always warmly support the SAP, it is clear that they are on
the same side of a generally recognized political divide, and that they share sentiments of
animosity, even adversity regarding the other, bourgeois side. The same holds for the green
Miljöpartiet, although its allegiance to the left has been somewhat less outright, perhaps
because green issues at times cut across the traditional left-right divide. It has taken until the
very end of the 1990s before negotiated, cross-bloc agreements emerged in Sweden, such as
the 1994-1998 SAP governments legislative agreement with the Center party.
To all intents and purposes, therefore, the Swedish political landscape can be viewed not
so much as a sytem made up of five, seven or even eight parties, but rather, as was already
argued in Chapter 4, a two-bloc structure, in which the left wing hopes for an SAP
government - be it minority government or not - while the bourgeois side aspires to form a
right wing government. In essence, the race between parties then becomes a race between
blocs, determining which side will take up government responsibility. Chapter 4 already
showed that, under such circumstances, closeness is related to turnout at the aggregate level.
But how will closeness affect individual voters?
Table 6-1 Sweden - Turnout Figures for Parliamentary Elections, 1979-1998 (percentages)
As Table 6-1 shows, turnout figures in Sweden are high, around the 90 percent mark for the
period of the early 1980s. Since then, turnout rates have declined somewhat, although 80
percent may still be considered high for present day western democracies. The high turnout
figures mean that there is little room for the additional influence of closeness, and we may
not see very strong effects. However, the gradual decline in turnout rates leaves more room
for a possible influence of closeness.
6 .1 Who  i s  A f f e c t ed?
Although the two-bloc structure includes all political parties in Sweden - or at least all those
represented in parliament - this does not necessarily mean that all of the electorate should be
affected by the closeness of an election race as well. 
In line with the argument of Chapter 3 and in a similar approach as the previous chapter,
three categories of voters have been constructed, on the basis of how voters evaluate the
parties of the two blocs. Again, voters will be described as Convinced, Confounded,
Condemned or Base category voters1. 
Convinced voters strongly support one of the parties in one bloc, while rejecting at least
one of the parties in the other bloc. These voters are expected to be most strongly affected by
the closeness of the election race, and to show a greater chance of participating in close
elections.
Year 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 
Turnout 90.7 91.4 89.9 86.0 86.7 86.8 81.4 
104
1 A discussion of the codings used to define the different voter categories is presented in the Appendix.
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Confounded voters care for one side as well as the other. They strongly appreciate at
least one party from the bourgeois bloc, as well as at least one from the social democratic
bloc. This might place such voters in a dilemma when elections become close, as the potential
consequences may make the choice harder to make.
Condemned voters do not favor either of the blocs. They do not express a great
evaluation for one of the parties of either bloc. As the Swedish two-bloc structure comprises
all parties, this implies that Condemned voters in Sweden by definition do not have strong
positive feelings for any of the political parties - in contrast for instance to their counterparts
in Great Britain. This will of course be of consequence for the impact that closeness may have
on these voters. Condemned voters are expected to show a lower propensity to participate in
the election, and are not very susceptible to the degree of closeness of the election. 
The remainder of the electorate is made up of voters who positively evaluate at least one
of the political parties, yet do not combine this positive evaluation with a strong dislike of the
parties on the other side. 
6 .2 Da t a
Swedish electoral research is rooted in a strong tradition of empirical survey studies, founded
in the mid 1950s by Westerståhl and Särlvik, with the first parliamentary election study being
held in 19562. Since then, studies have been held at every election, creating a substantial base
for electoral research. Helpful in this is a quality of the Swedish political system enviable to
researchers of contextual effects, namely frequent elections - held every three years since the
1970 election. Unfortunately - from a purely scientific standpoint, that is - Sweden moved
back to a four-year parliamentary term in 1994.
The number of election studies available for analysis was restricted by the availability
of a good party evaluation indicator. This requirement narrowed down the number of
available election studies to a total of seven, covering the parliamentary elections from 1979
to 1998. After corrections for missing data, a total of 16,812 cases within 7 elections
remained for analysis. 
As in the analyses of the preceding chapter, the aim of the model presented is to
determine how the closeness of the election affects different voters, not to explain individual
level electoral participation completely. Therefore, the range of individual level
characteristics included is not exhaustive, but a selection of the usual suspects was made.
These variables include age, gender (being female), education, income, political interest and
political cynicism. All except the last are expected to have a positive influence on turnout.
Education was coded into three categories (low, middle, high), while for income the same
standardization was used as in the previous chapter, i.e., a natural log transformation centered
around the mean. Political interest and political cynicism were each measured by a scale
ranging from zero to six, constructed from two four-point items3. 
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2 See Holmberg (1994) for an overview on the history of Swedish election studies.
3 The items used for political interest concerned reading political news in the papers, and self-declared political interest.
For political cynicism, the items tapped whether the respondent believed parties are only concerned about people's votes,
not what they think, and whether members of parliament pay attention to the views of ordinary people. A Mokken scale
procedure showed that, for each year, the items formed strong scales (H values between .58 and .73) (Mokken, 1971).
Missing values were subsequently recoded to the lowest score per item for political interest, and the middle score for
political cynicism.
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The respondents were subsequently classified as Convinced, Confounded,
Condemned or base category voters, in line with the categorization scheme introduced in
Chapter 3 and Chapter 5. Dummy variables were constructed to identify Convinced,
Confounded and Condemned respondents. This was based on a party rating score, running
from -5 for a negative evaluation, to + 5 for a positive evaluation of the party. Respondents
who gave one of the parties at least a 4 or 5, while evaluating at least one of the parties
from the other bloc with minus 3, 4 or 5 were grouped in the Convinced category.
Respondents who evaluated at least one of the parties from either bloc with a 4 or 5 were
scored as Confounded. Respondents who evaluated none of the left wing parties nor any of
the bourgeois parties with 4 or 5 were scored as Condemned voters.
The remainder - that is those who do not fall in one of the above categories - consist
of respondents who did evaluate at least one of the parties with a score of 4 or 5, but did
not score -3, -4 or -5 for at least one of the parties from the other bloc, and are coded as
Base category. To use a liberal interpretation, these voters may vote for a party, but do not
necessarily vote against the other side. These voters may well be affected by closeness,
though not as strongly as Convinced voters. 
An overview of the percentage of respondents per category of voters is presented in
Table 6-2. From this table, it is clear that Confounded voters are especially hard to find: on
average, about five percent of the electorate fall in this category. This will of course make
it hard to find statistically significant estimates for this category. Compared to the
distribution of voters in Great Britain presented in the previous chapter, Base category
voters are also relatively scarce in Sweden. The majority of the electorate is made up by
the Convinced and Condemned voters.
Table 6-2 Sweden - Frequencies of Convinced, Confounded and Condemned Voters 
versus Base Category (percentages)
The indicator for closeness of the election is based on opinion poll data from SIFOs
election barometers (Oscarsson, 1995). These polls are typically reported by the media in
the run up to the election. The combined vote-share for the left-wing parties SAP and
Vänsterpartiet was pitted against the joint share for the bourgeois parties Center,
Folkpartiet and Moderaterna, with the gap between the two blocs in absolute percentage
points taken as an initial measure. Because a number of newcomers appeared on the
political stage, the definition of the two blocs had to be adapted accordingly. This means
that as of the 1991 elections, Kristdemokraterna was added to the bourgeois bloc, while
from the 1998 election onwards the Miljöpartiet was regarded as part of the left-wing bloc
(Oscarsson, personal correspondence). Table 6-3 presents an overview of the closeness of
Election Year Convinced Confounded Condemned Base 
1979 48.2 2.5 17.4 32.0 
1982 47.1 3.4 18.1 31.4 
1985 46.1 5.8 13.8 34.2 
1988 38.8 4.8 17.3 39.1 
1991 41.1 6.0 14.3 38.9 
1994 44.5 4.7 13.9 36.9 
1998 32.4 3.0 21.4 43.2 
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the election based on poll data compared to actual election outcomes, together with election
turnout.
Table 6-3 Sweden - Degree of Closeness (in polls and actual) and Turnout
The same transformation as in Chapter 5 was applied to the indicator for closeness to reflect
the expected non-linear effect of closeness. By taking the inverse of the gap between the blocs
(1 divided by the gap between the two blocs in percentage points), a measure of closeness
was created with higher scores indicating a closer election.
6 .3 Ana l y s i s
The results of the analyses for Sweden are presented in Table 6-4. As in the previous chapter,
a logistic multi-level regression was applied. The first column presents the variable names,
followed by pairs of columns presenting the parameter estimates and the standard errors (in
italics). Bold type indicates statistically significant estimates at an alpha level of .05. Finally,
at the bottom of this table there is the likelihood estimate and the dichotomous pseudo-R2
(Snijders & Bosker, 1999).
Election Year Gap in Polls Actual Gap Turnout (%) 
1979 1.5 0.2 90.7 
1982 5.5 6.2 91.4 
1985 1.0 4.5 89.9 
1988 7.0 7.3 86.0 
1991 5.4 4.5 86.7 
1994 5.8 10.1 86.8 
1998 9.3 8.4 80.3 
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Table 6-4 Sweden - Closeness and Electoral Participation, 1979-1998
The first model contains estimates for individual level characteristics as well as for
Closeness, at the contextual level. It is the traditional model in which the contextual effect
is assumed to have an equal influence on all of the respondents. No surprises are encountered
here. Women tend to vote more often than men, when controlling for the other individual
level characteristics. Education is contrast-coded so that each educational level is compared
to the level preceding it. The first education indicator shows that respondents with a middle
level education have a higher propensity to vote than those with a low level of education only.
However, the second education indicator shows that the difference between the higher and
middle education level is of more importance still, since its estimate is larger. Age, income
and political interest all show a positive influence on the chances of participation, as was
expected. The negative influence of political cynicism is also in line with expectations.
The Closeness of the election has a substantial and statistically significant positive
influence on electoral participation. Additional analysis (not shown here) proves that this
effect is not greatly dependent on the individual characteristics included in the model; only
minimal changes in parameter estimates occur if closeness is left out. The variation at the
second level is very small and not statistically significant, indicating that little between-
election variation is left in the model. Based on these analyses, we would conclude that the
closeness of the election does indeed have an effect on Swedish voters. Something we could
also conclude from the analysis presented in Chapter 4. But from these analyses we cannot
determine whether the closeness of the election is of influence for all Swedish voters.
 ‘Traditional’ ‘Individual context’ 
  B s.e. B s.e. 
Age 0.012 0.002 0.011 0.002 
Female 0.382 0.064 0.307 0.065 
Education:     
Middle compared to Lower 0.204 0.079 0.256 0.080 
High compared to Middle 0.286 0.090 0.292 0.091 
Income 0.215 0.029 0.235 0.029 
Political Interest 0.358 0.025 0.277 0.025 
Political Cynicism -0.128 0.023 -0.101 0.023 
     
Closeness 0.685 0.229 0.637 0.272 
Convinced voters   0.439 0.118 
Convinced*Closeness Interaction    0.116 0.272 
Confounded voters   -0.116 0.226 
Confounded*Closeness Interaction   0.458 0.557 
Condemned voters   -0.724 0.108 
Condemned*Closeness Interaction   0.153 0.250 
      
Constant 1.056 0.187 1.279 0.199 
Variation election (2
nd
) level 0.030 0.020 0.031 0.020 
      
Likelihood, -1669  -3310  
R
2
dicho  .150  .187  
Standard errors in italics. Bold figures indicate statistical significance at p < .05. 
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The Individual Context model presents the analysis with additional indicators added
for the different categories of voters. Convinced, Confounded and Condemned voters are
denoted by dummy variables. The Interaction variables denote an interaction between each
of the categories and the degree of closeness of the election. In this model, closeness may
have an across-the-board effect on all of the electorate, denoted by the Closeness indicator,
but allowance is also made for additional influence on individual segments of the electorate,
denoted by the Interaction terms. The dummy variables indicate whether a respondent is
classified as Convinced, Confounded or Condemned, they do not indicate how close the
election actually is. These are in effect individual characteristics. The Interaction terms
indicate whether the closeness of the election has an additional influence for voters in any of
the categories, over and above the effect denoted by the Closeness indicator.
The likelihood value indicates that the model has improved significantly, which is
confirmed by the improved R2 value. Inspection of the top pane containing individual
characteristics reveals that the estimates here have largely remained stable. The difference
between men and women is reduced somewhat, while education proves to be somewhat more
influential. The estimates for political interest and political cynicism are reduced slightly.
However, none of these changes are substantial.
The across-the-board influence of Closeness is reduced somewhat, but a statistically
significant effect remains. This is important to recognize, when we look at the estimates for
the different categories of voters. The effect on Convinced voters is positive, as was expected,
and statistically significant. Likewise, the estimate for Condemned voters is also statistically
significant, and in the direction that was hypothesized, in this case negative. Both estimates
are of substantial size, indicating that it does make a difference whether one is a Convinced
or Condemned voter in Sweden. 
The other estimates for the voter categories do not prove to be statistically significant.
For the Confounded voters, this is hardly surprising as Table 6-2 already showed that this
category contains very few voters. Since expectations as to the size and direction of the
estimates for this category were rather tentative, there is very little that may justifiably be
concluded from the findings for this category of voters.
The expectations for the Interactions between Closeness and Convinced and
Confounded voters were more specific. The Convinced Interaction term was expected to be
positive and statistically significant. An additional effect of closeness on Condemned voters
was expected to be absent. In view of the substantial and positive across-the-board effect for
Closeness, a significant, negative Condemned Interaction term might be expected in the
analytical model. Neither of these two expectations appears to be supported by the findings.
The absence of statistically significant interaction terms could mean that the closeness of the
election affects every Swedish voter to virtually the same degree. People tend to show a
higher propensity to vote in close elections, regardless of whether they are Convinced,
Confounded, Condemned voters or none of the three. The absence of significant interactions
could also be caused by the characteristics of the data. The distribution of respondents over
the different categories has already been referred to. An additional feature of the Swedish
political system is worth mentioning here, too, and will become more apparent in Figure 6-1
and Figure 6-2, below. Electoral participation in Sweden is typically very high. Variations in
this participation rate, especially within groups with very high rates of participation, will
therefore be very difficult to detect and explain in an analytical model. 
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The model of Table 6-4 as it stands now seems to suggest that what matters is closeness,
and that it matters equally for all voters, irrespective of whether a voter actually cares for a
particular party and rejects the other party, or whether these party preferences are less intense.
Although the interpretation that only an across-the-board effect of closeness exists may be
correct, there is also the risk that the operationalization of the variables is causing problems here. 
The indicators for the three categories of voters may in fact work as a proxy for another
individual characteristic, hinted at already in the previous paragraph, namely party
attachment. Since the two-bloc division in Swedish politics comprises all political parties,
Condemned voters may be differently described as "respondents who have not expressed a
high evaluation for any of the political parties on offer" while Convinced voters are
"respondents who clearly favor at least one party and reject one from the other bloc"4. This
may have an unwanted effect on the analysis. To control for this, an analysis including
information on party attachment was carried out. Whether the respondents considered
themselves close to a political party or not was included in the model through a dichotomized
variable5. The results are presented in Table 6-5.
Table 6-5 Sweden - Closeness and Electoral Participation 1979-1998, 
including Party Attachment
 ‘Traditional’ ‘Individual context’ 
  B s.e. B s.e. 
Age 0.007 0.002 0.008 0.002 
Female 0.389 0.064 0.327 0.065 
Education     
Middle vs. Lower 0.265 0.080 0.286 0.081 
High vs. Middle 0.341 0.091 0.334 0.091 
Income 0.218 0.029 0.233 0.029 
Political Interest 0.308 0.025 0.256 0.025 
Political Cynicism -0.094 0.023 -0.082 0.023 
Party Attachment 0.900 0.071 0.665 0.074 
     
Closeness 0.633 0.194 0.601 0.252 
Convinced voters   0.287 0.119 
Convinced Interaction    0.130 0.273 
Confounded voters   -0.151 0.226 
Confounded Interaction   0.455 0.558 
Condemned voters   -0.623 0.109 
Condemned Interaction   0.130 0.250 
     
Constant 0.862 0.178 1.127 0.193 
Variation level 2 (election) 0.019 0.014 0.023 0.016 
     
Likelihood -3322  -4134  
R
2
dicho  .190  .208 
Standard errors in italics. Bold figures indicate statistical significance at p < .05. 
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4 The difference with the British polity for example is that in Britain a Condemned respondent may still adamantly support
a third party, while in Sweden there is no third 'bloc' on offer.
5 Introducing the party evaluation scores as a variable into the model would not be useful here, since by definition
Convinced respondents will have a higher party evaluation score than Condemned respondents (see section 6.2, above).
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The strong influence of Party Attachment on electoral participation has an impact on the other
individual characteristics of the traditional model: most the estimates show some change
compared to the model presented in Table 6-4. The estimate for Age is reduced considerably,
indicating that there is a substantial relationship between age and party attachment. The
influence of education is increased, while the influence of political interest is reduced. The
latter is hardly surprising as party attachment and political interest tend to be related. The
estimate for Party Attachment is statistically significant, positive and of substantial size, as
might be expected. The likelihood and pseudo-R2 figures show a considerable improvement
over the first model shown in Table 6-4. The aggregate influence of Closeness has decreased
somewhat, although not by a great deal. It remains statistically significant.
The Individual Context model presented in the next two columns of Table 6-5 shows
comparable changes in estimates to the model presented in Table 6-4. Including the indicators
for the different categories of voters decreases the estimate for Party Attachment, suggesting
that there is indeed a relationship there. The changes in the other estimates is comparable to
what we saw in the previous analyses. 
The estimates for Convinced and Condemned voters do show some notable changes.
Both estimates are substantially reduced. They remain statistically significant, however. This
indicates that part of the influence of Party Attachment is indeed mediated through the
Convinced and Condemned indicators. The model as it is presented now should therefore be
a better representation of the actual process of electoral participation. The overall picture,
however, remains unchanged. In Sweden, Closeness appears to affect the electorate
uniformly, while Convinced voters show a distinctly higher propensity to vote and
Condemned voters show a consistently lower likelihood of turning out. From the analyses
presented here, we can conclude that the degree of closeness of the election does not
influence these differences between categories of voters.
6 .4 P r ed i c t i ng  E l e c to r a l  P a r t i c i pa t i on  
What do the above findings imply for the propensity to vote of the Swedish electorate? To
what degree are voters more likely to turn out in close elections? In this section, the predicted
chance of voting for a few stereotypical voters will be compared. Comparisons will be made
for different categories of voters, as well as for different levels of closeness of the elections.
We will see that the closeness of the election does affect voters of the different categories to
different degrees, even though no significant interaction effects could be established in the
analyses reported above. 
Before the predictions can be made, a model must be established from which to derive
the predictions. The point of concern in establishing this model is whether to include the
parameter estimates that were not found to be statistically  significant in the analyses of Table
6-5. Including statistically non-significant parameters is acceptable if we argue that sample
size and distribution are the main cause that these parameters are not statistically significant.
However, we cannot be sure of this. Therefore, we adopt a cautious approach, and base our
predictions on a model containing statistically significant results only. The predictions are
therefore based on a re-estimated model, analogous to that of Table 6-5 but with the non-
significant estimates removed. The estimates are largely comparable to those presented in
Table 6-5, and are presented in Table 7, in the Appendix. 
The degree of closeness is derived from actual opinion poll predictions for the elections.
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The values of 9.3, 7, 5.4 and 1 percent correspond with the elections of 1998, 1988, 1991,
1985, respectively. A hypothetical close election with a gap of 0.5 percent is added for
illustrative purposes.
Figure 6-1 shows the predicted chance to vote for a female respondent of 45 years of
age with an average income (score of 0), middle levels of education, political interest and
political cynicism (scores of 3), and who also feels close to a political party. The plotted lines
represent such a respondent as a Base category, Convinced or Condemned voter. As no
statistically significant estimates for Confounded voters were found, the predictions for Base
and Confounded voters are identical.
Figure 6-1 Sweden - Predicted Chance to Vote for Different Categories of Voters (left), and
Deviation from Chance Predicted for Base Category Voters (right).
The most striking feature of Figure 6-1 is of course the extremely high predicted probability
of voting for each of the voter categories. Regardless of the closeness of the election, and
regardless of whether our female voter is a Convinced or a Condemned voter, her predicted
probability of voting is near 95 percent or over. At such levels of predicted participation, the
impact of political context will be minimal. The left hand pane of Figure 6-1 shows a small
increase in the chance to participate as the election becomes closer. The right hand panel
shows that the differences between categories of voters diminish as the election becomes
closer: extremely close elections ensure that this female voter stands an almost equally high
chance of participation, regardless of what voter category she is part of. In elections that are
less close, we see that Condemned voters fall behind the Base category and especially the
Convinced voters. The following section will show a comparable pattern for some voters, but
a decidedly different one for other voters.
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6.4.1 High versus  Low Invo lvement
Based on individual characteristics alone, some voters show a high propensity to vote, while
others show a lower likelihood to participate. It is in the difference between these groups that
the influence of the political context is best perceived. High political involvement leaves little
room for outside influences. On the other hand, low political involvement means that the
political context can play a crucial role in determining actual electoral participation.
Figure 6-2 Sweden - Predicted Chance to Vote for Different Categories of Voters with High
Involvement (left), and Deviation from Chance Predicted for Base Category Voters
with High Involvement (right).
Figure 6-2 shows the predicted chance of voting for a 50 year old female with high education,
above average income (score of 1), high political interest (score 5) and low political cynicism
(score of 0) who feels close to a political party. This respondent is virtually guaranteed to
vote, regardless of the closeness of the election, and regardless whether this is a Convinced,
Confounded, Condemned or a Base category voter. The virtually straight lines in the left hand
panel suggest only one thing: this person will vote, come what may. The right hand panel
shows that the chance of participation for Condemned voters is nearly equal to that of
Convinced and Base category voters. The story is completely different on the other end of the
involvement spectrum, as is illustrated in the next figure.
Figure 6-3 shows the predicted probability to participate under different degrees of
closeness for a 20 year old male, with low education, low income (-2) with low political
interest (0) and a high political cynicism score (6) who does not feel close to a political party.
This is a group of voters whose propensity of participation based on individual characteristics
is low. Here, the closeness of the election is of great importance, and does increase the chance
to participate by over 20 percent points. 
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Figure 6-3 Sweden - Predicted Chance to Vote for Different Categories of Voters with Low
Involvement (left), and Deviation from Chance Predicted for Base Category Voters
with Low Involvement (right).
As the right hand pane of Figure 6-3 shows, for voters with low political involvement it
matters a great deal whether they are Convinced, Condemned or Base category voters - the
differences between the categories call for an extended range on the X-axis. Although the
differences decrease as the election becomes closer (as in Figure 6-1, above), substantial
differences do remain, even in the closest election. The left hand panel of Figure 6-3 shows
clearly how the political context (i.e., closeness) stimulates these voters to participate. From
a high likelihood of abstention in elections that appear a foregone conclusion, a close election
can boost the chance of voting beyond 70 or 80 percent, making participation much more
likely. 
Figures 6-2 and 6-3 imply that variation in turnout levels across elections is not likely
to be explained by the very politically involved. They are likely to vote in every election,
regardless of the closeness of the race or other political context factors. Variation in context
does not generate variation in participation, for these voters. The key to the ebb and flow of
turnout levels can be found with the politically less involved. That is the section of the
electorate that will be likely to participate in some, but not in all elections6. Contextual
characteristics, such as the closeness of the election, will help determine whether these voters
will participate or not. It is here that we should turn our attention if we want to explain why
some elections show a record turnout, while others show a lackluster participation.
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6 Establishing the size of this part of the electorate can give us an insight into the degree of turnout variation we can expect
in elections. If a large part of the electorate is susceptible to contextual influences, we can expect large variations in
turnout between elections. Establishing the size of this segment of the electorate falls beyond the scope of the current
research, however. 
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6 .5 P r ed i c t i ng  Tu rnou t  L e ve l s
Section 6.3 showed that closeness affects electoral participation in Sweden. In fact, Section
6.3 showed that all voters are affected by closeness in Sweden. Does this mean that the
Individual Context model, in which the influence of closeness can vary between voters, is no
improvement over the traditional model? In this section, we will examine whether the
Individual Context model improves our ability to predict turnout at the aggregate level,
compared to the traditional model.
The procedure is comparable to the predictions presented in Section 5.4 of Chapter 5.
The predicted turnout is estimated, based on the Individual Context and the traditional
model, and for each election the turnout estimates are compared with the actual turnout7. The
basis for the predictions is the traditional model presented in Table 6-5 (including party
attachment information), and the Individual Context prediction model used for the
predictions of the previous section (including statistically significant results only, see Table 7
of the Appendix). 
Table 6-6 presents the turnout level as predicted by the traditional model and the
Individual Context model, followed by actual election turnout. The last column presents that
average absolute deviation in predicted and actual turnout per model. 
Table 6-6 Sweden - Turnout (percentages), Actual and Predicted by Traditional and Individual-
context Model and Average Absolute Deviance to Actual Turnout (percentage points)
As for Great Britain (see Table 5-10), Table 6-6 shows that the differences in predicted
turnout between the two models are small. Comparing with Table 5-10, we see that the
Swedish model predicts more accurately than the British models. In Table 6-6 a clear pattern
can be detected. The Individual Context model is most accurate overall, as the smaller
average deviance score indicates. In addition, the Individual Context model is more accurate
in predicting turnout than the traditional model in all elections except 1998 election, as
Figure 6-4 emphasizes.
Year 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 Deviance 
Traditional model 89.6 89.2 88.9 84.9 85.5 85.9 81.8 1.13 
Individual-Context model 89.6 89.3 89.0 85.0 85.6 86.0 81.9 1.08 
Actual turnout 90.7 91.4 89.9 86.0 86.7 86.8 81.4 - 
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7 As was the case for Great Britain, the predictions were weighted (to allow for aggregate level predictions) in SPSS, while
the individual level predictions were produced in MLwiN (cf. Note 24, Chapter 5). 
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Figure 6-4: Sweden - Predicted Turnout Levels, Deviation from Actual Turnout
Figure 6-4 presents the predicted turnout rates as deviations from the actual election outcome.
We see that the Swedish model has a tendency to under-estimate actual turnout. Figure 6-4
shows clearly that, with the exception of the 1998 elections, the Individual Context model
provides more accurate turnout predictions than the traditional model does.
6 .6 Conc lu s i on s
Chapter 4 showed that closeness is an extremely good predictor of electoral participation in
Sweden at the aggregate level. This chapter aimed to examine whether variation in that
influence could be established at the individual level, or whether that influence is uniform for
the whole electorate. The previous chapter showed that individual level variation in the
influence of closeness could be established in Great Britain.
The analysis of the current chapter showed a clear across-the-board effect of closeness,
influencing Convinced, Confounded, and Condemned as well as Base category voters.
Individual variation in the impact of electoral closeness could not be established. All
interaction terms between the degree of closeness and the three categories of voters proved
not to be statistically significant. This may be caused by the limitations in the data available.
The small numbers of Confounded respondents available for analysis make it unlikely that
we will find significant estimates. Whether the same holds true for the interaction terms for
Convinced and Condemned voters cannot so easily be argued. Both categories of voters
represent sizable numbers of respondents. Data limitations may therefore appear a gratuitous
excuse too easily made. Unfortunately, however, this excuse cannot be summarily discarded.
Although the number of respondents in the Convinced and Confounded category is
sizable, it is possible that this number is still not sufficient to detect variation in turnout when
smeared out over the seven different elections by the interaction effect. Especially since
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only a small percentage of respondents are non-voters. The typically high rates of
participation in Sweden make the detection of turnout variation more difficult. This situation
is exacerbated by a typical trait of election studies in general: reported electoral participation
tends to exceed actual turnout figures. For Sweden, the result is extremely high reported
turnout, ranging from 90 to as high as 95 percent. As a consequence, the number of non-
voters in the sample is small, smaller than in the actual population. The percentage of non-
voters that exist in each of the voter categories will thus also be smaller in the sample than in
the actual population. In any case, the distribution is heavily skewed. Together, these data
limitations hinder the detection of statistically significant results. The superior aggregate
level turnout predictions of the Individual Context model presented in Section 6.5 also show
that it is perhaps too rash to dismiss individual level variation in the influence of closeness
for Sweden.
We must not rule out another explanation, which is that in Sweden all categories voters
are affected by closeness. Because the race affects the whole of the party spectrum, the whole
of the electorate may be affected as well - with the exception only of the small part of the
electorate that turns their back to any and all of the political parties. Because the two-bloc
structure comprises all political parties from the moment they become established players at
the political stage, supporters of all of these parties are therefore likely to be affected by the
closeness of the election. Voters in Sweden are thus left with two choices. Either take the anti-
system emergency exit, and withdraw completely from the electoral system. As the high rates
of turnout show, this option is not taken up by many. The other option is to support one of the
parties in either of the two blocs. A choice that is widely made by voters in Sweden, and is
likely to make them responsive to the degree of closeness of the election. Figures 6-2 and
6-3 show us that the degree of this influence is heavily dependent on individual
characteristics, but the uniform direction of the influence of closeness suggests that whenever
it rains in Sweden, everyone gets wet.
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C o n c l u s i o n s  a n d  D i s c u s s i o n :
W h a t  A b o u t  t h e  R a i n ?
In this chapter the implications of the research presented in this bookwill be discussed . As
the concluding sections of the various chapters contain summaries of their findings, this
chapter will not reiterate these again. Rather, a set of more general concerns will be
addressed. The first section discusses whether it is always necessary to analyze contextual
effects at the individual level. The second section discusses who may be affected by
contextual characteristics, and the third and last section considers the conceptualization of
political context.
7 .1 Con tex t  and  I nd i v i dua l  -  A  C lo s e  Enough  Look?
The main subject of this dissertation is the influence of political context on the individual
voter. It is argued that the influence of contextual factors is not equal for all voters. Some
voters will be more affected by contextual factors than others. The extent to which voters are
affected by the political context is determined by their individual characteristics. These cause
some voters to remain virtually immune to the context of the election. In terms of the specific
dependent variable investigated here, electoral participation, such voters will either vote
regardless of what the election is about, while others will not vote at all, no matter what
electoral circumstances. These certain voters or certain non-voters are beyond the influence
of contextual factors.
However, there is also a segment of the electorate that is affected by the context of the
election. For this part of the electorate, the probability of participation in an election is
influenced by the particular circumstances of the election. Chapters 5 and 6 showed that
specific parts of the electorate in Great Britain and Sweden, termed "Convinced" voters, are
more likely to participate in an election if their favored party might just about win the
election. In close elections, where the leading parties are in a neck and neck race, supporters
of each of these leading parties show a greater probability to vote than in elections where the
race is not as close. These Convinced voters see their probability to vote affected by a
contextual characteristic, i.e. the closeness of the election.
The analyses of Chapters 5 and 6 also showed that not all people are equally strongly
affected by the closeness of the election. For people who do not support any of the parties in
the lead, the so-called "Condemned" voters, it made little difference whether the election was
close or not. Their willingness to participate was not affected a great deal. They were not
completely unaffected: an overall tendency of increased electoral participation was
established for close elections, affecting this group of Condemned voters as well. But the
degree to which this segment of the electorate was influenced by the closeness of the election
fell far behind the effects noted for Convinced voters. 
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We may therefore conclude that the central argument of this book is upheld. Voters are
indeed influenced by contextual characteristics, by factors connected to the election as such.
And the degree to which they are affected by these factors is determined by their individual
characteristics. In the examples examined in this book, it was shown that an individuals party
affiliation and party support influence whether or not they are affected by the closeness of the
election, and if so, to what degree1.
Having established that contextual characteristics do indeed affect individual voters,
and to different degrees, this inevitably begs the question: does it make a difference? Do we
improve our understanding of the processes that determine electoral participation if we take
the electoral context into account? The answer to this depends on how we wish to determine
what constitutes an improvement.
The standard approach to determine whether an alternative analytical model is an
improvement over the existing model is to look at the amount of variance explained by the
new and improved model, usually summarized by some kind of model fit-statistics, such as,
an R-square estimate. For this measure, bigger is better, so a new and more complex model
should be justified by a substantial increase in variance explained. Rated by this standard, the
Individual-Context model proposed in this book is something of a disappointment. The
variance explained was certainly higher for this model than it was for the simpler and more
traditional models in the analyses presented in Chapters 5 and 6. The R-square estimate
increased - but not by a substantial amount. However, we did see substantial improvement on
another count.
Section 2.5 of Chapter 2 presented predictions of turnout levels based on the competing
models. One model contained information on individual voters only, while the alternative
model contained information on individual voters combined with contextual level
information of the elections. The two models were tested by determining how well they could
reproduce the actual turnout levels of the elections analyzed. The results were presented in
Table 2-4 and Figure 2-1. These results showed that the Context & Individual model
performed substantially better in predicting turnout rates than the traditional model. In all
but one election, the Context & Individual model outperformed the traditional model by
predicting turnout rates that were considerably closer to the actual election turnout rates. In
other words, the new model appeared to add little to variance explained at the individual
level, but for predicting aggregate levels of turnout the Context & Individual model is a
definite improvement. It is therefore better able to shed light on turnout variations from one
election to another, a notoriously weak point of more traditional models that only consider
information from individual voters.
The benefit of combining individual and contextual information in a single model is
thus established. But is it always necessary to go into such a detailed analysis as presented in
Chapters 5 and 6 to answer questions on political context? In these two chapters, not only was
contextual information added to the model, but the influence of this contextual information
was also expected to vary at the individual level in a model dubbed the Individual-Context
model. The turnout predictions for Swedish elections in Section 6.5 of the previous chapter
120
1 That is, for Great Britain and Sweden. For the Netherlands, the influence of closeness proved not to be statistically
significant or even run counter to expectations (cf. Table 2-3). We must keep in mind, however, that the analyses
presented in Chapter Two paid only limited attention to potential individual level variation in the effect of closeness. 
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showed that the Individual-Context model improved our accuracy in predicting turnout.
Turnout predictions for the British elections presented in Section 5.4 of Chapter 5, however,
did not show such an unequivocal improvement. Is the level of detail of the Individual-
Context model always required to establish whether a contextual factor will influence
electoral participation in country A or Country B, in Election X or Election Y? The answer
depends on the specific aims of the analyst, as well as on the characteristics of the electorate.
Chapter 4 showed that the closeness of the election has an effect on turnout rates in
several countries, among which Great Britain and Sweden. In principle, this suffices if all we
desire is to answer the question whether closeness has an effect on turnout in Britain or
Sweden: it does. If we ask the same question for the Dutch electorate, or for Germany with
regards to supporters of the small FDP or Grünen party, the answer - based on the analysis of
Chapter 4 - is negative. But, as Chapter 3 argued, the latter conclusion may be misleading.
Composition effects of the electorate may hinder our perception here.
Chapter 3 offered a theoretical examination of the influence of closeness at the
individual level. Four categories of voters were presented, three of which we dubbed
Convinced, Confounded and Condemned voters, next to a remaining Base category of voters.
These categories of voters react in different ways to the closeness of an election. The analyses
of Chapters 5 and 6 showed two clear findings. Convinced voters have a greater propensity
of voting in a close election, while Condemned voters do not react strongly to the closeness
of the race. The composition of the electorate determines how easily these individual level
effects can be detected at the aggregate level as well. If the segment of Convinced voters in
the electorate is sufficiently large, turnout levels will reflect the responsiveness of this
category of voters to the closeness of the election. If the segment of Convinced voters is not
so large, and Condemned voters make up a large part of the electorate, the closeness of the
election will only affect a small part of the electorate. Its small size may obstruct the detection
of this individual-level effect in the aggregate. In Germany, the race of small parties against
the five percent threshold that must be overcome to acquire parliamentary representation
affects only a small part of the electorate - not large enough to be discernable at the aggregate
level. In the multi-party system of the Netherlands, a substantial segment of the electorate
supports parties that are not in the lead. For these Condemned voters, the closeness of the
election is hardly relevant.
If all we want to know is whether the closeness of the election affects turnout in the
Netherlands, the aggregate level analyses of Chapter 4 suffice. If we want to know whether
the closeness of the election - or any other contextual factor - influences Dutch voters, we
need to dig deeper. For contextual factors that affect only part of the electorate, or for which
it is unclear how many voters are affected and in what way, an individual level analysis is
required. That analysis will have to combine contextual and individual level information in a
single model, and that model has to allow for individual level variation in the effect of the
contextual factor of interest.
Aggregate level analyses proved sufficient in determining whether closeness of the
election is of influence in Great Britain or Sweden. However, the individual level analyses of
Chapters 5 and 6 show that teh situation is somewhat more omplex than the picture portrayed
at the aggregate level. For Great Britain, Chapter 5 showed that some parts of the electorate,
the Convinced voters, are indeed affected to a considerable degree by the closeness of the
election. Other parts of the electorate, i.e., the Condemned voters, were at the same time
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hardly affected by this closeness. Aggregate level analysis is unable to detect such individual
level variation. For Sweden, the picture was comparable to that of Great Britain at the
aggregate level, but not at the individual level. Chapter 6 showed that the influence of the
closeness of the election varies little between different categories of voters in Sweden.
Virtually the entire electorate turned out to be affected by closeness to the same degree, in
contrast to British case. Again, only individual level analyses can determine this. The findings
of this dissertation demonstrate that whether a contextual factor - such as the closeness of the
election - has an influence that varies between voters is an empirical question that cannot be
answered by aggregate level analyses.
Whether we care about individual level variation or only about aggregate level effects
is not only contingent on our research question, but it also carries a normative component.
The way in which context has different consequences for the electoral participation of various
segments of a society has ramifications for the extent to which elections attain the democratic
ideal of political equality. Consider the example of weekday versus Sunday voting, discussed
in Section 3.2.2. There it was argued that some parts of the electorate may be more likely to
vote in elections on Sunday, while others, such as for instance devout Christians, may object
to Sunday voting and consequently participate in smaller numbers. If these two segments of
the electorate are of equal size, the contextual effect will balance out at the aggregate level,
and turnout, in quantitative terms, will be equal to weekday elections. In qualitative terms,
there is likely to be a substantial difference, however. If devout Christians tend to support
specific political parties, the outcome of an election held on Sundays is likely to differ from
weekday elections.
The norm of political equality is clearly violated if large inequalities exist in electoral
participation. Whether or not such equalities exist, and whether or not they are related to
contextual factors, cannot be determined by aggregate level analyses, and therefore requires
individual level analyses.
7.1.1 Exp la in ing Between-country  D i f fe rences
The argument of the previous section is also helpful in understanding the between-country
variation in turnout levels shown in Figure 1-2 of Chapter 1. The consequence of country
differences in contextual characteristics is that voters are confronted with different
circumstances, and therefore show different behavior, leading to on average higher turnout in
one country, and lower turnout in another. 
Figure 1-2 shows that, even though substantial variation in turnout exists between
elections within a single country, it may easily be surpassed in magnitude by between-country
differences. In this figure, turnout is structurally lowest in Great Britain. These differences
between countries should not be attributed to characteristics inherent to the people of each of
them. There is no reason to assume that the British are by nature less interested in politics, or
the Swedes are cognitively superior to the Dutch, and so forth. Rather, these differences are
the consequences of political and systemic circumstances - the electoral context - that are
different between Sweden, the Netherlands and Great Britain. For example, in Sweden we
saw that large segments of the electorate are affected by the closeness of the election, since
the two-bloc structure implies that all parties are part of the race. Large segments of the
electorate are therefore more motivated to participate when the race between the two blocs is
a close one. In the Netherlands, large segments of the electorate are not affected by the
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closeness of the election, since their favored party is not in the lead. However, because of the
proportional representation system in the Netherlands, these third parties still remain viable
government parties and attractive options to voters. In Great Britain the majority system
ensures that any voter who wants to vote for a potential government party sees his or her
choice limited to two parties at the national level. The British constituency system also
implies that such a voter might even be without a favored party option at the local level, since
the party of their choice might not run, or stand no chance of winning in the local
constituency. These are but a few examples of the differences in circumstances voters are
confronted with in different countries. 
The consequences of varying electoral contexts contribute to the explanation why in
some countries large segments of the electorate refrain from voting, while in other countries
virtually the whole of the electorate participates. British voters are not instinctively less
inclined to vote, but they cast their vote under circumstances that more often provide
disincentives to vote than is the case for Dutch or Swedish voters.
7 .2 Who  may  be  A f f e c t ed?  
In the opening section of this chapter, the argument from Chapters 5 and 6 was repeated (cf.
Figure 5-2 and 5-3 of Chapter 5, and Figure 6-2 and 6-3 of Chapter 6) that contextual
characteristics do not influence all voters, but only a particular segment of the electorate. This
segment consists of those voters whose participation in the election is not a certainty - we
may call it the occasional electorate. This occasional electorate participates in some
elections, but not in others. Whether these occasional voters participate in the particular
election at hand is determined by the characteristics of that election2. In other words, the
electoral participation of the occasional electorate is dependent upon the context of the
election.
To explain variation in turnout over different elections in a single country, we have to
look at the occasional electorate. By participating in greater numbers in one election while
failing to do so in another, it is this segment of the electorate that is mainly responsible for
changes in turnout3. These voters determine the ebb and flow of turnout rates. Habitual
voters, who participate in every election, do not cause variation in turnout. Neither do
abstainers, who never participate.
The size of the occasional segment of the electorate may of course vary over time. Such
variation is likely to be the result of changing political circumstances that modify voters
certainties or preferences. Compositional changes may also be the result of cohort
replacement, when the influx of young voters and the dying off of the old change the
proportions of the various electoral segments.
The composition of the electorate with regard to habitual voters, habitual abstainers and
occasional voters could offer us valuable insights into the turnout rates we may expect in a
given political system. The composition of the electorate may tell us what maximum and
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2 "Characteristics' here refer to the values of specific elections on variables that are used to describe elections. 
3 In addition to contextual characteristics affecting the occasional voters and hence turnout, one can also think of chance
as a process that determines whether or not any voter turns out to vote. This formulation leaves open the possibility to
regard 'chance' as the set of omitted relevant variables (cf. King, Keohane & Verba, Chapter 2). Hhowever, chance is, by
definition, not expected to influence turnout systematically.
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minimum levels of turnout may be attained. The degree of variation to be expected is
determined by the size of the occasional electorate compared to the size of the habitual voters
segment. A small occasional segment of the electorate can only create minor turnout
variations, while systems with a large occasional segment of the electorate may face far
greater turnout fluctuations.
From the considerations above it follows that it would be attractive for further
empirical research to have individual-level indicators for these segments. To a certain
extent, an indication of the size of the occasional electorate may be derived from observed
turnout rates and variation therein. But such derivations will most likely be very imprecise,
and can at best only be proxies for what is essentially an individual level characteristic: the
degree of certainty of a voters electoral participation. 
With such an instrument, the probability of electoral participation for all members of
the electorate could be measured. Ideally, such an indicator would be comparable between
systems and over time, so that it could contribute to comparative research on turnout and
electoral participation.
Through the use of such a measure, aggregate measures could be constructed to
describe political systems. The size of the occasional electorate might be calculated and
used as an explanatory variable in between-country or over-time comparative research. But
such a measure of the certainty of electoral participation would also be of interest at the
individual level. As a dependent variable, to determine what are the most important factors
determining electoral participation, or the intention to participate. But it could also be used
as a mediating variable in the sort of research that has been carried out in this book,
establishing the influence of contextual factors on individual behavior.
The development of indicators such as the certainty of electoral participation is a
matter of further research. Franklin (2003) suggests that we look at psychological lock-in
processes. According to his argument, choosing for a particular behavioral option, e.g.,
voting or non-voting, increases the chance of choosing that same option again at a future
occasion. After having chosen for the same option uninterruptedly in a series of successive
occasions, "lock-in" would occur, i.e., approaching certainty (chance=1) to choose that
same option again at future occasions. Lock-in would remove a person from the occasional
electorate to the ranks of the habitual voters, or the habitual non-voters. Obviously, new
voters entering the electorate will necessarily form part of the occasional electorate. But
older voters may be part of that segment as well.
Another option to establish an indicator for the certainty to vote is to look at past
electoral participation. When taking into account participation in first- as well as second-
order elections, a measure with sufficient predictive power may conceivably be achieved.
A drawback of such a retrospective measure is of course that it is likely to be less accurate
for younger voters, simply because their vote record is not as extensive as that of older
generations. And first time voters would have no record of voting at all. Moreover, memory
effects and social desirability could generate bias towards high certainty. Such deficiencies
in the measuring instrument could in part be amended by adding information from
additional individual characteristics such as education or political interest. But one can also
think of a newly developed scale, measuring a voters attitude towards electoral
participation, or a probability to vote question - measuring just that. 
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7 .3 Concep tua l i z i ng  Po l i t i c a l  Con tex t
This book has examined the influence of the political context on individual behavior, and
the interplay between individual and contextual level effects on electoral participation. It
was argued and demonstrated that an integration of contextual and individual level
information improves our understanding of individual level behavior. Although the
empirical analyses in this book focused on electoral participation, the argument is not
restricted to this domain. Many of the fundamental research questions in the social sciences
consider the behavior of individuals within their social context. To examine individual
behavior, we need to examine the context as well.
To examine the context, we need to know what we are talking about. That is less
trivial than it sounds. Often the outcome of an election is explained by referring to
particular events connected with the election. The candidates may be particularly dull, the
economy might be booming or a political party may have gone through an internal power
struggle. Ad hoc explanations are offered to account for the outcome of a particular
election. Such explanations are popular in the media, when a quick interpretation of
current affairs is needed. But even in electoral research such explanations are at times
offered, when for instance outcomes from single election analyses need to be brought in
agreement with existing knowledge. This is not the kind of contextual interpretation that
will bring us forward in our understanding of electoral behavior. Unique, ad hoc
explanations do not help us to arrive at an adequate characterization of elections. Only
when we are able to establish what makes a particular election unique in terms that are also
applicable to other elections, can we start to compare elections. By comparing elections in
terms of a set of concepts applied to all of them, we can address the question how much of
the variation in turnout may be attributed to what contextual characteristics of a particular
election.
What comparative electoral research thus needs are concepts and associated measures
that describe relevant aspects of the political context, in a way that allows us to compare
between elections. When using these contextual characteristics in individualized ways, as
illustrated in Chapters 5 and 6, we can determine why some elections see high turnout,
while some see a lower turnout.
A substantial number of contextual indicators is already available for research. Most
of these indicators describe system characteristics, such as type of electoral system, number
of political parties, degree of proportionality, day of the week elections are held and so
forth. These are characteristics that are typically very stable: they show little variation
within a political system. As a consequence, such indicators work quite well in explaining
between-system variations in turnout - e.g., why turnout is consistently higher in Sweden
than in Great Britain - but they are of little use in explaining why the Dutch election of
1981 saw a substantially higher turnout than the 1982 election. Indicators for contextual
characteristics that can explain these short-term turnout variations are in much shorter
supply. Not because the data is more difficult to come by, but rather because the theory
behind these indicators is largely non-existent. We often do not know very well what it is
that makes turnout high in one election and low in the next, if we refrain from ad hoc
explanations.
One of the characteristics that can help to explain short-term turnout fluctuations was
examined in this book. It was shown that the closeness of the election can help us explain
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why voters participate in some elections, and not in others, and hence why certain elections
see higher turnout rates than others. To do so, the concept of the closeness of an election
was extended beyond the typical two-party race. It was shown that the concept of closeness
can be applied to two-party, but also to multi-party, systems and that the race may be
between two parties, two blocs of parties, a number of parties versus one party, or even a
single party against an electoral or self-imposed threshold. This extension of the concept of
closeness also showed that this characteristic is applicable to more than just a single
country, and that it can in fact be used in comparative research. The comparability of the
measure between countries required some attention, but did not prove to be impossible.
Comparative electoral research has provided a few other suggestions of contextual
characteristics that may exert short-term influences on turnout. A number of these were
referred to in Chapter 2. The time since a previous election, the premature collapse of a
government coalition or pre-election coalition agreements were three contextual
characteristics that were examined for the Netherlands, in addition to the closeness of the
election. Other contextual explanations have been suggested in the literature. The concept of
first and second order national elections has been used to described elections that are of
importance or of less importance to the general electorate. It was developed to explain the
low turnout rates witnessed for European Parliament elections in countries that were
accustomed to substantially higher turnout rates in national Parliamentary elections, but the
concept is equally well applicable to other settings. Congressional elections in the USA see
considerable variation in turnout between years when the elections are held in concurrence
with Presidential elections, and off-years, when they are not. 
The contextual characteristics mentioned here are examples of contextual characteristics
that have proved informative in explaining between-election turnout variation. These
constitute, however, a rather small set. In the metaphor of this research, all kinds of
precipitation can be distinguished, according to temperature, volume, duration and physical
appearance. What we refer to as hail, snow, sleet or rain can be distinguished in degrees of
volume (from torrential rain to drizzle), duration, temperature and additional factors such as
wind-velocity. Depending on all these characteristics, different individual reactions will vary
in their efficiency to keep us dry. In much the same way, we need to be able to characterize
the (short-term) political, social and economic contexts that characterize elections, and that
affect us in varying degrees - depending on individual characteristics.
A first step may be formed by taking stock of all the ad hoc explanations of turnout
offered by the media, politicians and political scientist after any election, and attempting to
operationally define these into characteristics that can be applied to every election. These,
then, may form the inspiration for further research into the influence of contextual
characteristics on individual voters and electoral outcomes, such as turnout.
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The appendix contains technical details on the variables and datasets used, as well as
additional tables referred to in the text.
Va r i ab l e s  and  Da t a
The Nether lands
The analyses of Chapter 2 are based on data gathered for the Dutch Parliamentary Election
Studies (DPES, referred to in Dutch as NKO). The DPES are an enterprise of the Dutch
political science community united in Dutch Electoral research foundation SKON (before
1989: NKO). Data is archived at the NIWI/Steinmetz Archive in Amsterdam, the
Netherlands. In the table below, Study ID numbers refer to the Steinmetz Archive. All
election studies are titled Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (followed by year of
election).
Table 1 The Netherlands - DPES Studies Overview
The variables employed in the analyses of Chapter 2 are defined as follows.
Age 
Age in years
Female:
Coded zero for men, 1 for women
Class
Based on EGP-index (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992). If not available from original
DPES dataset, based on Nieuwbeerta & Ganzenboom, (1996).
Education 
Two dummy indicators distinguish primary, secondary and tertiary level education.
Year Principle Investigators Steinmetz Archive ID
1972 NKO: L.P.J. de Bruyn, J.W. Foppen P0353 
1977 NKO: G.A. Irwin, J. Verhoef, C.J. Wiebrens P0354 
1981 NKO: C. van der Eijk, B. Niemöller, A. Th. J. Eggen P0350 
1982 NKO: C. van der Eijk, M.J. Koopman, B. Niemöller P0633A 
1986 NKO: C. van der Eijk, G.A. Irwin, B. Niemöller P0866 
1989 SKON: H. Anker, E.V. Oppenhuis P1000 
1994 SKON: H. Anker, E.V. Oppenhuis P1208 
1998 SKON: K. Aarts, H. van der Kolk, M. Kamp P1415 
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Base category is primary education. Dummy indicators are contrast coded:· Secondary level dummy-indicator signifies education at least secondary level(scored positive for respondents with secondary and tertiary level education)· Tertiary level dummy-indicator scored positive for tertiary level educationParameter estimates for the dummy indicators indicate the influence of an additional
level of education (e.g., secondary vs. primary, tertiary vs. secondary). To assess the
influence of tertiary level education compared to primary level education, the
parameters estimates for secondary and tertiary level education need to be added up.
Respondents for which no information on educational level was ascertained were
added to the base (primary) category, while an additional dummy variable was coded
positive for this group (zero for respondents for which the educational level was
ascertained).
Lowest Income Quartile
Coded positive for respondents with household income within lowest quartile
(determined per sample), zero for all other respondents. 
Respondents for which no income was ascertained were coded zero (base category),
while an additional dummy variable was coded positive for this group (zero for
respondents for which income was ascertained).
Religion 
Four dummy-variables indicating Catholic, Dutch Reformed, Calvinist and other
religions. Scored positive where applicable, zero if not applicable. Base category is
not religious.
Church attendance: 
Dummy-indicators signifying church attendance on weekly or monthly basis. Scored
positive where applicable, zero if not applicable
Union member
Scored positive if labor union member, zero for all other respondents.
Party attachment
Coded positive if respondent expressed a preference for a political party.
Political interest
Five-point, additive index-score, based on Mokken-scales of four separate items.
(Anker & Oppenhuis, 1995, pp. 323-330).
Political efficacy
Five-point, additive index-score, based on Mokken-scales of four separate items.
(Anker & Oppenhuis, 1995, pp. 323-330).
Government collapse
Coded positive if election followed after the collapse of the government coalition, zero
for all other elections.
Time since previous election
Time since previous parliamentary election in years, divided by 4. Four years is the
normal Parliamentary term in the Netherlands.
Coalition seeks re-election
Coded positive if incumbent coalition made an expressed wish to continue after the
election, zero for all other elections.
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Closeness of the election
Defined as 1 divided by the gap between the two largest parties in last NIPO opinion
poll before the election.
Great  Br i ta in
Data used for the analyses of Chapter 5 are from the British Election Studies (BES, also
referred to as British General Election Studies BGES).
Table 2 Great Britain - BES Studies Overview
The variables employed in the analyses of Chapter 5 are defined as follows.
Age 
Age in years
Female:
Coded zero for men, 1 for women
Education
Predicted value (Y-hat) of electoral participation in OLS regression model with
education indicators as predictive variables (cf. note 12, Chapter 5). 
All available education indicators per BES survey were turned into dummy-variables
and entered as independent variables in the OLS regression model.
Political interest
Predicted value (Y-hat) of electoral participation in OLS regression model with
political indicators as predictive variables (cf. operationalization of Educaton, above). 
"Dont know" and "no answer" codes on political interest indicator questions were
recoded to the lowest political interest score on the variable concerned, before
introduction into the OLS regression model.
Income
Standardized respondents household income. Transformed by taking the natural log
of the respondents income after dividing by the mean survey income. An exception is
the 1983 survey for which only a subjective perceived distance to average income is
ascertained, (far below average income, below, average, above, far above average
Year Principle Investigators Data ID
1970  D. Butler, D.E. Stokes ICPSR 7250 
1974 Feb I. Crewe, B. Särlvik, J. Alt ICPSR 7868 
1974 Oct I. Crewe, B. Särlvik, J. Alt ICPSR 7870 
1979  I. Crewe, B. Särlvik, D. Robertson ICPSR 8196 
1983  A. Heath, R. Jowell, J.K. Curtice, E. Field ICPSR 8409 
1987  A. Heath, R. Jowell, J.K. Curtice ESRC 2568 
1992  A. Heath, R. Jowell, J.K. Curtice, J. A. Brand, J.C. Mitchell ESRC 2981 
1997  A. Heath, R. Jowell, J.K. Curtice, P. Norris ESRC 3887 
ICPSR=Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor (Mi) USA 
ESRC= ESRC Data Archive, University of Essex, Colchester (UK)
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income). The variable was recoded from 1 to 6, respectively, before transformation as
noted above. Respondents for which no income information was ascertained were
coded as having a mean income. A separate dummy-indicator was coded positive if no
income was ascertained, zero for all respondents for which income was ascertained.
Voter categories.
These are based on party evaluation scores, with dummy variables being constructed
to indicate the three categories of voters. For the national level, the two largest parties
are invariably Labour and the Conservatives. For the constituency level, the actual
election outcome in the constituency was used to determine the two largest parties. 
The Base category is the complement of the other three categories defined.
Operationalization for the different surveys are as follows.
1970
Party evaluation score, 0-100 scale.
Convinced voter
Coded positive if evaluation score is 80 or greater for one leading party, and equal or
smaller than 50 for other leading party. 
Confounded voter
Coded positive if evaluation score is 80 or greater for both leading parties.
Condemned voter
Coded positive if evaluation score is 50 or lower for both leading parties.
1974 February, 1974 October, 1979, 1997
Party evaluation score, 0-10 scale.
Convinced voter
Coded positive if evaluation score is 8 or greater for one leading party, and equals or
smaller than 5 for other leading party. 
Confounded voter
Coded positive if evaluation score is 8 or greater for both leading parties.
Condemned voter
Coded positive if evaluation score is 5 or lower for both leading parties.
1983
No party evaluation score for all parties was included. Therefore, indicators were
constructed using strength and direction of (positive and negative) party identification.
Convinced voter
Coded positive if respondent expressed strength of party identification as fairly
strong or very strong for one leading party, and very strongly against the other
leading party. 
Confounded voter
Coded positive if respondent expressed strength of party identification fairly strong
or very strong for one leading party, and not really against other leading party.
Condemned voter
Coded positive if very strongly against both leading parties.
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1987, 1992
Party evaluation score, five-point scale (strongly in favor, in favor, neither in favor or
against, against, strongly against).
Convinced voter
Coded positive if strongly in favor of one leading party, and against or strongly against
other leading party. 
Confounded voter
Coded positive if strongly in favor of both leading parties.
Condemned voter
Coded positive if against or strongly against both leading parties. 
Closeness
Defined as 1 divided by the gap between the largest parties. Opinion poll data used for
the national level, actual constituency outcomes at the constituency level. 
Sweden
Data used for the analyses of Chapter 6 are from the Swedish election studies. All data
identification refers to the Swedish Social Science Data Service (SSD) in Göteborg, Sweden
Table 3 Sweden - Swedish Election Studies Overview
The variables employed in the analyses of Chapter 6 are defined as follows.
Age 
Age in years
Female
Coded zero for men, 1 for women
Education
Comparable to analyses of Chapter 2. Two dummy indicators distinguish primary,
secondary and tertiary level education. Base category is primary education. Dummy
indicators are contrast coded:· Secondary level dummy-indicator signifies education at least secondary level(scored positive for respondents with secondary and tertiary level education)· Tertiary level dummy-indicator scored positive for tertiary level educationParameter estimates for the dummy indicators indicate the influence of an additional
Year Principle Investigators SSD Data ID 
1979 S. Holmberg 0089 
1982 S. Holmberg 0157 
1985 S. Holmberg, M. Gilljam 0217 
1988 S. Holmberg, M. Gilljam 0227 
1991 S. Holmberg, M. Gilljam 0391 
1994 S. Holmberg, M. Gilljam 0570 
1998 S. Holmberg 0750 
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level of education (e.g., secondary vs. primary, tertiary vs. secondary). To assess the
influence of tertiary level education compared to primary level education, the
parameters estimates for secondary and tertiary level education need to be added up.
Income
Comparable to analyses of Chapter 5. Standardized respondents household income.
Transformed by taking the natural log of the respondents income after dividing by the
mean survey income. 
Political interest
Six-point Mokken scale constructed using two four-point items: reading political news
in the papers, and self-declared political interest. Missing values were recoded to the
lowest score per item for political interest.
Political cynicism
Six-point Mokken scale constructed using two four-point items: whether the
respondent believed parties are only concerned about peoples votes, not what they
think, and whether members of parliament pay attention to the views of ordinary
people. Missing values were recoded to the middle score per item.
Party attachment
Coded positive if respondent considered themselves close to a political party, zero if
not.
Voter categories
Based on an eleven-point party evaluation scores (-5 to +5), dummy variables
indicating the three categories of voters were constructed. 
Base category is complement of three categories distinguished. 
Convinced voter
Coded positive if evaluation score is 4 or 5 for at least one of the parties of one bloc,
and minus 3 to minus 5 for at least one of the parties from the other bloc. 
Confounded voter
Coded positive if evaluation score is 4 or 5 for at least one of the parties of either bloc. 
Condemned voter
Coded positive if evaluation score is no higher than zero for any of the parties in either
bloc.
Closeness
Defined as 1 divided by the gap between the largest parties, opinion poll data used.
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Tab l e s
Table 4 Great Britain - Closeness at Constituency Level Per Election. Figures are Percentages of
Respondents per Sample
Election Gap % Respondents Cumulative % 
1970 <1 % 4.5 4.5 
 1 - 2 % 1.3 5.8 
 2 - 3 % 2.5 8.3 
 3 - 4 % 5.6 13.9 
 
4 - 5 % 
5 - 6 % 
5.0 
0.0 
18.9 
18.9 
 6 - 7 % 3.0 21.9 
 7 - 8 % 4.6 26.5 
 
8 - 9 % 
9 – 10 % 
3.8 
0.0 
30.3 
30.3 
 >10 % 69.7 100.0 
 Total 100.0  
    
1974Feb <1 % 3.3 3.3 
 1 - 2 % 1.4 4.7 
 2 - 3 % 3.3 8.0 
 3 - 4 % 2.1 10.1 
 4 - 5 % 3.8 13.9 
 5 - 6 % 5.5 19.4 
 6 - 7 % 3.5 22.9 
 7 - 8 % 4.3 27.2 
 8 - 9 % 3.1 30.3 
 9 - 10 % 3.1 33.4 
 >10 % 66.6 100.0 
 Total 100.0  
    
1974Oct <1 % 1.7 1.7 
 1 - 2 % 4.1 5.8 
 2 - 3 % 2.4 8.2 
 3 - 4 % 3.0 11.2 
 4 - 5 % 1.5 12.7 
 5 - 6 % 2.5 15.2 
 6 - 7 % 2.4 17.6 
 7 - 8 % 1.4 19.0 
 8 - 9 % .9 19.9 
 9 - 10 % .7 20.6 
 >10 % 79.4 100.0 
 Total 100.0  
    
1979 <1 % 1.9 1.9 
 1 - 2 % 3.7 5.6 
 2 - 3 % 2.5 8.1 
 3 - 4 % 1.5 9.5 
 4 - 5 % 2.1 11.6 
 5 - 6 % .2 11.7 
 6 - 7 % .6 12.3 
 7 - 8 % 3.1 15.4 
 8 - 9 % 1.6 17.1 
 9 - 10 % 3.1 20.2 
 >10 % 79.8 100.0 
Total 100.0
Election Gap % Respondents Cumulative % 
1983 <1 % 1.9 1.9 
 1 - 2 % 0.9 2.8 
 2 - 3 % 2.5 5.3 
 3 - 4 % 3.4 8.7 
 4 - 5 % 3.6 12.3 
 5 - 6 % 3.3 15.6 
 6 - 7 % 2.9 18.4 
 7 - 8 % 1.1 19.5 
 8 - 9 % 2.0 21.5 
 9 - 10 % 2.0 23.5 
 >10 % 76.5 100.0 
 Total 100.0  
    
1987 <1 % 1.6 1.6 
 1 - 2 % 1.4 3.0 
 2 - 3 % 3.2 6.2 
 3 - 4 % 2.6 8.7 
 4 - 5 % 1.6 10.3 
 5 - 6 % 2.1 12.4 
 6 - 7 % 1.6 13.9 
 7 - 8 % 2.8 16.7 
 8 - 9 % 3.5 20.2 
 9 - 10 % 1.9 22.1 
 >10 % 77.9 100.0 
 Total 100.0  
   
1992 <1 % 4.4 4.4 
 1 - 2 % 2.9 7.3 
 2 - 3 % 1.9 9.2 
 3 - 4 % 3.9 13.1 
 4 - 5 % 1.3 14.4 
 5 - 6 % 2.8 17.2 
 6 - 7 % 2.9 20.2 
 7 - 8 % 2.8 22.9 
 8 - 9 % 4.7 27.7 
 9 - 10 % 3.2 30.9 
 >10 % 69.1 100.0 
 Total 100.0  
    
1997 <1 % 0.5 .5 
 1 - 2 % 1.1 1.6 
 2 - 3 % 2.7 4.2 
 3 - 4 % 4.8 9.1 
 4 - 5 % 1.5 10.6 
 5 - 6 % 3.0 13.6 
 6 - 7 % 5.8 19.4 
 7 - 8 % 1.3 20.7 
 8 - 9 % 0.8 21.6 
 9 - 10 % 4.1 25.7 
 >10 % 74.3 100.0 
Total 100.0
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Table 5 Great Britain - National/Constituency Level Interactions
National level: Convinced Convinced 
Constituency level: Convinced Condemned 
 B s.e. B s.e. 
Age 0.013 0.001 0.013 0.001 
Female 0.193 0.040 0.193 0.040 
Education 0.074 0.008 0.074 0.008 
Political interest 0.230 0.008 0.231 0.008 
Income 0.261 0.029 0.262 0.029 
Income missing–dummy -0.110 0.061 -0.111 0.061 
Constituency level:     
Closeness  0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 
Convinced voter 0.358 0.104 0.162 0.071 
Convinced*Closeness Interaction 0.371 0.320 0.231 0.180 
Confounded voter 0.149 0.156 0.152 0.155 
Confounded*Closeness Interaction -0.108 0.484 -0.124 0.484 
Condemned voter -0.153 0.082 -0.216 0.094 
Condemned*Closeness Interaction 0.029 0.085 0.020 0.059 
National level:     
Closeness  0.179 0.038 0.191 0.038 
Convinced voter 0.459 0.080 0.262 0.070 
Convinced*Closeness Interaction 0.153 0.128 0.282 0.107 
Confounded voter -0.116 0.180 -0.099 0.181 
Confounded*Closeness Interaction 0.392 0.856 0.506 0.873 
Condemned voter -0.422 0.119 -0.385 0.122 
Condemned*Closeness Interaction 0.153 0.160 0.152 0.160 
Interaction: National Convinced * Constituency Convinced voters: 
Interaction effect -0.490 0.151   
Interaction * Constituency closeness 0.230 0.201   
Interaction * National closeness  -0.274 0.395   
Interaction: National Convinced  * Constituency Condemned voters: 
Interaction effect   0.152 0.160 
Interaction * Constituency closeness   0.389 0.234 
Interaction * National closeness    1.301 1.278 
Constant -0.550 0.070 -0.544 0.070 
Variation level 3 (constituency) 0.051 0.019 0.051 0.019 
Variation level 2 (election) 0.059 0.028 0.059 0.028 
     
Likelihood 11703  11717  
R2dicho  .189  .189 
Standard errors in italics. Bold figures indicate statistical significance at p < .05. 
Actual election outcomes used for constituency level closeness, opinion poll data used 
for national level closeness. 
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Table 6 Great Britain - Prediction Model
‘Prediction model ‘Individual context’
s.e. B s.e.
Age 0.013 0.001 0.013 0.001 
Female 0.190 0.040 0.197 0.040 
Education 0.075 0.008 0.074 0.008 
Political interest 0.232 0.008 0.232 0.008 
Income 0.249 0.029 0.260 0.030 
Income missing – dummy - - -0.112 0.061 
National level:     
Closeness  0.219 0.037 0.212 0.038 
Convinced voter 0.387 0.059 0.385 0.059 
Convinced Interaction 0.211 0.103 0.220 0.104 
Confounded voter - - -0.054 0.183 
Confounded Interaction - - 0.741 0.889 
Condemned voter -0.439 0.095 -0.495 0.112 
Condemned Interaction - - 0.159 0.160 
     
Constant -0.558 0.070 -0.544 0.071 
Variation constituency level 0.056 0.020 0.055 0.020 
Variation election level 0.064 0.028 0.064 0.028 
     
Likelihood 11236  11229  
R
2
dicho  .188  .188 
Standard errors in italics. Bold figures indicate statistical significance at p < .05. 
Prediction model is re-estimation of model containing statistically significant parameter 
estimates only.  
Opinion poll data used for national level closeness.  
B
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Table 7 Sweden - Prediction Model
‘Prediction model’ ‘Individual context’
B s.e. B s.e.
Age 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.002 
Female 0.324 0.065 0.346 0.065 
Education     
Middle vs. Lower 0.287 0.080 0.284 0.080 
High vs. Middle 0.332 0.091 0.345 0.091 
Income 0.233 0.029 0.230 0.029 
Politi cal Interest 0.256 0.025 0.279 0.025 
Political Cynicism -0.082 0.023 -0.088 0.023 
Party Attachment 0.665 0.074 0.720 0.074 
     
Closeness 0.610 0.207 0.431 0.189 
Convinced voters 0.330 0.081 0.279 0.119 
Convinced Interaction    0.124 0.126 
Confounded voters   -0.129 0.202 
Confounded Interaction   0.481 0.418 
Condemned voters -0.662 0.074 -0.359 0.106 
Condemned Interaction   0.160 0.102 
     
Constant 1.123 0.188 1.091 0.197 
Variation level 2 (election) 0.022 0.016 0.011 0.010 
     
Likelihood -4120  -3953  
R
2
dicho  .205  .209 
Standard errors in italics. Bold figures indicate statistical significance at p < .05. 
Prediction model is re-estimation of model containing statistically significant parameter 
estimates only.  
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Dit boek gaat over de invloed van de context op het individu. Meer specifiek handelt dit boek
over de invloed van de electorale context op het wel of niet gaan stemmen bij verkiezingen.
Hoofdstuk Een maakt duidelijk waarom dit onderwerp van belang is: individuele kenmerken
bepalen weliswaar voor een groot gedeelte of iemand wel of niet regelmatig stemt, maar het
merendeel van deze individuele kenmerken is zeer stabiel, en kan  daarom niet verklaren
waarom de opkomst bij de ene verkiezing hoger is dan de andere. Contextuele kenmerken,
kenmerken die de verkiezing beschrijven, kunnen deze variaties in verkiezingsopkomst wel
verklaren.
Hoofdstuk Twee onderzoekt de invloed van contextuele kenmerken op individuele
kiezers bij Tweede Kamerverkiezingen in Nederland. Naast de gebruikelijke individuele
kenmerken die helpen verklaren of iemand zal gaan stemmen bij Tweede Kamer
verkiezingen, is ook een viertal contextuele factoren in het verklaringsmodel opgenomen.
Deze kenmerken van verkiezingen zijn: of de verkiezingen volgen op een val van het kabinet;
hoe snel twee verkiezingen elkaar opvolgen; of de bestaande coalitie na de verkiezingen wil
doorregeren; en of de verkiezingen een nek-aan-nek race te zien geven. Deze factoren blijken
inderdaad van invloed te zijn op de opkomstbereidheid van Nederlandse kiezers. Dit model
met individuele en context kenmerken kan tevens beter voorpellen of verkiezingen een hoge
of lage opkomst zullen kennen.
In Hoofdstuk Twee wordt tevens een eerste aanzet gegeven tot het 'individualiseren' van
de context. Met behulp van interactie effecten wordt individuele variatie in de invloed van
contextuele effecten gemodelleerd. Dit wordt verder uitgewerkt in Hoofdstuk Drie, en vormt
de rode draad van deze dissertatie: het effect van verkiezingskenmerken is niet uniform, maar
verschilt voor verschillende groepen kiezers.
Hoofdstuk Drie geeft allereerst een overzicht hoe electorale participatie op individueel
en contextueel niveau geanalyseerd kan worden, en laat zien dat het niet voldoende is om het
individuele en het contextuele niveau simpelweg samen te voegen in een verklarend model.
Voor een juiste weergave van de invloed van contextuele kenmerken op individuele kiezers
is een meer geavanceerde benadering nodig, waarin de invloed van de context varieert op
individueel niveau. Deze benadering wordt vervolgens theoretisch uitgewerkt voor drie
contextuele kenmerken: of verkiezingen op een zondag of een weekdag gehouden worden; of
verschillende verkiezingen op dezelfde dag gehouden worden, en of de verkiezingen een nek-
aan-nek race te zien geven. De invloed van een nek-aan-nek race op het wel of niet gaan
stemmen biedt de beste mogelijkheid tot een empirische toetsing van het model, hetgeen in
de hoofdstukken Vier, Vijf en Zes wordt uitgewerkt. Daarbij wordt gebruikt gemaakt van een
typologie van kiezers die aangeeft welke kiezers wel, en welke zeer waarschijnlijk niet
beïnvloed worden door een nek-aan-nek race.
Hoofdstuk Vier analyseert de invloed van een nek-aan-nek race op geaggregeerd niveau,
voor verschillende politieke systemen. Tevens wordt het onderscheid tussen opiniepeilingen
of verkiezingsuitslagen als indicator voor een nek-aan-nek race behandeld. Hoofdstuk Vier
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laat zien dat een verkiezingsrace op verschillende manieren geoperationaliseerd kan worden,
afhankelijk van de structuur van het partij-politieke landschap. De resultaten geven aan dat
voor verschillende landen de invloed van een nek-aan-nek race op opkomst duidelijk
waarneembaar is.
Nu vastgesteld is dat een nek-aan-nek race de verkiezingsopkomst beïnvloedt, is een
volgende stap mogelijk. In Hoofdstuk Vijf en Hoofdstuk Zes wordt de invloed van een nek-
aan-nek race op individuele kiezers in Groot-Brittannië en Zweden geanalyseerd. Hoofdstuk
Vier liet zien dat in deze landen de invloed van een nek-aan-nek race op opkomst
waarneembaar is. De vraag die beantwoord wordt in Hoofdstuk Vijf en Zes is: wordt iedere
kiezer in gelijke mate beïnvloedt door de verkiezingsrace? Hoofdstuk Vijf laat zien dat in
Groot-Brittannië aanzienlijke verschillen zijn waar te nemen tussen kiezers. De verschillende
typen kiezers, geïntroduceerd in Hoofdstuk Drie, blijken inderdaad verschillend te reageren
op de verkiezingsrace. Hoofdstuk Zes laat zien dat dit in Zweden niet het geval is: de invloed
van een spannende verkiezingsrace is in Zweden nagenoeg gelijk voor alle kiezers.
Het concluderende Hoofdstuk Zeven beschouwt de bevindingen uit de voorgaande
hoofdstukken. Er wordt een discussie gevoerd over de noodzakelijkheid van de analyse van
contextuele invloeden op individueel niveau. Tevens worden aanzetten gegeven tot een
verdere bestudering van de politieke context.
144
binnenwerk.qxd  14-May-03  8:58  Page 144
I CS  D i s s e r t a t i on  Se r i e s
The ICS series presents dissertations of the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and
Methodology. Each of these studies aims at integrating explicit theory formation with state of the art
empirical research or at the development of advanced methods for empirical research. The ICS was
founded in 1986 as a cooperative effort of the universities of Groningen and Utrecht. Since 1992, the
ICS expanded to the University of Nijmegen. Most of the projects are financed by the participating
universities or by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). The international
composition of the ICS graduate students is mirrored in the increasing international orientation of the
projects and thus of the ICS series itself.
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